DISCUSSIONS WITH BEIJING ON TAIWAN ARMS SALES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84B00049R001303210011-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 13, 2006
Sequence Number:
11
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 8, 1982
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
Approved For Release 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP84B00049RO01303210011-5
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Notional Intellig.nce Council
-- NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: John Holdridge`s Trip to Beijing
Attached are comments I sent John for
possible use with the Chinese.
cc DDCI -t/
C/NIC
VC/NIC
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303210011-5
Approved For Release 200hEi8T: CIA-RDP84B00049R001 30321 001 1-5
Discussions with Beijing on Taiwan Arms Sales
Each side will deal some strong cards and some weak cards in discussing
Taiwan arms sales.
Strong US Cards
-- We have decided against selling the FX
-- We have already shown our reasonableness by agreeing to talk about
Taiwan
-- Continued F5E coproduction and sale of second-hand F104Gs is
equivalent to supplying like kind replacements
-- We are willing to limit sales to quantity and quality levels of the
the recend.past
-- We have put the Chinese on the defensive. over Huang Hua's "unilateral
ultimatum" that we stop sales fntil a permanent solution is found
through bilateral talks.
Strong Chinese Cards
-- They are successfully psoing as the injured party
-- Having publicly positioned themselves to accept retrogression,
the threat to do so is real to us
-- In recent months they have escalated their demands, thus giving
them room for compromise
-- They have reached a decision to allow continued sales if an
overarching principle is established.
And each side holds some weak cards.
Weak US Cards
-- We don't want a retrogression in relations at this time
-- The requirement for certification to Congress in late January
of early February of the recent military spare parts sale locks
us into timing which they are using against us
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-- The portion of an overarching principle that is most important
to us --- agreement that we continue arms sales -- will have to be
stated implicitly rather than explicity in order to gain. Chinese
acceptance.
Weak Chinese Cards
-- The p o.r.tion of an overarching principle that is most important
to them -- agreement that we will limit or end sales at an
undefined future time -- is difficult if not impossible for us
to accept
-- More of their position on arms sales is known to us than is our
position known to them
-- Deng Xiaoping is closely identified with relations with the US
and will be hurt somewhat if relations deteriorate.
The Chinese. are likely to resort to traditional Chinese negotiating
tactics.
Chinese Tactics
-- They. will talk very tough when trying to establish a suitable
overarching principle, claiming that we have ignored the
normalization agreement, insulted--their-honor and shown bad faith
in making a spare parts sale immediately following Huang Hua's
departure from Washington
-- Subsequently they will back off and claim to be`dispiaying great
flexibility in agreeing. to accept continued arms sales (whereas
agreement about our continued sales to Taiwan was actually reached
implicitly in December 1978).
. Possible US Tactics
-- We can negotiate about the overarching principle until an impasse
is reached
-- We can hold back our strong cards -- the decision not to sell the
FX and description of the F5E and F104G as replacements -- until
the impasse is reached and then put our strong cards on the table
coupled with a demand that they show an equal willingness to
accommodate our position.
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303210011-5