CUBAN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES INIMICAL TO US INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001202840038-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: November 8, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
25X1
Notional Intelligence Council
8 November 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals
THROUGH: Walter Elder, Executive Secretary
National Foreign Intelligence Board
FROM:
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Cuban International Activities Inimical to US Interests
1. The attached draft Intelligence Commuuiy and Assessment uban
international activities inimical to US interests
actions the Castro government may take in the next year" was written at
the request of the National Security Council. The paper was prepared
under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
and drafted by analysts in the Office of African and Latin American
Analysis, CIA.
2. On Thursday, 4 November 1982, the DCI decided that this paper
should be reviewed by the NFIB Principals. The NIO for Latin America
met with his counterparts in DIA, INR, and NSA on Friday, 5 November,
3. The final paper must be sent to the Acting DCI on 9 November 1982,
for transmittal to the Deputy Secretary the due date you pleasefcall
10 the 1982. For that reason with your comments
the Executive e Secretary o of NFIB FIB (Walt Elder - 25X1
and coordination by 1400 hours on Tuesday, 9 November. With the exception
of DIA, the comments of NFIB representatives on the preliminary draft
were not received in time to be incorporated into this text, but will be
reflected in the final text. If you have not commented by; 1400 hours,
the Executive Secretary will take it that you concur. 25X1
to discuss the preliminary draft.
Attachment:
as stated above
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SUBJECT: Cuban International Activities Inimical to US Interests
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - ADCI
1 - C/NIC
1 - Walt Elder (20 copies)
1 - W. Knepper (INR)
6 _
(DIA)
(with copies
or Army - Col. Nevares
Air Force - C. Silva
Marines - Capt. M. Silver
Navy - T. Pallas)
(DDI/ALA)
NIO/L
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CUBAN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES INIMICAL TO US INTERESTS*
Table of Contents
Summary
PART 1: Current Cuban International Activities
Hostile to the United States
Overview of Geographical Scope and Methods 1
Latin America 3
Africa 5
Middle East 6
Other International Actions 7
PART II: Possible Additional Cuban International 9
Actions Hostile to US Interests in 1983-1984
Overview 9
Latin America 9
Africa and the Middle East 11
Other areas 12
PART III: The Military Threat Posed by Cuban 13
and Soviet Military Assets in Cuba
Trends in the Acquisition of Military Equipment 13
ANNEX: Cuban Military Forces
TABLES: Cuban Presence and Activities in Latin America
Cuban Presence and Activities in the Caribbean
Cuban Presence and Activities in Africa
Cuban Presence and Activities in the Middle East
Cuban Presence and Activities in the Far East
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Cuban actions inimical to US interests: Summary
The likelihood of an accommodation with Castro in the next two years
The Castro regime is promoting a broad range of activities designed to
undermine US influence worldwide. We believe these actions will continue as
long as Fidel Castro and his guerrilla veterans remain in power. Only the
intensity varies, determined by the conditions in each country and Cuba's
ability to exploit them. Six former US presidents tried to negotiate Cuba
into accommodation; all failed and the available intelligence information
suggests that there is virtually no prospect for a genuine accommodation with
Cuba on major issues in the next two years.
PART 1/Current Cuban international activities hostile to the US
In overview, Cuba has active subversive and military operations in Latin
America, Africa, and the Middle East while also using diplomacy, propaganda,
and covert action for anti-US purposes world-wide and in Western Europe/Japan.
In Latin America and the Caribbean
--Cuba is directly supporting active insurgencies in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Colombia and is laying the groundwork in Honduras,
Costa Rica, and Chile. Hundreds of Latin American guerrillas have
been trained in Cuba in recent years.
--Havana is heavily engaged in the consolidation of power in
Nicaragua and Grenada.
--Where guerrilla strategies are presently non-productive, Havana is
relying on a mixture of diplomacy, propaganda, and non-violent
covert action to undercut US influence.
In Africa:
--Cuba now has over 40,000 military and civilian personnel propping
up Angola and Ethiopia and working in more than a dozen other
countries. Four other African governments are the target of Cuban-
assisted subversive groups (South Africa, Namibia, Zaire, and
Morocco).
In the Middle East:
-Cuba has aligned itself closely with the PLO and the radical Arab
States (Libya and South Yemen).
In Europe:
--Cuba uses political and economic tactics to create and exploit
differences between Washington and its allies.
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PART 2/Possible additional Cuban activities hostile to US interests in 1983-84
During the coming 12-18 months, these activities will continue and in
certain areas, will expand. The very nature of the Castro regime precludes
anything but an adversary relationship between Havana and Washington. Latin
America will continue to be a priority target.
--Subversion will continue apace, especially in Central America.
--Cuba will try to encourage and take advantage of the leftist drift
in Suriname and Bolivia.
--Concern over change in Panama's orientation could cause Havana to
begin supporting subversive efforts there.
--If the Sandinistas are seriously threatened, Havana would almost
certainly send troops unless deterred by the credible threat of US
military forces.
--It is not certain, however, that Cuba's promotion of subversion
will steadily increase in all cases. Under certain circumstances,
Castro would be willing to reduce his revolutionary profile
temporarily if convinced it would advance his overall goal of
diminishing US influence in the hemisphere.
