MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND KING HASSAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 25, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920009-2
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NIC 8585-82
25 October 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Charles E. Waterman, NIO/NESA
SUBJECT: Meeting Between President Reagan and King Hassan
1. NSC senior NESA staff official Geoffrey Kemp gave the following
summary of the meeting between President Reagan and King Hassan. General
Walters was the interpreter.
2. Hassan asked what "guise" the PLO could utilize to permit direct
contact with the United States. He referred to contacts made several years
ago between General Walters and a PLO representative, and commented they
had never leaked. (Comment: This is not true - the fact of them did
appear in print.) The President commented the PLO must recognize Israel's
right to exist. After suggesting a vague statement by the PLO which the
President found ambiguous, the King asked if the following wording of a PLO
statement would be sufficient to bring-about contact with the United
States: "All states in the area, including Israel, have the right to live
a
as sovereign nations with secure borders." The President said he felt this
would be sufficient, to which Hassan said he would attempt to obtain it
from the PLO. He said it "might take several weeks, perhaps five."
3. King Hassan then asked how, if the PLO produces the statement,
contact would occur. The President said the Ambassador in whatever locale
the PLO leadership was located would make contact - or perhaps a State
Department official - and then representation would be escalated in level.
4. The King then stated he felt the inclusion of "nationalist" West
Bank politicains in Hussein's potential negotiation team would meet the
requirements of the PLO for inclusion. He also strongly urged President
Reagan to build up Hussein's image, receiving him in Washington soon for
this purpose. (Comment: The West Bank "nationalists" would presumably
include the Mayors who were dismissed by the Israelis over the past year.
This Memo is classified
SECRET in its entirety.
NSC review completed.
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920009-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1202920009-2
They have emerged as a semi-independent factor in the equation. They are
associated with, but not prisoners of, the PLO, have nationalist
credentials, and are not among the PLO hardcore leadership which the
Israelis cannot accept under any foreseeable circumstances.)
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1202920009-2 ,