SOMALIA: STATUS OF THE ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001303260018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 4, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE FOR INTELLIGENCE
4 March 1982
MEMORANDUM
Somalia: Status of the Armed Forces
Somali President Siad, who begins 'a visit to Washington on 9
March, will seek increased military assistance in addition to
expanded economic and political support. Since he signed the
military access agreement with the United States in 1980, Siad has
attempted to become more closely identified with the US and has
counted on Washington and its allies to rebuild his country's weak
and disorganized military.
The effectiveness of Somalia's armed forces has declined
steadily since the end of the 1977-78 Ogaden War with Ethiopia. This
deterioration has been largely the result of combat losses--both the
Army and Air Force lost approximately 50 percent of their inventories
in the war--aging equipment, poor maintenance procedures, and the
lack of standardized equipment. The armed forces, totally supplied
by Moscow until the Somali-Soviet break in military relations in
1977, now have a mix of Soviet, Chinese and Western equipment. The
military also is experiencing personnnel problems that weaken its
*This memorandum was prepared by the Office of 25X1
African and Latin American Analysis and was co-ordinated with the National
Intelligence Officer for Africa and the Directorate of Operations. It was
requested by Mr. Curtis Kamman, Director, Office of East African Affairs,
Department of State. Information as of 2 March has been used in the
preparation of this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, West and East Africa Division, ALA, (U) 25X1
ALA M 82-10031
REV 4 MAR 92
DER MULTIPLE
DIA Review
Completed.
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combat capability. Tribal rivalries and economic unrest have led to
intra-unit clashes and a breakdown in unit discipline. These trends
are undermining the military's support for President Siad, who relies
on it to stay in power.
A substantial increase in military aid to Somalia by the United
States and its allies would strengthen Siad's domestic position
temporarily, but it also would carry a number of risks. A
revitalized Somali military probably would expand its support to
insurgents in Ethiopia's Ogaden Region and would be tempted to
reinsert regular combat forces into the Ogaden to disrupt Ethiopian
and dissident Somali operations. The US and its allies would then
find themselves open to charges of abetting Somali irredentism. An 25X1
improvement in Somalia's military capabilities would be especially
upsetting to Kenya, which remains an object of Somali irredentism and
also has a military access agreement with the United States.,,
The Military's Predicament
The deficiencies in Somalia's armed forces significantly
reduce its ability to respond to any concerted Ethiopian ground
attack or air activity, and to raids by anti-Siad Somali
dissidents. Ethiopian-supported insurgent operations, for
example, are successful because the Somali military lacks a quick
response capability and has little experience in counterguerrilla
fighting.
Mogadishu has had little success in attempts to solve its
military problems. Siad's efforts to acquire Western arms have
been frustrated by his refusal to renounce Somalia's irredentist
claims on Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. Somali technicians have
tried to keep some Soviet equipment in working order by
cannibalizing parts from damaged materiel but because of
declining inventories this effort is no longer effective.
Attempts to purchase spare parts have been frustrated by
Somalia's dismal economic situation--it has almost totally
depleted its foreign exchange--and the refusal of the Soviets to
provide any assistance since their expulsion. Romania has sold
some equipment to Somalia, but deliveries have been--limited by
Bucharest's demand for cash payment. In the non-Warsaw Pact
countries that have Soviet weapons, spare parts are either hard
to find or are overpriced. Egypt, for example, has provided
assistance to Somalia, but Cairo's prices are high and it also
demands cash.
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acquisition of non-Soviet equipment has compounded its
predicament. British tanks, Italian armored personnel carriers
and aircraft, and Chinese fighter-bombers have placed additional 25X1
burdens on Somalia's maintenance personnel and its inefficient
logistical network. In addition, many of these weapons are old
and are Dart for them are costly and difficult to obtain.
The problems of the Somali military are so fundamental and
widespread that only a total rebuilding effort would enable the
country'to defend itself effectively. The Army, 'however, does
have some capability to concentrate its limited resources for
specific operations. In these situations, it can coordinate its
forces, perform needed maintenance, and logistically support its
troops in combat. The improvement in the Ethiopian forces along
the border, however, has offset this capability during the past
year
The Threat to Somalia
Ethiopia and Libya are the main external threats to Somalia,
although their motives for wanting to overthrow the Siad regime
differ. Ethiopian leader Mengistu wants to blunt Somalia's
irredentist threat. He also is seeking revenge for Somalia's
1977-78 invasion of Ethiopia and Mogadishu's continued support to
guerrillas in the Ogaden Region. Qadhafi, on the other hand,
resents Siad's support for the Camp David Accords, his close ties
with Egypt, and Mogadishu's granting the US access-to its air and
naval facilities.