--Cuba can be expected to promote strongly the creation of a regional
organization that excludes the US.
--Cuba will probably retaliate strongly with jamming of US domestic
radio and counterbroadcasts if Radio Marti goes on the air; Castro
might also threaten or mount another Mariel-type exodus of refugees
to the US.
In Africa, Havana will maintain its military support for Angola and
Ethiopia:
--Cuba's reluctance to withdraw troops from Angola will hinder a
Namibian settlement.
--A deteriorating situation in Mozambique could bring an increased
Cuban military presence there.
Elsewhere, Cuba is likely to:
--Continue its cooperation with the PLO, Libya, and other radical
Arab states.
--Expand its efforts to create or exacerbate tensions between the US
and its European allies.
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PART 3/The military threat posed by Cuban and Soviet military-related
assets In Cuba.
Cuba has over 250,000 persons in its armed forces, and an air force with
more than 250 MIG fighters.
--During peacetime, Cuba serves as a base for Soviet intelligence
collecting activities against US government, military and
commercial communications.
--In wartime, Cuba could serve as a recovery base for
Soviet bombers while its air force and navy threaten Free
World sea lines of communications and the Panama Canal.
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Part I Current Cuban International Activities Hostile to the US
Overview of Geographical Scope and Methods
The Castro regime is promoting a broad range of activities
designed to undermine US influence. We believe this determined
effort to damage US interests will continue as long as President
Fidel Castro and his clique of guerrilla veterans remain in power
in Cuba. These activities run the gamut from universally
accepted diplomatic, commercial, military, and cultural practices
and behavior to covert destabilization, disinformation,
assassination, and guerrilla warfare. Tactics are chosen
according to the possiblities-seen in each country, but the
fundamental goal in each case is the same--diminution of US
influence.
Subversion, encompassing anything from espionage and the
promotion of coups to the training, funding, advising, and arming
of paramilitary forces, is employed against governments that
refuse to support Cuba's anti-US policies. The list of targets
of Cuban subversion includes governments friendly to the US and
countries where there are important US commercial interests. In
target countries where insurgency is not yet practical, Cuba is
working behind the scenes to unify the leftist forces, help them
develop broad links to the population, give them international
exposure and support, and provide them with political and
paramilitary training to enable them to take advantage of
whatever opportunities that may arise.
Havana is also using diplomacy to increase Cuban influence
in a number of countries and convince governments that
confrontation rather than accommodation.is the appropriate way to
deal with Washington. This diplomatic approach is bolstered by
strong doses of propaganda designed to exploit frictions between
the US and its allies and sow distrust of US intentions. Where
possibile, trade is used to undercut the US or US businesses or
to provide Cuba with entre into political circles where anti-US
policies can be promoted.
Havana places especially heavy emphasis on cultural
activities as a means of creating good will toward Cuba and
establishing contacts with cultural, intellectual, academic, and
sports figures who can then be exploited in an anti-US fashion
The Cuban leadership has consistently given high priority to
maintaining and expanding the already-established, broad body of
literature that places a hostile, highly ideological
interpretation on history and current events with the intention
of promoting popular misconceptions about the US and thus
poisoning US relations for many decades.
If circumstances allow, Havana is not above using both the
hard and soft approaches at the same time in one country.
Colombia, for example, recognizes that the Cubans committed in
principle to improving formal ties through overt channels while
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continuing covert support for Colombian insurgents. Some
governments, however, have not learned that the existence of
diplomatic relations with the Castro regime is no insurance
against Cuban subversion.
The scope of these activities hostile to the US is not
limited to a few countries or even to one general region. It is
worldwide. Only the intensity varies, determined by the
conditions in each country and Cuba's ability to exploit them.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, Cuba is directly
supporting active insurgencies in three countries (El Salvador,
Colombia, and Guatemala) and working to create the organizations
and political conditions propitious for insurgency in three
others (Costa Rica, Honduras, and Chile). While investing
heavily in the consolidation of the regimess in Grenada (600
,Cubans in country) and Nicaragua (7,000 to 8,000 Cubans in
country), Havana is overtly hostile to three other countries
(Uruguay, Paraguay, and Haiti) but apparently recognizes that
little can presently be done to initiate successful armed
struggle there. Elsewhere in the region, Havana is depending
primarily on diplomacy and non-violent means to convince
governments to support Cuba's effort to isolate the US.
In Africa, Cuba now has over 40,000 military and civilian
personnel propping up Marxist-Leninist regimes in Angolan and
Ethiopian governments and working more than a dozen other
countries. The governments of South Africa, Zaire, Namibia, and
Morocco) are the targets of Cuban-assisted subversive groups.
Adamant in their refusal to withdraw troops from Angola, the
Cubans are a key obstacle to a Namibian settlement.
In the Middle East, Cuba has aligned itself closely with the
PLO and the radices governments of the region, which is
complemented by a very aggressive Cuban policy against Israel.
There are some 4,500 Cuban civilian and military personnel in six
countries of the region with about 3,000 working in Libya.
