TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403490033-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: October 21, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/04/26: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403490033-0
CONFIDENTIAL
21 October 1982
Talking Points for the DCI
Yugoslavia
Fractious ethnic and regional interests are gaining strength
in post-Tito Yugoslavia. The ruling Communist party, ineffective
in coping with worsening economic conditions, faces criticism of
its weakness and pressures for democratization.
-- The collective hierarchy is stalemated between the need
for reforms and fear that significant changes could get
out of hand.
Regional administrations are increasingly in conflict on
economic issues and quarreling often blocks the
consensus required by law for national policymaking.
The leadership drift is eroding public confidence, and
the media regularly criticize Belgrade for its failures.
Ethnic tensions, primarily caused by a resurgence of
Serbian nationalism, are on the rise.
The economy is slowing after a decade of rapid expansion.
The need to repay foreign debts, coupled with low hard currency
earnings and inadequate loans from the West, is creating
pressures for rescheduling. But Belgrade is trying to avoid this
embarrassment by enacting ever broader and more unpopular
austerity measures and appealing for more Western financial help.
-- Industrial production is sagging due to cuts in imported
materials.
Energy shortages and cutbacks in oil imports led to
stiff gas rationing last week. Electricity shortages
forecast for this winter mean blackouts will be more
common.
To save hard currency, Belgrade also has imposed
financial obstacles to foreign travel and unofficially
limited drawings on private hard currency accounts.
A 20-30 percent devaluation is expected soon. (i\o VV4q' vk
Yugoslav leaders are upset that the West has not come to
their assistance. They fear grumbling may grow into unrest. If
it does, Moscow will have an opportunity to meddle in Yugoslav
affairs.
K
 Approved For Release 2007/04/26: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403490033-0
CONFIDENTIAL
-- The party knows that any attempt to restore its
authority forcibly would require crackdowns on liberals
and journalists which would erode Western sympathy.
-- Moscow has not yet meddled overtly but the declining
authority of the Yugoslav party and demands for more
democratization might serve as a pretext.
We expect that in an extreme crisis--which is not yet the
case in Yugoslavia--the military would intervene to "stabilize"
the situation.
So far, a few generals have joined in the criticism of
overall trends but none is obviously pressing for a
greater political role.
The party still has a chance to put its house in order
and we expect that there will be pressure soon to do
away with the ineffective collective leadership system.
The odds now are better than even that Yugoslavia will
enter a political crisis over the next year or two.
Such a crisis would entail threats to US security
interests in Southeast Europe.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/04/26: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403490033-0