THE FEZ SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001202910008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 14, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

National Intelligence Council
Approved For ReIJaFi~07/02/08: CIA-RDP84B00044
DDI 7384-82
14 September 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
A/NIO/NESA
1. As expected the Fez summit did not enthusiastically endorse
President Reagan's peace initiative. Nonetheless, despite some negative
elements, the summit's formal results do leave open several possibilities
for creative diplomacy.
2. The summit communique explicitly states the principle that the
Arab states' goal in their conflict with Israel is "a just peace." For the
first time in the history of the conflict, the Arabs are united behind the
concept of a peaceful settlement. This has already produced a violent
rhetorical blast from the true radicals in the area -- Libya has called the
summit's participants "cowards" and Iran has labeled the results "treason"
for implying "recognition of the Zionist entity." Despite this, Syria, the
PLO and 18 other Arab states now are on record as implicitly accepting
Israel within the 1967 borders.
3. Perhaps even more important, the summit's results leave open the
question of how to negotiate a peace agreement. As President Mubarak has
already noted, the Fez communique lists the Arabs' goals but gives no
mechanisms for achieving them. The only recommendation is for a seven-
country delegation headed by Saudi Arabia to visit key world capitals to
discuss both the summit's proposals and the Reagan initiative.
-- As a result, the summit does not rule out Jordanian
involvement in the peace talks. While Fez reiterates the Rabat
formula that the PLO is "the sole legitimate representative" of
the Palestinians, it in no way prevents Hussein and Arafat from
making a deal to let Amman negotiate for the West Bank. The
PLO and Jordan could, for example, form a joint negotiating
team under King Hussein's leadership but with several PLO-
approved West Bankers among the negotiators. (This would have
many advantages for the US since it would enhance Jordan's
credibility as a negotiator.)
Approved For Release 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP84BOO
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001202910008-4
SECRET
4. The.-,sit` `s call for "an independent Palestinian state" is
obviously, tthie with the Reagan initiative and will be a problem.
There is a way around this, however, if all sides accept the principle that
independence can be a long term option for the West bank only after an
extended transitional period (10-15 years) of linkage with Jordan. Israel
could retain some veto right over independence (it will always have the
military option to intervene).
5. The ke is how the Drabs interpret Fez. It appears that the
Saudis coaxed Syria into accepting a modified Fahd plan and a pro-Iraqi
stance on the Persian Gulf war in return for postponing action to formally
return Egypt to Arab ranks. The trade-off was the most the moderates
probably could have hoped for. Now the question is will Hussein, Arafat
and Fahd be willing to let Jordan actually negotiate. The key determinant
wI13,be how they ,je our willingness to press Israel to accept the Reagan
initiative, esppially the settlements freeze.
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001202910008-4