In West Europe, Cuba sees great opportunities to create and
exploit policy i erences between the US and its allies and
views the emergence of socialist governments as particularly
propitious for Cuban interests. Havana is trying to marshal
support in these circles for Cuba's position on such issues as
the consolidation of Sandinista rule in Nicaragua and the
provision of international recognition and juridical status to
the Salvadoran insurgents. Cuban effectiveness, however, is
currently a bit constrained by the need to renegotiate the Castro
regime's indebtedness with a number of these countries.
.Similarly, the Cuba's impending loss of the chairmanship of
the Nonaligned Movement--and Castro's obvious bias during his
three-year stint in the chair--is blunting its efforts in
portions of the Third World. Havana nevertheless will continue
to try to use the movement to generate anti-US sentiment and is
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certain to take advantage of the seventh summit in India early
next year as a launching platform for anti-US rhetoric. Havana
continues to try to embarrass the US in the United Nations on the
issue of Puerto Rican independence and can be expected to attempt
.to extract advantage from Nicaragua's success in gaining a seat
on the Security Council.
Latin America
Af-t-e-F-We ouster of the Somoza government in Nicaragua in
1979, Latin America again became a major focus of attention in
Cuban foreign policy circles. Havana tried quickly to duplicate
the success elsewhere in Central America but setbacks there and
in Colombia in early 1981 dashed the Cubans' hopes for quick
victory and caused them to shift to a medium-term strategy (two
to three years). At the same time, Latin American reaction to
the events in the Falkland Islands convinced the Cubans that the
time was ripe to mobilize the region's governments to create a
multilateral organization excluding the US and deal a death blow
to the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty.
In Central America, Nicaragua remains the key. The Castro
regime sees the consolidation of the Marxist-Leninist Directorate
there as important enough to justify a secret military pact which
commits Cuba to Nicaragua's defense. An estimated 5,500 to 6,000
Cuban civilians and some 1,500 to 2,000 Cuban military personnel
currently in Nicaragua are evidence of the Castro regime's
readiness to back the Sandinista government.
Nicaragua is also seen by Havana as an invaluable platform
from which to support insurgency in El Salvador and Guatemala and
an important transportation center through which Central American
leftists and insurgents and supporters of the extreme left can
travel to and from Havana without detection. Despite Cuban calls
for a "negotiated political solution" in Central America,
Havana's efforts to train and supply Salvadoran and Guatemalan
insurgents have shown no signs of abating. Cuban efforts to
organize the Honduran far left and prepare it for eventual
guerrilla warfare are also continuing as are Havana's plans to
destabilize the Monge government in Costa Rica and perhaps,
Panama. Cuban speeches at the International Theoretical
Conference in Havana in April indicate clearly that the Castro
regime is firmly wedded to the armed struggle doctrine in Central
America and the call for negotiations is simply a ploy developed
to buy time for the guerrillas and mislead Western opinion..
After the death of Omar Torrijos, Panamanian policy shifted
away from its pro-Cuban bias in Central America. Cuba's loss of
influence is of considerable concern in Havana, and has led to
Cuban and Nicaraguan actions to help the far left step up its
organizational and political work. The Castro regime will
probably increase subversive operations in Panama if it perceives
that the Panamanian government's tilt away from the extreme left
In the region continues.
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Cuba highly values its close diplomatic ties with Mexico and
professes to understand that the Mexican government will not
tolerate interference in internal politics. Nonetheless, Mexico
allows extensive Cuban intelligence operations directed against
the US, and Cuban contacts in Mexico with representatives of
revolutionary groups from Central and South America. Though our
information is sketchy, Cuba generally abides by the restriction
on interference in Mexican domestic politics. At the same time,
Cuban intelligence officers reportedly maintain a wide range of
contacts with opposition extreme leftist leaders, as well as with
leftists in the government and ruling party, and provide the
Marxist-Leninist parties with organizational advice and
presumably other forms of nonmilitary support.
While the Cubans are still confident about their close ties
to the Mexican government, they probably are wary that Mexico's
economic problems could have far-reaching political
repercussions. It is reasonable to expect Havana to have
contingency plans, on the one hand, to limit the damage any such
repercussions might have on Cuban-Mexican relations and, on the
other, to exploit any opportunities to exacerbate Mexico-US
frictions.
In the Caribbean, Havana is quick to take advantage of
opportunities as they arise but, except for Suriname, does not
for the moment have good prospects for a dramatic expansion in
Cuban influence. The Cuba-Grenada alliance, and the alarming
Cuban-sponsored military buildup there, has raised sensitivities
in the Caribbean ministates and Havana will probably find local
fears of Cuban meddling difficult to overcome. Nevertheless, the
Cubans continue their efforts to expand their contacts with
leftists and intellectuals in the region and probably intend to
use Radio Free Grenada to blanket the area with anti-US
propraganda.
Cuba is also working vigorously to ingratiate itself with
the Bouterse government in Suriname and the Cuban presence in
Paramaribo is likely to increase. Guyana appears to have very
low priority in Cuba's scheme for the Caribbean, largely due to
Forbes Burnham's proclivity for corruption rather than
ideological radicalism. The cooling in Cuban-Guyanese relations
has made it possible for Havana to improve its image in Caracas
by shifting to a more neutral position in the Guyana-Venezuela
dispute over the Essequibo region.
