Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 17, 2006
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 19, 1982
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP84B00049R001102820017-5.pdf450.27 KB
19 Oct 82 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001102820017-5 REMARKS FOR THIRD WORLD SEMINAR, 21 OCTOBER 1982 1. For more than 30 years now the Third World--a region of some 125 countries and more than 2 billion people--has been a major arena of competition between the Free World and the Soviet Union. 2. The basis for this competition was spelled out with stunning clarity back in 1950, when Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze brought their insight and eloquence to bear on the production of that brilliant and little-read document, NSC-68: "The Kremlin's policy toward areas not under its control is the elimination of resistance to its will and the extension of its influence and control. It is driven to follow this policy because it cannot... tolerate the existence of free societies; to the Kremlin the most mild and inoffensive free society is an affront, a challenge, and a subversive influence. "The means employed by the Kremlin in pursuit of this policy are limited only by considerations of expediency. Doctrine is not a limiting factor; rather it dictates the employment of violence, subversion, and deceit, and rejects moral considerations." 3. During the 1950s, the Soviets succeeded in making major inroads in Egypt, India, Indonesia, Ghana, and other former Western colonies. But Moscow's diplomatic and propaganda support, modest economic aid, and arms Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001102820017-5 -2- Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 sales failed to deter continuing US activism and did not prevent a string of major setbacks during the 1960s--in Zaire, Laos, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Ghana, Indonesia, Mali, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. 4. Nor did the Soviets make major headway during the next half decade, notwithstanding US difficulties in Southeast Asia: -- In 1972, two years after Moscow obtained a major military presence-in Egypt, the Soviets were just as suddenly ousted by President Sadat. -- In the Sudan, a Soviet-supported coup attempt against President Nimeiri failed. -- President Salvador Allende's regime in Chile was overthrown. Hanoi was*made to accept a compromise settlement notwithstanding the withdrawal of US ground forces from South Vietnam. - Although the Soviets contributed to India's victory over Pakistan in 1971, they watched quietly when the US and Israel strongly backed King Hussein during Jordan's conflict with the PLO an Syria in 1970. 5. Thereafter, however, and through the remainder of the 1970s, the Soviet Union notably improved its position and influence in the Third World. -- North Vietnam's 1975 defeat of South Vietnam, acquisition of control over Laos, and 1978 intervention in Kampuchea. Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 Approved For Release 2006/057AB : CIA-RDP84B00049R001102820017-5 -- The Soviet-supported MPLA's 1975-76 victory in the Angolan. civil war, following the intervention of Soviet-armed Cuban troops transported by Cuban and Soviet aircraft. -- Ethiopia's 1977-78 Soviet-Generaled drubbing of Somalia in the Ogaden War, following the intervention of Cuban troops supported by a massive Soviet military airlift. The 1978 Soviet-supported Communist coup in Afghanistan, acquisition of considerable Soviet influence in Kabul, and the 1979 Soviet invasion. -- The Shah's ouster in Iran, the new clerical regime's vituperative hatred of the United States, and seizure of the American Embassy and ensuing hostage crisis. -- China's relative restraint and early withdrawal during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. -- The Cuban-supported Sandinista's ouster of President Somoza from Nicaragua in 1979 and developing insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala. -- Moscow's signature on 12 friendship treaties between 1971 and 1981 (two of which were later abrogated). 6. Clearly, the Soviet Union's position in the Third World today is stronger than it was a decade.ago. Approved For.Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001102820017-5 -4- Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 -- Soviet naval aircraft periodically operate out of Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Syria, and Libya, whereas a decade earlier they spent far less time in the Third World and operated only out of Cuba, Egypt, and Somalia. -Moscow is the principal supplier of arms to 34 LDCs compared with 17 a decade ago (including Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia, and North Korea). -- The Soviets are earning up to $6 billion a year in hard currencies from the sale of arms and military equipment to Third World countries. -- The USSR and Cuba play a major role in southern Africa and on the Horn of Africa, while Libya now seeks to influence developments in West Africa. -- Nicaragua poses a serious conventional military threat to its neighbors and seeks to sustain the insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala. -- Vietnam dominates Indochina and threatens Thailand. -- The Soviets may yet turn Afghanistan into a new Mongolia, and Pakistan and Iran have been further threatened. -- The setback to US interests in the Persian Gulf caused by the Shah's ouster represents 'a continuing Soviet gain. Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 -5- Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 7. Moscow's aggressive foreign and defense policies also have paid off in the daily currency of Third World attention to Soviet interests. The Soviets have not gained control over noncontiguous Third World countries; but they have helped to install, keep in power, and otherwise support a host of governments amenable to Soviet interests and objectives and hostile to those of the US. 8...In still other nations, the USSR has gained an entree and. a respect leading to caution among some otherwise inclined to deny or attack its interests. Thus, Moscow has gotten off relatively lightly in international forums, despite its frequently aggressive behavior. The increased Soviet presence in the Third World also affords greater opportunities for intelligence gathering and subversion. 9. In addition to the strengthening of its strategic nuclear arsenal and Eurasian-based conventional forces--the principal foundations of its international position vis-a-vis the West and China--the Soviet Union has relied upon a combination of techniques to increase its Third World assets and influence. These include: -- Military activities and operations:. - Weapon and other military equipment sales.-totaled $59.8 billion in 1972-81, which makes the USSR the world's leading exporter. - Training LDC military personnel in the USSR--1,615 in 1981--and dispatching Soviet military training teams abroad. . Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 -6- Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 - Inviting foreign military personnel to the USSR to observe exercises, celebrate holidays, and otherwise visit; and sending Soviet military delegations to LDCs. Forward deploying naval units in the world's oceans, including the Mediterranean, Caribbean,. West African waters, and Arabian Sea. Crisis and other special activities--including naval presence, airlifts, sealifts, military exercises, and the deployment of ground and air units. -- Economic aid and cultural exchanges: - Between 1954 and 1981, the USSR extended $22.4 billion in credits and grants to LDCs, 65 percent of this in 1972-81. - In 1981, 34,970 Soviet economic technicians were in LDCs, and some 4,800 LDC technical trainees departed for the USSR and other Warsaw Pact nations last year. - At the end of 1981, 42,800 LDC academic students were in the USSR. -- Encouraging, supporting, and orchestrating its allies as surrogates: - A pattern of cooperation and coordination--threatening the stability of moderate and pro-Western LDCs and enhancing their own mutual security--exists between Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 -7- Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001102820017-5 the USSR, other members of the Warsaw Pact, Cuba, Vietnam, Libya, Nicaragua, Grenada, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, South Yemen, and a number of other states. - Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies, Cuba, Libya, and North Korea have given LDCs military and economic aid and technical assistance. - 35,000 Cuban.troops are deployed in Angola and Ethiopia. - East German security units and intelligence officers have taken on operational responsibilities in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Zambia, South Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Nicaragua. -- Other activities such as: - Direct and indirect Soviet and allied materiel assistance and training to insurgent and terrorist groups attempting to overtu,?n or otherwise threaten the governments of up to,21 Third World nations (including Turkey). - Financial support to Communist parties, front groups, and other opposition organizations in numerous LDCs. - Media propaganda and disinformation activities. - Subversion of moderate and pro-Western regimes. Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001102820017-5 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 10. In retrospect, during the 30 years of US-Soviet competition for Third World influence, the Soviets have enjoyed several advantages: -- The United States has been linked--however unfairly--to the colonial policies of its West European allies, whereas most Third World countries have had no experience with the USSR as a colonial power. -- The long-tenured Soviet leaders have displayed considerable continuity in their policies toward Third World countries, in contrast to US policies that have often moved by fits and starts. -- Moscow has been better able to identify itself with widely held positions in two of the most prominent and volatile issues in the less developed world: self-determination for Palestinian Arabs, and black majority rule in southern Africa. -- The United States, unlike the USSR, often has been blamed by Third World countries for actions taken by allies not subject to its control. -- The centralized, authoritarian political structure of the USSR has,been widely seen as a more suitable model by many Third World leaders. -- The USSR has delivered arms faster, and attached fewer strings to them, than has the United States. -- Soviet leaders have been much less constrained by parliamentary and public opinion than US leaders, and thus freer to use armed force to support the USSR's clients. Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 -9- Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 -- Friendship with the USSR often has brought with it tangible assistance from Cuba--which offers a form of military aid unmatched by the West--as well as from the East European states and other Soviet allies. -- Moscow has been willing to use subversion or military intimidation to pressure Third World countries into cooperating with it. 11. Nevertheless, the US has offsetting advantages--several of which are likely to become much more important during the coming decade: -- The colonial era has virtually ended, and the USSR`s role in the Third World has reached the point where it must defend its record there as much as the Western powers do. The. USSR has mismanaged. its relations with several Third World countries, suffering embarrassing setbacks as a result. Its intervention in Afghanistan and its subversive efforts elsewhere have angered and alienated many of these countries. -- Most Third World leaders now recognize that the United States is in a better position than the USSR to contribute to resolution of the disputes over the Palestinians and southern Africa. -- The United States is a more successful model of economic development than the USSR, a contrast that has become more widely recognized as modern mass communications have exposed more people to the affluent US lifestyle. . Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 -10- Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 -- There is widespread recognition that the United States is better able to provide the types of economic assistance, investment, and technology--agricultural as well as industrial--that are most likely to raise standards of living and sustain economic growth in developing countries. The USSR's economic problems, meanwhile, restrict its ability to make costly new commitments in'support of its clients- -- The United States and its Western associates control the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, whose resources are of major importance to Third World development. -- There is a widespread preference for the individual freedoms found in the United States, and a general recognition--despite Third World rhetoric to the contrary--of their relative absence in Soviet society. 12. Indeed, the momentum of Soviet gains and shocks to US interests appears to have already slowed owing to: -- The continuing stiff insurgency in Afghanistan, where Moscow has been reluctant to make new major commitments. -- Third World and particularly Islamic hostility to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, and related failure of Cuba's chairmanship of the Non-aligned Movement. -- The continuing crisis in Poland that has required substantial Soviet attention and perhaps made Moscow reluctant to be more aggressive elsewhere. - Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 84-RDP841300049R001102820017-5 -- The war between Iraq and Iran, in which Baghdad and Tehran have condemned Soviet aid to the other more than they have appreciated the modest Soviet support that they have each received. -- The US shootdown of two Libyan fighters, withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad in 1981, and failure of Qadhafi's 1982 OAU summit. -- The negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's cool relations with Moscow, and the eclipse of Joshua Nkomo, Moscow's principal ally. -- Increased South African and local insurgent threats to Angola and Mozambique. -- Successful, elections in El Salvador and the improved counter- insurgency outlook there and in Guatemala. -- The 1982 conflict in Lebanon in which the Syrian Air Force was humiliated, the PLO was driven from Beirut, and Moscow was a bystander. 13. Positive actions by this-administration are designed to further slow--and ultimately reverse--Soviet momentum in the Third World. -- The Caribbean Basin Initiative. -- Our willingness to provide technical-help to countries that are fighting insurgencies, such as El Salvador. -- Our diplomatic efforts to bring about a stable settlement in Namibia. -- Our plan for peace in the Mideast. Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001102820017-5 -12- Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 14. But we should--and we can--do more. In a nutshell, we need to fully understand the political, economic, and social pressures-under which already weak Third World countries operate. And we need to respond effectively to these pressures. 15. For example, Third World economies are always fragile. It takes so little effort to destabilize them. Increasingly, Third World leaders are signaling a willingness to cast their. lot with our side--or at least to cast off from their Soviet bloc moorings. In return they. need to show their people why this sort of reorientation is beneficial. They need a' quick pay-off--something they can point to as a sign of more to come. In this regard, we will need to do better in the quick provision of security assistance and economic aid--not just government aid but infusions of private enterprise capital that will create jobs. 16. We in the Intelligence Community are working to enhance our government's capacity to compete with the Soviets in the_ Third World. We are devoting more resources to Third World activities, including analysis of Third World trends and requirements. Our newly-created Instability and Insurgency Center will provide timely warning of countries that are faltering, and that are coming under outside pressure. The Center's analyses of these countries' problems and immediate needs will enable policymakers to respond quickly and effectively. 17. Those of you assigned to geographic panels are charged with an especially important task: to identify Third World countries of vital and moderate importance to the United States as targets of continuing Approved For Release 2006/05/25 CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 -13- Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5 high interest--and to provide a rationale for your selections. You are also to collaborate on your corporate view of the problems, issues, and trends that are likely to affect US security in the next five to ten years involving those areas. You will hear some important briefings during these two days which will aid your choices. I look forward to the results. Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102820017-5