FIRST MEETING OF THE IG/CM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102720009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2007
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 27, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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a
SECRET,
interagency Cairo /Counters essurss I - 20201/ 82
W&W01 D.C. Noeo.
2 ? AUG
MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS AND INVITEES, IN1'ERkGENC'Y GROUP/ -
000NTERMEASURBS --- - -
SUBJECT: FirIt Meeting of the, IG/ I
The first meeting of the IG/CM is scheduled for Friday,
September 10, 1982, at 1000 hours.- The meeting will be--held at 1724 F Street, Northwest,-in the sixth floor conference
room. For those who may hot have-received a copy of SIG-1 -.
Directive No. 1, establishing .this roup_,. a_ copy is_ appended.
list of resource enhancements called for by SIG-I Directive-
No. 1 pending our initial meeting. Efforts on the part of
may overlap or effect matters under consideration by the -
IG/CI, as well, they will be coordinated with the Chairman-
of that IG, as appropriate. Actual meetings will be held to
the minimum necessary.
A tentative list of'such initiatives, keyed to specific
recommendations in the NSSD-2 report, is attached. I would
like to have some di scussinn=.n_t e-se, as v.e1 i ?c-4? my
intended approach to our wo-YR tic, r--?nt"tial meeting.
------'
I deliberately decided not to include here the prioritized
the DCI, that this group play an active and useful role in
reviewing and developing national policy, where needed, to
improve the manner in which the United States counters and
protects against the hostile intelligence threat. I intend
to accomplish this by instituting a series of initiatives,
to be tasked to individual members of the IG/CM. It will be
the responsibility of t-"se so designated to have appropriate
persons in.their department or agency organize and develop -~
an executive branch response to the particular tasking at ---
hand within the time frames suggested. This may entail
establishing ad hoc working groups; written inquiries to
affected agencies; cooYJinating with, or tasking, other
interagency committees; or any other means appropriate to
the circumstances. Once a position has been formulated by
the responsible member agency, it will be forwarded to me as
Chairman, and I will circulate it to the other members of
the IG/Ci for review and concurrence, prior to recommending
approval by the SIG-I itself. Recognizing such recommendations
..The purpose of the meeting. will bx_to_d13suas_..he .nrgaaization_~.....
and agenda of the IG/CM. It is fey intention, and that of
my staff to develop such a list fo"t purposes of this meeting
have not proved productive.? It is apparent a clearer idea
of the role the IG/CM can and should play in identifying and
facilitating needed resource enhancements throughout the =-
execu*ivf- }ranch is needed before undertaking specific -
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1' look forward to our me'-ting and making this a productive
effort.
RicharI
`f e11
General, USA
Deputy
(Ret.)
Attachment 1
a/s
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LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY INITIATIVES
SECRET
LEGISLATIVE
1. (U) Legislative relief-from FOIA to exempt technical
data, subject to export control, from its purview (page -
53) ." -
a. Alternative 1.. Administration-approved amendaent
this an additional exemption.
kin
_
g
to FOIA, ma
Action recommended: Justice' to ascertain status
of amendment, determine best method of ---
achieving. In consultation with Defense, State;
and Commerce. Report in one month.
b. Alternative 2. Introduce bill authorizing
Secretary of Defense to withhold such information
from public. Becomes withholding -
statute under FOIA. Action recommended: DOD bas
-drafted such a bill. Needs to expedite internal
processing and vet OMB clearance. Needs to work
with Armed Services Committees in finding the
appropriate legislative vehicle. za
2. (U) The FY83 Authorization bill for the Department of
State gives the Secretary of State authority over real
estate-ac. Wisitions -by certain foreign, governments (page
49). The bill has passed the Congress sad. beew- sigaad--by
the President. Recommended actions: State to advise liow
authority will be implemented and expected impact on development
of U.S. countermeasures. Report in one month.
he made in two months.
3. (U) New Criminal Statute- onLeaks' a 59). The .
recommendation of the Attorney General Working Group on
"leaks" that a new criminal statute be drafted and proposed
by the Administration making-it a crime for government
employees to knowingly and willfully disclose classified sr
information-without proper authority ought to be pursued. -
Recommended action: Justice should be tasked with drafting.
alegislative proposal, and sponsoring -it through the OMB -_- ---
clearance process. While no action could be expected in this
Congress, it could provide an -opportunity to assess-?-reaetitnr?----
to it. Progress report in one month. --
4. (S) Analysis of Legal Restrictions on COMSEC Monitoring
(page 55). Justice, in coordination with NSA, should do an-
analysis of legal restrictions on COMSEC monitoring within
the United States, recommending whether changes to existing-
law should be sought, and, if so, what changes should be
made, to permit greater --se of such monitoring. Report to
Page references 31c. NJJD-2 Study.