In South America, Chile remains the target of occasional
infiltrations by Cuban-trained terrorists but even Havana
realizes that conditions for a successful insurgency in Chile--as
in Uruguay and Paraguay--simply do not exist. Nevertheless,
Havana is working to develop the infrastructure necessary for
organized opposition once conditions improve. At the same time,
Havana is wooing Bolivia, Argentina, and Venezuela with an eye to
promoting the demise of the OAS and replacing it with an all
Latin American organization through which the region, acting as a
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whole, can confront the US and force its demands on Washington.
Even the new government in Bogota has demonstrated a willingness
to downplay Havana's blatant intervention with the M-19
insurgents in early 1981. The Cubans probably view Colombia in
the same fashion they view Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela--
countries where emphasis on diplomacy, at least for the moment,
is more likely to produce dividends than an aggressive,
subversive approach.
Africa
tuba remains active in Africa but clearly does not view the
area as having the same political potential that it had in the
1970s when Havana was involved in a major effort to expand formal
ties in the Third World as a means of reducing the Castro
regime's diplomatic isolation. Bogged down in Angola, Cuba has
reason to act with restraint when tempted to embark on large-
scale military operations elsewhere. The remarkably successful
drive during the last decade to expand Cuban influence has slowed
markedly as Havana's attention has shifted to Latin America and
Cuba's chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement draws to an end.
Nevertheless, the Castro regime's revolutionary commitments in
Africa and its need to support Soviet policy and to export labor,
plus the desire not to alienate African allies, all point to
Havana's continued strong interest in the region and probably an
increase in the Cuban civilian presence there.
In Angola, Havana will not risk the collapse of the hardline
doinated Marxist regime by withdrawing Cuban troops. The Cubans
have indicated clearly that they intend to keep their 20,000 to
25,000 combat troops in country as long as the Marxist-Leninist
regime there is threatened by South African-backed guerrillas.
The Cubans were reported to have modestly increased their forces
in late summer with veteran reinforcements from Cuba and now seem
to be taking a greater part in the actual fighting against
Angolan insurgents. The civilian presence in Angola remains
about 4,500. Even though Havana now has formed diplomatic ties
with Zaire, Cubans in Angola presumably continue to support
insurgents who hope to seize power in Zaire's Shaba Province.
Insurgents of the African National Congress of South Africa also
reportedly receive Cuban support at their training camps in
Angola.
In Ethiopia, the Cubans apparently are restricted largely to
garrison duty, having been withdrawn from combat after the defeat
of Somali forces in the Ogaden campaign. There are now an
estimated 11,000 to 13,000 Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia
with another 1,000 civilians aiding the Mengistu government in
various capacities such as public health, construction, and
education.
In Mozambique, Cuba now has an estimated 800 to 1,000
military personnel with another 1,000 civilians in political and
technical advisory positions. The current threat to the Machel
government posed by South African backed guerrillas raises the
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possibility that Maputo may ask for Cuban combat troops. We
believe Havana's response would depend largely on Soviet
wishes. The Cubans clearly have a distaste for taking casualties
in combat but they would probably provide a large number of
troops at Moscow's urging and with the proviso that the Soviets
assured logistical support.
As for Namibia, Cuba continues to work with and support the
SWAPO forces in Angola and has little stake in the success of the
current negotiations. Cuba would undoubtedly view a SWAPO
dominated Namibia as a major success for Cuban foreign policy.
Should SWAPO come into control in Namibia, Cuba along with the
Soviets and the East Germans, would offer to provide technical
and security assistance. Although Namibia is not well-suited as
a base for guerrilla activities against South Africa, the Cubans
no doubt would support subversive activities there. In the
meantime, however, there is little likelihood that Cuban troops
will become more heavily involved in the Namibian "liberation
struggle."
Middle East
Cuban efforts to expand its influence in the Middle East
enjoyed a measure of success until the war between Iran and Iraq
forced the Castro regime, as chairman of the Nonaligned Movement,
into the role of mediator. Relations between Havana and Baghdad
soured as the Iraqis perceived a Cuban tilt toward Iran. A top
Cuban emissary visited Baghdad late last month on a fence-
building mission but it is unlikely that he was successful in
restoring ties to their former good standing. Cuba has let about
500 of its civilian personnel stay in Iraq--mainly medical
teams--to try to soothe Iraqi sensitivities. As in Africa, Cuba
will continue to protect its interests in the Middle East and, to
earn hard currency, will try to increase its non-diplomatic
presence there, but the main focus of its attention will continue
to be Latin America.
The presence of some 3,000 Cubans in Libya, mainly involved
in the fields of construction and public health, suggests a
warmth in bilateral ties that is deceiving. Castro's and
Qadhafi's egos have clashed on more than one occasion and neither
appears to place much trust in the other. At the same time, Cuba
is anxious to develop access to Libya's wealth and, in addition
to increasing the number of Cuban workers in Libya, Castro may be
willing to provide Cuban support for Libyan adventurism as a
means of ingratiating himself with Qadhafi. The relationship has
already paid off for Cuba in terms of Libyan financial support
for Havana's allies in Grenada and Nicaragua.
Havana has good relations with the PLO and continues to
provide training in Cuba for PLO personnel. The Cubans
apparently were incensed at Moscow's failure to help the PLO in
the recent debacle in Lebanon but Havana itself was in no
position to provide more than propaganda support and backing in
international forums. Cooperation with the PLO enhances Havana's
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ability to engage in subversion worldwide and increases the
likelihood that Cuba's clandestine resources will be used to help
achieve PLO goals.
