SYRIA: VIEWS ON THE PEACE PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403480027-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2007
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: October 14, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Apprdved-for -Release 2007/051 Pt: -CIA-RDP84Bfl004-9R-001403480027-8
Special Analysis
The Syrians, who have pretensions to a role of leadership in
the Arab world, almost certainly were disappointed by the lack of
any special mention of Syria or the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights
in Washington's recent Middle East peace initiative. Damascus has
tended to play a spoiling role in past peace schemes and has con-
siderable potential for continuing to do so. For the time being,
however, President Assad's regime has been careful not to comment
too critically on the plan, and it probably will wait to see the
general direction of events in the area before committing itself
to a firm policy.
Damascus has good reason to adopt a low profile.
Syrian forces, dealt heavy blows by the Israelis, have
been expelled from Beirut and are in a more threatened
position in the rest of Lebanon. A Phalange-oriented
government has come to power in Beirut with the intention
of eliminating the remaining Syrian presence.
PLO chief Arafat's determination to resist Syrian
efforts to gain control of PLO policies has been rein-
forced by Syria's inability to prevent the PLO's expul-
sion from Beirut. Moreover, any reinvigoration of the
peace process could bring Jordan into discussions with
Israel on behalf of the PLO in a way that diminishes
Syria's role and further weakens Assad's bargaining posi-
tion.
1 -1
Syrian Objectives
Despite these setbacks, Syria's goals in any peace
agreement are unchanged. First and foremost, Damascus
seeks restoration of the Golan Heights to Syrian sover-
eignty. It also wants a settlement of the Palestinian
problem under terms acceptable to the PLO.
Syria also would expect to be recognized as 'a key
participant in any Middle East settlement--one capable
of blocking a settlement if it were not along acceptable
lines. Consequently, Syria seeks maximum control over
the PLO in order to ensure that this leverage will serve
Syrian, and not Jordanian, interests. 25X1
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Neither the proposals of the recent Arab summit in
Fez, Morocco, nor the US initiative meet these needs, and
Assad will be content for now to stand aside, expecting
one or both plans to fail in the face of Israeli intran-
sigence. If the initiatives do founder, Syria will be
better able than most other Arab states to escape bein
tainted by association with the proposals. 25X1
If the proposals seem to be making progress and
Syrian interests are ignored, however, the Syrians prob-
ably will act as spoilers. They may in fact be drawn
into this role if large numbers of radical Palestinians
reject the current peace process and seek the ~eadersh
of a major Arab state to advance their cause. 25X1
To scuttle any talks, Damascus could provoke a
political or military crisis in Lebanon to ensure strong
Israeli reaction. Alternatively, the Syrians could
instigate radical Palestinian action against the Israelis
or encourage radical Pglestini ns to foment trouble in
Jordan and elsewhere. 25X1
External Pressure on Damascus
Other countries will have only a minimum effect on
the approach Assad chooses; The USSR has hailed the
Fez plan for allotting it a role in the peace process,
but the Soviets probably would not push Damascus to
accept the plan if Syria's basic aims were not being
met. Moscow is likely to support and may encourage ef-
forts to impede the US plan, but this probably would not
have more than marginal impact.
Saudi Arabia's financial support gives it some
leverage. Assad, however, almost certainly will reject
Riyadh's demarches without reciprocal concessions by
The Syrians clearly are unwilling at this point to
reject the US initiative outright, but they will be
difficult to bring on board. If they try to become
spoilers, their success will depend largely on the ex-
tent aLd nature Israel's reaction to their provoca-
tions.