Addis Ababa and Mogadishu are engaged in a long standing
conflict for control of the ethnic-Somali inhabited areas of
eastern Ethiopia. Since independence in 1960, Somalia has
consistently assisted insurgent operations in the region, and the
two countries have clashed in two wars and numerous border
incidents.
,During 1980-81, Ethiopia expelled elements of the regular
Somali Army that had been supporting the Somalia guerrillas, and
substantially weakened the insurgency through an aggressive
military campaign. This allowed Addis Ababa to reestablish its
military superiority along the border. It has used this edge to
conduct occasional limited ground incursions across the border
and to fly airstrikes against military targets in Somalia to
retaliate for Mogadishu's support to the guerrillas.
In addition to using its regular forces to undermine Siad,
Ethiopia provides military assistance and training to the
dissident Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF), which is
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based in Ethiopia. The Libyans also provide financial and
military assistance to the group. As a result, the SDSF is
conducting increasingly bold raids against Somali military and
police facilities near the frontier. The SDSF itself does not
have the capability to overthrow Siad because its support within
Somalia is limited by its narrow tribal base and its
identification with Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the SDSF attacks
highlight the weaknesses of the Somali military and its
embarassing inability to defend the country. This, in turn,
increases the likelihood of a challenge to Siad from within his
own military.
The Army ?
DIA 25X1 the ability of the Somali
Army to perform its missions is weakened by two interrelated
problems--poor troop motivation and equipment deficiencies.
Morals problems are especially serious among Somali troops in the
border area. For the past four years these forces have been
subjected to the stresses of combat or a high alert status. In
addition, the steady stream of false alarms over pending
Ethiopian attacks have caused some units to become lax in
performing their duties, and periodic problems with pay,
promotions, and other. personnel matters have precipitated local
25X1 mutinies.
functions, but some have not been paid and have left. 25X1
The Army's lack of mobility hinders its efforts to counter
raids by Somali dissidents, to patrol along the border, and to
conduct reconnaissance missions inside Ethiopia. Many Army
trucks and other support vehicles are inoperable and Italian
supplied armored personnel carriers are also beginning to
experience maintenance problems. As a result, the Army often
fails to respond quickly to attacks on isolated outposts,
resorted to hiring foreign technicians to perform these
The military's effectiveness.also has been undermined by
disturbances in the north caused by the dominant Issak tribe's
growing unhappiness with Siad's discriminatory tribal policies. 25X1
This unrest has sparked some mutinies and the defection of up to
several hundred Issak officers and enlisted men. Siad has had
little success in bringing the situation under control.
The Army is faced with serious maintenance and mobility
difficulties. The Soviet advisers taught the Somalis how to
operate their equipment but performed almost all the repair work
themselves. As a result, Somali technicians know little about
preventive maintenance or major repair work, resulting in a
steady decline in equipment operability. The military has
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arrive.
allowing the guerrillas to withdraw before Somali reinforcements
The Air Force
er orm i s w'o primary missions--defense against Ethiopian air
o
the Somali Air Force lacks the capability
attacks and the provision of close air support for the Army. The
weakness is the result of inferior aircraft and the lack of
The major problem is the lack of interceptor aircraft
capable of matching the relatively sophisticated MIG-21s and MIG-
23s in the Ethiopian inventory.
trained pilots and maintenance technicians.
-- Mogadishu's MIG-17s are obsolete and suffer from
engine wear and a lack of spare parts.
-- Somalia's MIG-21s, which are older and less
sophisticated than the MIG-21 models possessed by
Ethiopia, are from five to ten years old. Few of
them are flyable and even these are nearing the end
of their engine lives.
- The Chinese-produced F-6s (MIG-19s) also are
inferior to Ethiopian aircraft. They are limited to
ground support missions because they lack the air-
to-air missiles necessary to be effective as
interceptors. Although most of the F-6s are
operational, the Air Force has few qualified pilots
for them.
Somalia suffers from a general lack of qualified pilots.
Many of its skilled personnel were killed during the 1977-78 war
and few of the remaining aircrews have flown combat missions.
This contrasts with Ethiopian pilots who fly extensive combat
missions in Eritrea Province and the Ogaden Region. Somali
pilots also suffer from a lack of flying time due to fuel
shortages and maintenance problems that periodically ground many
of their aircraft.
the Chinese have been
consistently frustrated in their deali ngs with the Somali Air
Force. Over half of the Somali F-6 pilot trainees have been
dropped from the program because of poor qualifications or
ineptness. Fuel and munition shortages have generally prevented
the Chinese from conducting more than basic flight training.