Cuba also has provided training for Polisario forces and
continues to maintain a medical team of about 200 Cubans at a
Polisario camp in Algeria. We suspect there may be a handful of
Cuban military advisers there but Algeria's reluctance to permit
Havana to increase its assistance means that Cuba's support will
be limited mainly to propaganda and backing in the UN and
Nonaligned Movement. The Castro regime nevertheless is strongly
committed to backing the Polisario in its war against Morocco.
Cuba still has an estimated 650 military and civilian
personnel in South Yemen providing military advice, training the
militia, and ensuring the government's leftist political
orientation. Some Cubans have been involved in training foreign
insurgents--for example, Omani guerrillas and dissidents from
North Yemen--and we assume this type of activity persists.
Other International Actions
Heartened-by the emergence of various democratic socialist
parties as leading forces in a number of countries of West
Europe, Havana sees great opportunities to exacerbate frictions
between Washington and its Western allies. The Castro regime,
for example, would like to generate West European diplomatic.
pressure on Washington to cease its military support for the
government in El Salvador; the Cubans are convinced that without
US arms, the government would succumb to the insurgents. Havana
would also like to see a repetition of French military sales to
Nicaragua or similar actions that embarrass Washington and damage
US prestige. The Cubans are finding, however, that their ability
to exploit frictions is being hampered by Havana's necessity of
renegotiating outstanding loans with a number of creditors in
Europe and Japan.
Havana is continuing its program of long standing to
influence both public and private opinion in the US. A key
aspect of this effort is to create opposition to continued US
military assistance to the government of El Salvador. Toward
this end, the Castro regime is promoting the concept of a
negotiated political solution in Central America, knowing it has
great appeal for the US media. It is also promoting a comparison
with the US military experience in Vietnam as a means of souring
US public opinion on additional military aid to the Salvadoran
government.
In the Nonaligned Movement, Cuba continues to represent
Soviet interests and is working to alienate the Third World from
the US. Cuba's effectiveness, however, has been reduced markedly
by its blatant, repeated abuse of its role as chairman over the
past three years.
Cuba has a vast, well organized infrastructure for expanding
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its influence abroad in a variety of ways, legal and illegal.
The Cuban Communist Party Central Committee's America Department,
for example, determines what approach is to be used in a
particular country--at times, Havana utilizes both the diplomatic
approach and subversion coincidentially--and then becomes
directly involved in policy execution. If a decision is made to
follow the armed struggle route in a particular country, the
Central Committee's Department of Special Operations provides'
logistical support, ensuring that the appropriate facilities of
the Cuban armed forces and security services are prepared for any
task from training foreign recruits to shipping munitions
secretly.
The party, in coordination with Moscow, periodically holds
International Theoretical Conferences to establish the
ideological lines it expects revolutionary groups to follow. The
Cuban Interior Ministry uses its elite Special Troops to train
foreign recruits in any skills needed for clandestine or
insurgent activity, be it frogman training, paratroop training,
guerrilla tactics, hand-to-hand combat, weapons familiarization,
communications, or use of demolition charges.
Cuba also has an outstanding propaganda apparatus--Radio
Havana, Prensa Latina, newspapers, magazines, covert publications
and radios, journalists' organizations, and a stable of foreign
writers and intellectuals--which is used to help shape public
opinion around the world, give international exposure and
prestige to insurgent groups, and undercut US credibility. The
Interior Ministry also has an efficient intelligence collection
apparatus, the DGI, and an internal security force, the DSE,
which penetrates exile communities abroad to promote friction and
discredit refugees.
Any Cuban ministry or governmental entity can be, and has
been, used to support insurgent operations when necessary. The
Communications Ministry provides communications links for agents
abroad, for Cuban missions abroad, and for Cuban embassies; the
Ministry of the Fishing Industry and Ministry of Merchant Marine
and Ports provide facilities for shipping arms clandestinely as
does Cubana Airlines, a branch of the Transportation Ministry.
Even Cuba's mass organizations--for women, students, peasants,
union members, and the population in general--operate schools
where foreigners are trained in ideology and techniques for
organizing and promoting mass organizations in their own
countries.
The Cuban experience in subversive operations dates from the
time the current leadership was carrying out the Cuban revolution
in the 1950s. The Castro regime, therefore, has a large number
of experienced cadres ready to train foreign insurgents in the
skills of the trade or take the field with them to carry out the
revolution.
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Part II Possible Additional Cuban International Actions Hostile
to US Interersts in -8
Overview
The very nature of the Castro regime precludes anything but
an adversary relationship between Havana and Washington. Castro
needs this adversary relationship:
-- To guarantee Soviet aid indispensable to his survival
(he would hardly expect the Soviets to take kindly to a
rapprochement with Washington that threatened Soviet
interests in Cuba).
-- To justify and excuse continued austerity at home (he
uses the US as the standard whipping boy whenever in
need of a scapegoat).
-- To allow him to assume a major role on the world stage
(the hostile US permits him to assume the hero's role in
a David vs. Goliath drama).