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5. (U) Legislation to provide all U.S investiggfWve- "a-
agencies with access to criminal history records for purposes
of background investigations should be-sought (page S7). -
Justice should take lead in developing such legislation and
sponsor through the OMB clearance process. Report to be
made in two months.
(page 48). Recommended action:__DoD?take lead in drati
POLICY
-CATEGORY I: Work Largely Done'.
1. (S) National Policy on Civil Overflights, including
establishment of a coordinating mechanism at national levels
should take lead. 'Action due in one month.
rather than the National Security Advisor. The DCI representative
national policy to include papers necessary to establish a
national level coordinating mechanism for overflights of
civil aircraft. Action due in two months.
2. (U) National Police on Dealing with Leaks (pa a S9).
This requires following up on Attorney General Working Group
report on "leaks" to ascertain status of recommendations and
the desirability of having policy adopted through SIG-I
3. (S) National Policy on Encryption of Weapons Telemetry
(page 55). Defense b- -dented such a policy already. The
need here is to ascertain whether such policy should be
adopted at the national level, and if so, what it should
consist of. This will ?'9tail coordination with the National
Communications Security Committee. Defense should take the _
lead. Action due in two months.
4. (S) National policy on encryption of satellite communications
(page 48). Existing policy should be reviewed, and the
nature of possible alternatives or improvements explored.
Coordination would be required with National Communications
Security Committee. NSA should take the lead. Action due in
one month. --
CATEGORY II: Work has not_btgun but a I brae effort is not
-Mw required to support develo Actions to be
completed in three months.
1. (C) The development of a rational policy on damage
assessments (page 46). The DCI should take the lead.
?. (S) The development_ of a national policy on imagery and
ELINT?countermeasures (page'48). Defense should take the
lead.
3. (U) The development of a national policy on personnel
security investigations This will entail a review of
applicable executive or..3Prs, and development of recommended
changes. Defense shrii' ? a' r the lead.
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4. (S) Encouraging U.S Mission ATO to take greater
role in having missions of NATO members employ better counter-
intelligence and security measures (page 46). Defense to
take lead in coordination with State.
CATEGORY III: Work has not begun, and considerable work is
required to support the development of policy. Actions to
be completed within four months.
1. (C) National TSCM policy. Existing policy and practices
should be reviewed. Suct- topics as cross-servicing arrangements
between agencies and better allocation of resources ought to
be explored. The desirn'41ity of a national policy statement
on the, subject should be explored, and, if necessary, developed.
The DCI representative s}i,ld take the lead.
2. (C) National TEMPES1 policy. Same thrust as TSCM
study. Defense should take lead, coordinating with the
National. Communications Security Committee.
3. (C) National OPSEC policy (page 61). Examine existing
requirements in executive branch and determine desirability
and nature of a national policy on OPSEC to apply government-
4. (C) Technology Transfer (page S3). Are there actions
in the enforcement area that are not being taken, or might
be improved, by greater participation of U.S. law enforcement,
CI and security organizations? Coordination with Justice
Committee on Export Control Enforcement required. Treasury
to take lead in coordination with FBI and Commerce.
5. (U) National policy ?n industrial security (page-60).-
This should review existing programs and_policies. Determines
need for uniform policies at national level, explore possibilities
for greater cross-servicing, additional requirements,
especially to preclude the transfer of unclassified but
sensitive technology. Defense should take lead.
6. (S) Enhancement of U.S. Embassy security (page 58).
The construction of the new embassy in Moscow has highlighted
the necessity for compreh:..tsive and detailed security planning
prior to and during construction. The desirability of
having a national policy statement setting forth requirements
and/or mechanisms to consider security arrangements for U.S. -
diplomatic establishments should be considered. State to--
take lead.
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PFIAB Visit - Headquarters Building_Tour
TADS (1D10 Hqs, Evan Hineman, DDS&T,
C/AVAD/DMAB/OSWR--R-1423 )
TADS will be graphically demonstrated, improvement over
previous paper and hand calculation procedures will be
described, time savings will be emphasized.
SAFE (prototype electronic mail system) may be demonstrated
relative to analysis on SSMX-20.
OPS CENTER (7G15 ffgs,.Bob Gates, DDI, an DC/Ops
- OPERATIONS CENTER procedures, relationship with the
intelligence CorTnunity and the current production cycle will be
reviewed.
OTHER AVAILABLE "FOURS /BRIEFINGS
H I ST %0 I Q%L T 7-TTTI7T T_ T (STl> CE COLL 4`f-r T :l~v ( T i 4.., a r y:
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