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They also have complained about the poor attitudes of the Somali
technicians who are to maintain the F-6s after the Chinese
leave.
ability to perform major engine work.
Only minimal maintenance is performed on Somali aircraft
because of a shortage of spare parts. Somali technicians, with
Egyptian assistance, have proven adept at cannibalization in an
effort to keep the MIG-17s and MIG-21s flying, but they lack the
Air Defense
The Somali Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) and Anti-Aircraft
(AAA) systems are generally ineffective and their operational
readiness is marginal to poor. Their capabilities are hindered
by a shortage of spare parts, the poor condition of the
equipment, limited training opportunities, a lack of preventive
maintenance, and poor communications. The weaknesses are so
extensive that it would take a major overhaul of the entire
system and significant outside assistance to make it effective.
Somalia's early warning radar network, designed to alert the
country to a pending Ethiopian air attack, is of little value.
The radars--which were provided by the Soviet Union--are in poor
condition, suffering from a shortage of spare parts and poor
maintenance. Many of them are functional for only a few hours a
25X1 day.
25X1 he air defense
DIA forces suffer from a poor communications system. Many of the
Soviet manufactured radios have broken down. As a result, even
if an air attack were detected, the radar site would be unable to
provide timely warning to the Air Force or air defense
positions. The communications problem also hinders defensive
coordination between sites.
The SAM system, which is designed to defend Somalia's major
population centers and air bases, provides little deterrence to
an air attack. The radars that support the SA-2 and SA-3 systems
no longer function because of inadequate maintenance and a lack
of spare parts. The liquid fuel SA-2 missiles are probably not
operational because of these problems, although the SA-3 system
appears to be in better shape because its solid fuel missile is
easier to maintain.
The AAA system, which consists primarily of 37mm guns and
smaller-caliber artillery, is incapable of sustained
operations. The air defense crews are well disciplined and
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trained in drill procedures and simple engagement techniques, but
their equipment suffers from poor maintenance and prolonged
exposure to the elements. In addition, the crews have little
experience in firing live rounds because of the ammunition
.shortage. These forces were ineffective during the Ogaden
conflict in 1977 and while su ortin Somali Army incursions into
the Ogaden in 1978-80.
The Navy
The Navy is accorded the lowest priority -of Somalia's
military services. Mogadishu realizes that in the event of open
hostilities with Ethiopia the Navy's.,contribution would be
minimal. Its participation in the Ogaden War, for example,
consisted of logistical support to Somali forces in the northern
part of the country. As a result, it has received little
attention in recent years. 25X1
Because of this neglect; the Somali Navy is unable
effectively to perform its missions, such as coastal surveillance
and defense, cargo lift, and mine countermeasures. The OSA
missile boats, for example, the most sophisticated craft in the
Navy's inventory, have frequent engine problems and rarely
venture out of the port of Berbera. In addition, the inability
of the Somali Air Force to provide air cover would prevent the
Somali Navy from operating against the naval forces of Ethiopia
and South Yemen, its potential opponents. 25X1
Like the other services, the Somali Navy has serious
maintenance problems. The Soviets provided all of Somalia's
naval craft, and almost all maintenance was performed by Soviet
advisers prior to their expulsion in 1977. Since then, the
Navy's ability to maintain its equipment has been limited by
inadequate spare parts and support facilities. Egypt has
provided limited amounts of spare parts and maintenance
assistance, but Cairo terminated the arrangement because of
Somalia's inability to pay. Romania provides some training for a
small number of Somali naval students. 25X1
Implications for the US
US interest in Somalia is based on the agreement signed in
1980 permitting US access to Somali air and naval facilities.
Siad will continue his attempts to build on that US interest, to
become closely identified with the United States and to make
Somalia more important to Washington's defense plans in the
region. Siad will use his ties to the US and his general support
for Western policies to appeal for significant military
assistance.
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The basic problems that have prevented a more extensive US-
Somali arms supply relationship are not likely to change. These
include:-
Mogadishu's refusal to renounce its Irredentist
claims on Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia.
Somalia's continued support to the insurgents
operating in Ethiopia's Ogaden Region.
The massive financial cost of rebuilding Somalia's
military capabilities.