This adversary relationship will not change as long as
Castro is in power. The guerrilla elite that dominates the
current leadership developed its political beliefs during the
guerrilla struggle against former dictator Batista. The
experiences of that campaign and the initial years of power
consolidation created an unswerving commitment to the philosophy
of armed struggle and a visceral distrust of US intentions.
From their perspective, the US is, and always will be, the
principal threat. Promoting revolution is seen as a means of
defending Cuba from the US threat (i.e.: the US has limited
resources and cannot make war on Cuba if it is busy fighting a
number of small wars elsewhere).
The future holds no change in the Castro regime's anti-US
orientation. Strategy and tactics may change to suit the
opportunity but the general policy goal--to reduce US influence--
will remain the same. Havana's efforts are likely to be directed
in several different areas.
LATIN AMERICA
Latin America will be the priority target probably for the
remainder of the decade. Subversion will continue apace,
especially in Central America, and Cuban support for Nicaragua
will remain a very high priority.
In the event of a war between Nicaragua and Honduras, or a
serious threat to Sandinista control posed by armed exile groups,
Cuba would probably lend direct military support to Nicaragua.
The Cuban Air Force and Cubana Airlines have the capability to
fly several thousand combat troops with their personal weapons
into the Managua area within about two weeks. Control of the
airfields in Nicaragua is critical to the performance of this
operation.
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Cuban Air Force fighters could fly directly to the Managua
area and operate from there if fuel and ordnance are
prepositioned. Inserting MIG fighters directly from Cuba would
be a very difficult and risky operation, however, unless the
runway at Puerto Cabezas on the Atlantic coast is lengthened to
provide a refueling stop.
Cuba has the ability to airlift up to a battalion of ground
troops or paratroopers to several smaller airfields in Nicaragua,
and could even air drop them if necessary. Cuba lacks the
capability to airlift bulk cargo, however, and would have to send
any tanks, artillery, helicopters, and large radars by ship.
Most heavy equipment would have to transit the Panama Canal
because Nicaragua's Atlantic coast ports lack the facilities to
unload them.
Cuban merchant vessels provide a modest sealift capability,
but only a few small draft vessels can use the Atlantic coast
posts. The Soviets have recently delivered one amphibious
landing ship to Cuba--a second is enroute--but their capacity is
small.
Panama is obviously becoming a serious concern in Havana and
an effort is likely to be made to convince the Panamanian left
that resorting to armed struggle will eventually be necessary to
achieve true independence. Cuba will urge the left to send
recruits to Cuba for training as a contingency, should the Castro
regime's efforts to improve relations with the Panamanian
government fail and the Cuban presence in Panama be threatened.
Havana will watch events in Mexico carefully to guard its
interests there and take advantage of any opportunity to sabotage
US-Mexican relations. Cuba will try to expand its influence in
Suriname and will devote considerable effort to consolidating the
revolution in Grenada. It is reasonable to expect Havana to use
Grenada as a base from which to propagandize the eastern
Caribbean and to conduct liaison with leftists in that area.
Cuba's greatest potential for military intervention in the
eastern Caribbean will be realized when the new airfield in
Grenada is completed next year. Although it is not scheduled to
open until 1984, it could be ready for military operations before
then once the runway is complete and fuel storage is provided.
Grenada could then serve as a staging base for Cuban ground and
air operations in support of its friends in the area. Grenada,
Suriname, and possibly Guyana would find this potenial for swift
military support comforting, while others like Venezuela and
Trinidad and Tobogo might find it intimidating. The airfield
will also give Cuba a convenient stop over for troops en route to
Africa.
Havana is certain to expand its efforts to destroy or at
least weaken the OAS and, through wooing new governments in a
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number of Latin American countries, to create a new regional
organization that excludes Washington. This is a major
preoccupation of the Castro regime and it may be willing to
reduce its subversive profile in certain countries if convinced
such temporary retrenchment would contribute significantly toward
that end.
AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Africa will remain a second priority after Latin America.
The Cuban presence in Angola, military and civilian, will
continue at high levels because Havana fears the collapse of the
Marxist regime if the Cubans leave. Although the Cubans are
reluctant to become more deeply involved in combat in Angola or
elsewhere in Africa--such as Mozambique--Havana will do so if
necessary to remain in Moscow's good graces. Cuba is simply too
dependent on Soviet economic assistance to say no without a major
justification.
As for a Namibian settlement, Havana will work to scuttle it
if Moscow so desires. Without such pressure, however, Havana
would probably want to avoid the onus of such meddling so long as
a settlement meant nothing more than a token withdrawal of Cuban
troops. On the other hand, if a total Cuban troop withdrawal is
a condition of a settlement, Havana and Luanda would not comply,
no matter what the outcome for SWAPO. In any event, Cuban
support in Angola for SWAPO and the African National Congress
will continue.
The Cuban combat forces in Angola and Ethiopia are primarily
dedicated to defending Marxist regimes in those two countries
from their foreign and domestic enemies. Providing additional
military advisors and instructors to these or other African
regimes is well within Cuba's current capabilities. Providing
combat troops to Mozambique or any other nation would be much
more difficult unless the troops could be taken from those
already in Africa. Calling up additional reservists for
internationalist combat duty would raise the domestic costs to
the Castro regime, and would require another large airlift and
sealift operation. Considerable Soviet assistance to airlift
heavy equipment and to provide logistical support would also be
necessary.
