TERRORIST THREAT REPORTING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403550012-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: December 28, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007~0E1Q: IAERJ) P84B00049R001403550012-6
28 December 1981
Breakfast Item for Acting DCI/SECDEF - 29 December 1981
SUBJECT: Terrorist Threat Reporting
1. There is no magic answer to the question of how to
improve the U.S. Intelligence Community's capacity to acquire,
report and disseminate information about terrorist threats against
U.S. interests, i.e. lives and installations. All of us agree
that we need more well-placed penetrations of major terrorist
organizations, a sustained high standard of professional handling
of sources and of our relations with foreign intelligence services
and an improvement in our analytical capability, both in the field
and at the national level.
2. At the same time, it should be pointed out that ter-
rorist threat reporting is a business filled with bear traps.
Intelligence professionals are uncomfortable with the "cry wolf"
nature of most terrorist threat information. Much is reported,
little ever takes place. If the target of the terrorist threat
is an important person, frequently there is overreaction--which
leads to a spate of reporting beyond any one agency's ability to
control, which in turns leads to false confirmation, to still
greater dissemination and so on through the vicious circle. The
Libyan threat to assassinate President Reagan is the most recent
example of terrorist threat information taking on a life of its
own.
3. Even with the prompt dissemination of well-sourced
warning information, there remains the difficult question of how
long we can reasonably maintain an alert status against a threat
to U.S. interests. Significant threat information circulated for
several months prior to both the Red Army Faction's attacks
against Ramstein AFB and General Kroesen in West Germany and the
Red Brigades kidnapping of General Dozier in Italy.
4. Experience shows that the most effective method of
guarding against a terrorist attack is exposure of terrorist
intentions. That exposure represents a dilemna between protec-
tion of sources and methods and the dissemination of enough of
the basic threat information to those responsible to ensure an
adequate security response. That dissemination often means
sharing with foreign intelligence services whose reactions are
not always predictable.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403550012-6
 Approved For Release 20075(055160: ~IP~-RgP841300049R001403550012-6
5. There is little doubt that foreign intelligence services
are attuned to terrorist threats which may impact against U.S.
interests and that they share this information with us freely.
Some of this information acquired is excellent. Most is marginal,
but we cannot ignore any threat to U.S. citizens and, therefore,
must treat each threat seriously. Also, even the better intel-
ligence services, such as those of Western Europe, seem to lack
the solid penetration sources which each should have to deal with
his own threat.
6. Field evaluation of threat reporting can and should be
improved. Generally, we do a competent job of evaluating/
assessing our unilateral reporting, but much of the information
from foreign intelligence and security services does not receive
the same scrutiny.
7. Thus, it is not a question of more reporting, but of
better reporting (and, more importantly, reporting over which we
have a measure of control), better exploitation of sources and
better analysis. The basic expertise is already available in the
U.S. Intelligence Community--what is required is much more of the
same.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403550012-6