TOPIC FOR THE MEETING WITH JUDGE CLARK, 17 NOVEMBER 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001202850025-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: November 16, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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16 November 1982
NOTE FOR: DCI
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FROM; NIO/LA
SUBJECT: Topic for the Meeting with Judge Clark, 17 November 1982
1. As John McMahon has probably told you, we completed the Interagency
Intelligence Assessment on hostile Cuban activities as requested by the
NSC. A copy of the three-page Summary is attached, and essentially concludes
that:
--There is no prospect for genuine accommodation with Cuba
in the next two years.
--Cuban subversive and military operations in Latin America,
Africa and the Middle East are extensive, dangerous and
have not slowed during the last two years.
--The Cubans can be expected to do more in all three areas
against the United States during the next two years,
with Latin America being the priority for expanded Cuban
operations.
This is the considered judgment of the Intelligence Assessment as provided
by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
2. In my view, there are two important questions not being asked in
the NSC Review: Is the current US strategy and the sum of activities
adequate to meet the threat posed by the extreme left in the region from
Panama to the US border? And specifically, concerning Nicaragua, is the
current strategy of interdiction/harassment and a negotiated end to the
Nicaraguan export of subversion adequate?
3. In my view, the answer to both questions is "No." Given the
intelligence we have on Cuban/Nica.raguan actions to date, I judge that
the current strategy in Central America will most likely fail to defeat
the extreme left in El Salvador and Guatemala and that Nicaragua will counter
the current strategy by (a) either militarily crushing the anti-Sandinistas
(albeit in ways they do not present an occasion of war) or (b) by negotiating
a false agreement to end its export of subversion which would be adhered
to only until the anti-Sandinistas have been demoralized and/or disbanded.
4. I hope we can discuss these issues and I think the question of
the adequacy of our basic strategy in Central America is worth raising
in the context of the NSC Cuba Review.
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9 November 1982
CUBAN ACTIONS INIMICAL TO US INTERESTS: SUMMARY
The likelihood of an accommodation with Castro in the next two years
The Castro regime is engaged in a broad range of activities designed to
promote radical change and undermine US influence worldwide. From the Cuban
perspective, the US is, and always will be, the principal threat. We believe
these actions will continue as long as Fidel Castro and his guerrilla veterans
remain in power. Only the intensity varies, determined by the conditions in
each country and Cuba's ability to exploit them. Six former US presidents
tried to negotiate Cuba into accommodation; all failed and the available
intelligence information suggests that there is virtually no prospect for a
genuine accommodation with Cuba on major issues in the next two years. This,
despite the fact that a modus vivendi may continue on some secondary but
potentially troublesome issues like air piracy.
PART 1: Current Cuban international activities hostile to the US
In overview, Cuba has active subversive and military operations in Latin
America, Africa, and the Middle East while also using diplomacy, propaganda,
and covert action for anti-US purposes world-wide.
In Latin America and the Caribbean
--Cuba is directly supporting active insurgencies in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Colombia and is laying the groundwork in Honduras,
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Chile. Hundreds of Latin
American terrorists and guerrillas have been trained in Cuba in
recent years.
--Havana is heavily engaged in the consolidation of power in
Nicaragua and Grenada.
--Where guerrilla strategies are presently non-productive, Havana is
relying on a mixture of diplomacy, propaganda, and non-violent
covert action to undercut US influence.
In Africa:
--Cuba now has over 40,000 military and civilian personnel propping
up Angola and Ethiopia and working in more than a dozen other
countries. Other African targets of Cuban-assisted subversive
groups are South Africa, Namibia, Zaire, and Morocco.
In the Middle East:
--Cuba has aligned itself closely with the PLO and the radical Arab
States (Libya and South Yemen).
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In Europe:
--Cuba uses political and economic tactics to create and exploit
differences between Washington and its allies.
PART 2: Possible additional Cuban activities hostile to US interests in 1983-84
During the coming 12-18 months, these activities will continue and in
certain areas, will expand. The very nature of the Castro regime precludes
anything but an adversary relationship between Havana and Washington. Latin
America will continue to be a priority target.
--Subversion will continue apace, especially in Central America, but
also in Colombia and Chile.
--Cuba will try to encourage and take advantage of the leftist drift
in Suriname and Bolivia.
--Concern over change in Panama's orientation could cause Havana to
begin supporting subversive efforts there.
--If the Sandinistas are seriously threatened from without, Havana
would almost certainly send additional combat forces unless
deterred by the credible threat of US military forces.
--It is not certain, however, that Cuba's promotion of subversion
will steadily increase in all cases. Under certain circumstances,
Castro could be willing to reduce his revolutionary profile
temporarily if convinced it would advance his overall goal of
diminishing US influence in the hemisphere.
--Cuba can be expected to promote strongly the creation of a regional
organization that excludes the US.
--Cuba will probably retaliate strongly with Jamming of US domestic
radio and counterbroadcasts if Radio Marti goes on the air (Castro
mi ht also threaten another Mariel-type exodus of refugees to the
us).
In Africa, Havana will maintain its military support for Angola and
Ethiopia:
--Cuba's reluctance to withdraw troops from Angola, as long as the
stability of the Marxist-Leninist government is in doubt, will
hinder a Namibian settlement.
--A military threat to Mozambique from South Africa could bring an
increased Cuban military presence there.
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Elsewhere, Cuba is likely to:
-Continue its cooperation with the PLO, Libya, and other radical
Arab states.
--Expand its efforts to create or exacerbate tensions between the US
and its European allies.
PART 3: The military threat posed by Cuban and Soviet-military-related
assets in Cuba.
Cuba has over 250,000 persons in its armed forces, and an air force with
more than 250 MIG fighters.
--Cuba serves as a base for Soviet intelligence gathering
propaganda activities in the Western Hemisphere.
--In the event of war between the US and the USSR, Cuba cou serve
as a recovery and turn around base for Soviet air and naval units
attacking the US.
--During a major world war, the US Naval Base at Guantanamo would be
vulnerable to Cuba's increasing military capabilities. A more
serious potential threat is Cuban capability to harass or interfere
with sea and air routes in the Caribbean/Gulf of Mexico/Straits of
Florida areas. This would be of particular concern because of the
amount of US commerce --particularly oil -- that passes through
this region and when unhampered transit from southern US ports and
through Caribbean sea lanes would be required, such as for US
reenforcement of NATO.
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