The Middle East will also remain an area of secondary
importance behind Latin America. Havana will try to increase the
number of civilian workers it now has in some of the Arab
countries and thus acquire hard currency. Cuban construction
workers will go to Algeria to satisfy construction contracts in
much the same manner as Cubans are now working in Libya. Cuba
may become more closely linked to radical Middle East groups,
supporting their efforts in Latin America and profiting from
their contacts and facilities in other parts of the world.
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OTHER AREAS
There are other areas where Cuba will be active in
undermining US policy and influence. High priority will continue
to be given to efforts to influence public opinion and private
interests in the US itself. If the US military threat to Cuba
increases, Havana will almost certainly manipulate Puerto Rican
terrorists and the Cuban exile community to cause disturbances
within the US.
Cuba is likely to retaliate in kind against perceived
hostile actions from the US. Radio Marti, for example, is
certain to provoke powerful counterbroadcasts from Cuba and heavy
interference to US broadcasters. If Radio Marti causes
significant discontent in Cuba, Castro most likely will resort to
another mass rufugee exodus to punish the US.
Havana will continue to pay considerable attention to
cultivating European countries, especially Spain and France,
looking for political support on issues such as consolidating the
Sandinista's position in Nicaragua, Justifying the Cuban military
presence in Angola, and gaining international juridical standing
for insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala.
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 Approved For Release 2007/OFb&KET lA-RDP84B00049R001202840038-9
PART 3/The Military Threat Posed by Cuban and Soviet Military
ssets in Cuba.
During peacetime, Cuba serves as a base for Soviet
intelligence gathering and propaganda activities in the western
hemisphere. The largest Soviet signals intelligence collection
facility outside of the USSR is located near Havana and is
directed primarinly at US government, commerical, and military
communications links. Soviet naval maritime reconnaissance
aircraft based in Cuba almost contiuously for the past year carry
out regular surveillance of US naval vesels exercising in the
Caribbean or transiting the Atlantic Ocean.
In the ewrent of war between the US and the USSR, Cuba could
serve as'a recovery and turn around base for Soviet long range
bombers attacking the US. While Cuba's military forces pose
little threat to the continental United States, they would force
the US to retain significant air defense assets in Florida, and
would draw some naval forces away from the Atlantic to patrol the
Caribbean Sea. Cuba's navy and airforce would pose a threat to
free world merchant shipping and sea lines of communications
through which many oil tankers pass. From bases in Nicaragua,
Cuban aircraft could also threaten the Panama Canal.
During a major world war, Cuba's primary concern would be
survival and defense of the island. The sizeable and well-
equipped Cuban military would be expected to offer a credible and
stiff defense of the homeland. There is little likelihood that
Cuba would attempt offensive military action against the United
States. Nonetheless, a number of US targets would be vulnerable
to Cuba's increasing offensive military capabilities. The US
Naval Base at Guantanamo could be such a target. A more serious
potential threat is Cuban capability to harrass or interfere with
sea and air routes in the Caribbean/Gulf of Mexico/Straits of
Florida areas. This would be of particularly concern because of
the amount of US commerce'-- particularly oil -- that passes
through this region and when unhampered transit from southern US
ports and through Caribbean sea lanes would be required, such as
for US reenforcement of NATO. The presence of Cuban FOXTROT-
Class submarines intensified this threat. Use of air bases in
Nicaragua and possibly in Grenada would put Cuban fighter
aircraft within range to threaten the Panama Canal and sea lines
of communicatin in the Caribbean. The Soviets would likely
continue to use Cuba during a war as a base for intelligence
collection against US military operations. They might also use
the island to recover Soviet combat aircraft or naval ships.
Trends in the Acquisition of Military Equipment
The Soviet Union has provided Cuba an increasing amount of
technologically sophisticated military equipment over the past
two years, and the scale of arms deliveries is not slackening.
Fighter aircraft, surface to air missiles (SAMS), and new radars
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to improve Cuba's air defenses have been at the top of the
list. Further deliveries of MIG-23s, SAMS, and possibly some
MIG-25 Foxbat interceptors can be expected in the next few years.
Recent construction of naval support facilities in the
Cienfuegos area suggests the Cuban navy will also be expanding
significnatly. At least four more submarines, some larger
surface combatants, and more amphibious landing ships are
expected. While these improvements will not greatly alter the
minimal direct threat Cuba poses to the continental US, they will
serve to further intimidate US friends in the Caribbean.
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Annex: Cuban Military Forces
Ground Forces
1 Armored Division
6 Mechanized Infantry Divisions
1 Infantry Division
20 Reserve Divisions (cadre)
Combat and Service Support
Expeditionary Force, Angola
Expeditionary Force, Ethiopia
Air Forces
40 MIG-23
195 MIG-21
25 MIG-17
26 AN-26 (Transports)
Navy
TOTAL: Regular Military Forces
Ready Reservists
Territorial Militia
Personnel
6,000
29,000
3,000
8,000
17,000
63,000
63,000
20,000-25,000
11,000-13,000 31,000-38,000
18,500*
18,500
12.000
95,000-125,000
300,000
125,000-132,000
*2,000 of these are serving with the Angolan and Ethiopian
Air Forces. The aircraft they fly belong to the
host countries.
