STATUS REPORT ON GREEK PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION AND US BASES IN GREECE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84B00049R001203020006-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 28, 2007
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP84B00049R001203020006-2.pdf | 142.76 KB |
Body:
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State Dept. review
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STATUS REPORT ON GREEK PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION AND US BASES IN GREECE
The Election
The outcome of the Greek parliamentary election this fall could have profound
consequences for Greece's polity and for US and Western interests.
-- If George Rallis' moderately conservative New Democracy party is
returned to power, Greece would remain stable and its Western
ties would be consolidated.
-- Should Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement win,
Greece would likely experience domestic turmoil, and it would
become an unreliable and troublesome partner for the US and
Western Europe.
Because Greece has a strong presidential form of government, however, conserva-
tive President Karamanlis would be in a position in his remaining four years in
office to curb Papandreou's more radical policies and keep the military out of
politics.
All indications are that the election, which must take place by November, will
be close and that neither party will win a parliamentary majority. Although New
Democracy trails in the polls, it cannot be counted out.
-- Greece is still largely a nation of conservative farmers and small
shopkeepers and Greeks are aware that they have fared generally well
under New Democracy rule.
-- When faced with the prospect of a Socialist government that might
substantially alter Greece's domestic and foreign policy course,
many Greeks who currently support Papandreou to protest New Democracy's
shortcomings may have second thoughts in the voting booth.
Nonetheless, there is a slightly better than even chance that the Socialists will
edge out New Democracy and secure a parliamentary plurality.
-- Papandreou's flamboyant personality, his ability to beguile the
electorate with populist and demagogic rhetoric, and the modern party
machine he has forged will work to his advantage.
-- Moreover, the very real problems facing the country--inflation,
deterioration in the quality of life, disputes with Turkey in
which the US is perceived to be tilting toward Ankara--along with
the apparent desire of many Greeks for change and widespread
confidence that Karamanlis would curb Papandreou's excesses, could 25X1
persuade voters to give the Socialists a try.
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If neither party wins a majority, both would look first to the small
centrist parties for coalition partners.
-- If New Democracy failed to forge a centrist coalition, it
would not be averse to cooperating with the far right.
-- Papandreou, however, would call for new elections in lieu of
joining forces with the Communists.
-- The Greek Communists are militantly pro-Soviet.
-- The Greek military--nervous enough about a Socialist
government--would probably not tolerate Communist participation.
The closeness of the contest, the inordinate importance of foreign policy in
Greek elections, and the Greek perception that the US plays a major role in Greek
affairs suggests that Washington could influence the election outcome by its policies
toward Greece over the next few months.
-- US political, economic, and diplomatic support for Greece would
redound to New Democracy's advantage; perceived US indifference
would help the Socialists.
-- Any US largesse or tilt toward Greece by Washington, however,
would have to be balanced against the possible damage to US
relations with Turkey.
The US Bases
The Greek government suspended bilateral defense negotiations on 17 June because
the US would not:
-- Make available at concessionary prices a wide range of military
equipment, particularly advanced fighter aircraft.
-- Consent to Greek demands for the right to halt unilaterally US
operations from Greek bases and to exercise greater command
of base operations.
Behind the scene, the decision was heavily influenced by domestic political
considerations and fear of a US tilt toward Turkey.
-- An accord would have been more of an election liability than a
benefit given the final US position and the surge in Papandreou's
popularity.
-- The Greek government could not afford to accept an agreement that
did not clearly ensure the military balance with. Turkey.
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In the meantime, the four principal US military facilities* continue to
operate normally.
The government would reopen negotiations if it were returned to power in the
fall and an accord would likely be reached. A victory by Andreas Papandreou and his
Panhellenic Socialist Movement, on the other hand, would preclude a new agreement
and place the future of some base activities in jeopardy. Although Papandreou
would not be inclined to close the bases, lest he antagonize the military and
President Karamanlis, he could:
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-- Demand substantial quantities of US military equipment as the
price for the continued presence of US facilities.
-- Draw up a timetable for gradual withdrawal of US military
personnel and the closure of the bases.
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