Mogadishu's inability to pay for major arms
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A successor regime probably would continue the country's
pro-Western policies in the short term. Most Somali military
officers support the idea of looking to the US for help, and the
country's perennial hostility toward Ethiopia limits chances for
an early rapprochement with Ethiopia's Soviet patron. The new
leadership would expect the US and its allies to be more generous
with military aid, however, and if this did not occur the Somali
Government over time probably would attempt a rapprochment with
the Soviet Union. Such a policy shift would jeopardize the US
decline, these factions are likely to move to oust Siad.
Siad's failure to strengthen the country's military has led
to a growing frustration in the armed forces and may be
encouraging some coup plotting among senior officers. This will
make Somalia a regional ally of questionable stab for the
foreseeable future, some Somali
officers believe th a west's refusal to provide more than
limited defensive arms stems from a distrust of Siad. Siad's
refusal to initiate ma r d political reforms,
is the reason. Siad is
increasing y seen by these military leaders as the source of
Somalia's problems. If the situation in Somalia continues to
position in Somalia and US access to Somali facilities.
Any substantial increase in Western military aid-,to Somalia
would pose problems for Washington and regional nations. Despite
a recent thaw in Kenyan-Somali relations, Nairobi still fears any
improvement in Somalia's military capabilities and would press
the US for increased assistance. Nairobi also could threaten to
restrict US access to its air and naval facilities in an effort
to discourage the United States from rearming Somalia. Ethiopia,
for its part would respond to increased US aid to Somalia by
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moving still closer to the Soviet Union and Cuba. Addis Ababa
would probably also increase its efforts to topple Siad before
makes any significant improvement in his military posture.
A revitalized Somali military almost certainly would become
more aggressive on the Ogaden issue, viewing Western assistance
as both a military and political commitment. The military is a
major supporter of Somali irredentism, and if it were
strengthened would seek once again to support guerrilla
operations and use its own regular forces in the Ogaden to keep
Ethiopia away from the Somali border. In such a situation the
United States and its allies would find themselves open to
charges of supporting Somali military adventures in the region.
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se R1 T
Somali Ground Order of Battle
Personnel: 50,000
Major Equipment:
Tanks: 162 Total
Inventory Source
Remarks
T-34
39
(USSR and Egypt)
T-54/55
72
(USSR and Egypt)
CENTURION
40
(Kuwait)
M-41
11
(US)
Captured from Ethiopia
Armored Personnel Carriers:
391
Fiat 6614/16
270
(Italy)
BTR-152
100
(USSR)
May not be operational
BTR-60
10
(USSR)
May not be operational
M-113
11
(US)
Captured from Ethiopia
Artillery/Rocket Launchers:
400
Anti-Tank
106 mm Recoilless Rifle 200 Pakistan
MILAN Launcher 95 France
STRIM Launcher Unknown France
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Somali Air Force
Personnel: 1000
Equipment:
Fighter
Possess
Operational
Pilots
F-6 (Chinese Mig-
19) 29
25
15
MIG-21
11
4
9
MIG-17/15
13
7
6
Transport
G-222 2
1
10
AN-24 2
0
AN-26 2
0
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V LVL 1
Somali Navy
Personnel: 2,860
Equipment:
Possess
Operational
OSA-II Missile Attack Boat (P'IG)
2
2
MOL Torpedo Boat
(PTF)
2
2
P-6 Torpedo Boat
(PTF)
4
1
MOL Patrol Boat
2
2
~OLUCHAT-l Patrol Craft
5
0
POLNOCNY Landing Craft (LSM)
1
0
T-4 Landing Craft
4
4
NYRYAT II Diving Tender
1
1
*In Egypt for repair.
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Ethiopia-Somalia: Order of Battle Comparison
Somalia
Army
Personnel 50,000a
Tanks 160
Artillery 412
Mortars 455
Air Defense guns 290
Armored vehicles 390
SAM Battalions 10
Navy
Personnel 2860
Missile Attack boats 2
Patrol Boats 5
Air Force
Personnel
Jet fighters
Reconnaissance
Helicopters
Transports
1000
50
3500
4
14
3500-4000
112
12
45c
30
aTotal includes personnel from Air Defense Command subordinate to Army Headquarters.
bFigures exclude some 200 tanks, about 135 field artillery pieces, nearly 200 armored vehicles
and some 40 air defense suns purchased by the Ethiopians from the Soviet Union but assigned to Cuban
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CFigure includes air rescue, transport, and assault helicopters.
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Ethiopia
250,000a-260,000a
525-625b
500-600b
1100-1308
500-550
500-600b
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Somali Order of Battle
'6th Garbr
Harre
Name. end boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
Uanle Uen ,
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4 Air base
(y Naval base
SA-2 I SA-3
Secret
0 150