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1 Koni-class frigate
2 Foxtrot-class submarines
23 OSA and Komar Missile Patrol Boats
Cubana Airlines
10 IL-62 (capacity 186)
3 TU-154 (capacity 168)
2 Britannia (capacity 100)
4 IL-18 (capacity 122)
11 AN-24 (capacity 50)
14 IL-14 (capacity 36)
13 YAK-40 (capacity 32)
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 UUOA14 YKtJtI41,t A14U Ht,I1VII1tJ 114 LNI114 HI`II K1l,H
Estimated
Diplomatic Cuban Presence
Country Relations Military Civilian Total
Belize
Cubans training leftist 1
-.terrorists/guerrillas-'in the
past years.
Chile yes
Colombia2
Costa Rica3
Countries with nationals)
in Cuba for technical/
academic education in the
past year.
Ecuador4 yes yes
El Salvador
Guatemala yes
Honduras yes
Mexico yes
Nicaragua5 yes 1700-2300 5500-6000 7200-8300
Panama yes
1/Reflects information available.
2/Diplomatic relations suspended March 1981.
3/Relations broken by Costa Rica on 11 May 1981.
4/Relations downgraded to charge level April 1981.
5/Cuban instructors train Central American guerrillas in Nicaragua.
 CUBAN ACTIVITIES AND PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN
Cubans training leftist)
Estimated
revolutionaries in the
Diplomatic
Cuban Presence
past year.
Country
Relations
Military Civilian Total
Antigua
Dominica
yes
Dominican Rep.
Grenada2
yes
10-12
6003
610-612
Guyana
yes
27
27
Guadeloupe
Jamaica4
St. Lucia
yes
St. Vincent
Suriname
yes
1Reflects information available.
2Cuba is training small numbers of East S~ribbbbsan revolutionaries in Grenada.
3Cuban civilian presence will return to 0-40 early next year.
4Diplomatic relations. broken October 1981.
Countries with nationals)
in Cuba for technical/
academic education in the
past year.
 ` CUBAN PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA
Country
Diplomatic -
Relations
Estimated
Cuban Presence
Military Civilian Total
Angola2
yes
20,000-
25,000
4,500
Benin
yes
20
26
Botswana
yes
Burundi
yes
16
Cape Verde
yes
6-12
10
Congo3
yes
500
100-200
Ethiopia
yes
11,000-
13,000
1,000
Gambia
yes
Ghana
yes
Guinea
yes
20-30
200-225
Guinea-
Bissau
yes
50
100-150
They are included in the number of Cuban miliary in Angola.
Countries with nationals)
Cubans training leftist' in Cuba for technical/
revolutionaries in the academic education in the
past year. ,.... past-year.
24,500-
29,500
46 yes
16
16-22 yes
600-700
12,000
14,000
220-255
150-200
1Reflects information available.
2Cubans training SWAPO and ANC guerrillas in Angola.
3Excludes about 1500-2000 Cuban military personnel in Pointe Noire, Congo, supporting activities in the Angolan exclave of Cabinda.
 CUBAN PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA (cont'd)
Country
Diplomatic
Relations..
Estimated
Cuban Presence
Military Civilian Total.
Lesotho
yes
Madagascar
yes
10-12
10-12
Mali
yes
8
8
Mozambique4
yes
1,000
1,000
2,000
Namibia
Rwanda
yes
Sao Tome
yes
30-50
200-250
230-300
Seychelles
yes
4
20-25
24-29
Sierra Lune
yes
10-20
10-20
Tanzania
yes
80
80
Uganda
yes
10-20
10-10
Zambia
yes
Zimbabwe
yes
1Reflects information available.
4Cuban instructors at bases training ANC guerrillas outside Maputo.
Countries with Nationals1
Cubans training leftist 1 in Cuba for technical/
revolutionaries in the academic education in the
past year. past year.
Lyn
yes
yes
 Diplomatic
Estimated
Cuban Presence
CUBAN PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Cubans training leftist'
revolutionaries in thee.:
past year.
Country
Relations
Military Civilian Total
Afghanistan
yes
unk2
50
50+
Algeria
yes
50
50
Libya3
yes
unk2
3200
3200+
Iran
yes
unk2
Iraq4
500
500
South Yemeni
yes
500
100
600
Saharan
Democrat ? c
Arab Republic yes 100-150 100-150
(Polisario)
'Reflects information available.
2We are unable to quantify, but believe there is a Cuban military presence.
3Cuban instructors are assigned to some guerrilla training camps in Libya and South Yemen.
4Cuban presence reduced from 3500 this fall due to dangers posed by the Iran-Iraq war.
Countries with nationals'
in Cuba for technical/
academic education in the
past year.
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes yes
yes
CA
 CUBAN PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES IN THE FAR EAST
Country
Diplomatic
Relations
Estimated
Cuban Presence
Military Civilian Total
Kampuchea
yes
20
Laos
yes
50-60
Mongolia
yes
Vietnam
yes
500
20
50-60
500
Countries with nationalsi
Cubans training leftist in Cuba for technical/
revolutionaries in the academic education in the
past year. past year.