MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403560041-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: March 24, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

6,0 POLICY
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSES LCIRETArY Cr L -fl~~r
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2 4 [?PR IS-81
In reply refer to:
1 -21418/81
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher (U)
(U) Time and Place: Friday, 27 February 1981, 1510-1605 hours, Room 3E912
(U) Participants:
US UK
Secretary of Defense, Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher
Caspar Weinberger Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Cabinet, Sir Robert
Frank Carlucci Armstrong
Charge, US Embassy London, Permanent Under Secretary, FCO, Sir
Edward Streator Michael Palliser
Dr. Fred Ikle Permanent Under Secretary, MOD, Sir
Under Secretary of Defense, Frank Cooper
Policy(Acting), Franklin Kramer Ambassador, UK Embassy, Sir Nicholas
Francis West Henderson
The Special Assistant, John Rixse Head, British Def Staff, Washington,
Director, EUR & NATO Affairs, ISA Air Marshal Sir Roy Austen-Smith
MG Richard Bowman, USAF Counselor, UK Embassy, John Weston
Military Assistant, BG Carl Smith Private Secretary to PM, Clive Whitmore
Country Dir for UK, J. Timberlake
1. (C) Special Relationship. Secretary Weinberger warmly welcomed Mrs. Thatcher
and noted her previous visits to the Pentagon. He is a strong believer in the
special relationship and felt its spirit was never more evident than at last
night's White House dinner. He complimented the Prime Minister on her toast.
Mrs. Thatcher said it had been a wonderful evening.
2. (C) DOD Budget. Mrs. Thatcher noted the preferential treatment being accorded
DoD in.the budget. Secretary Weinberger said that, even with favored treatment, DoD
must find ways to save money, and $3.6B in savings had been identified. But DOD,
because inflation had been underestimated, was now faced with over $40B more in
systems cost.
3. (S) Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. Mrs. Thatcher expressed gratitude for Trident.
She referred to the coming debate in Parliament on the UK's strategic nuclear deter-
rent and her desire to. get the support of as many Labor MPs as possible. The UK,
she said, must have its own strategic nuclear deterrent. Secretary Weinberger agreed.
Mrs. Thatcher, noting there is no defense against nuclear warheads, expressed concern
OSD Review completed
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about the possible consequences of Soviet R&D efforts in this area. Secretary
Weinberger agreed it was a great worry. He then gave a rundown on US efforts to
strengthen the three legs of the US strategic Triad to redress the balance. We
need the MX missile, but the problem is basing. The racetrack would require 4,600
shelters and cost $34B in current prices. There are other basing options, and
he has asked a group of scientists to look at this and report to him by July.
He was attracted by the possibility of putting the MX on old ships that
could be moved around. Dr. Ikle elaborated on basing modes and mixes that
would entail less political and environmental cost. Secretary Weinberger
explained that the US has environmental laws and procedures that can be used
to delay and block MX basing. That is a reason to look at the possibilities of
less controversial basing. We are also looking at ABM defenses and how we should
proceed when the ABM Treaty comes up for review in 1982.
4. (S) TNF. Secretary Weinberger said we plan to go ahead with the December 1979
TNF decision. He cited the need of a stronger anti-tank weapon in Europe and the
role a low blast weapon such as ERW could play. ERW, which makes everyone
so nervous, is not an issue at the moment, and the US will consult before
doing anything on it. Mrs. Thatcher noted the propaganda battles waged on ERW
and the difficulty of answering the argument that the weapon would lower the
nuclear threshold. Lord Carrington said part of the problem is that it is
considered unsporting in Europe for a weapon to kill people only. Sir Frank Cooper
interjected that to put the MX to sea could rebound against TNF. Schmidt had
talked of putting TNF at sea. Secretary Weinberger said he was aware of the
argument that if MX can be put at sea why not GLCMs and Pershing Its?
Mrs. Thatcher said it appeared to her that ships would be as vulnerable as
land-based sites. She referred to the problem of "nuclear paci.ficism" and the
need to uphold the TNF decision before the 'public. Every argument that can
be used against it will be used; ERW_is seen as an issue to knock out the
whole nuclear posture. Lord Carrington said the Germans, Belgians, and Dutch,
and, to a lesser extent, others feel that unless the 1979 commitment is upheld
to go ahead with negotiations, TNF could become unstuck. He had suggested to
Secretary Haig that the US resume talks. Some tangible signal is needed that
the US will go ahead in the future. Secretary Weinberger agreed we should not
abandon procedures to resume talks, but should enter into such negotiations
from a position of strength.
5. (S) Arms Cooperation. Secretary Weinberger noted the great success of
Rapier and announced we were recommending to Congress production of the AV-8B
Harrier and restoration of funds for JP-233. Mrs. Thatcher expressed gratitude
and asked when Congress would decide. Secretary Weinberger said sometime before
next October. Secretary Carlucci remarked that the UK should also buy AV-8B.
Sir Frank Cooper replied that the US decision would make the UK decision easier.
Mrs. Thatcher, observing the UK must earn its own way by exporting, presented
a surprise shopping list of eight pieces of UK equipment the US should also
consider for purchase: 81mm mortar, Searchwater radar, Wavell, Giant Viper,
ship stabilizers, Stingray, Scorpion light tanks, and Hawk. She stressed the
need, in view of the enormous cost of weapons, to avoid duplication of R&D
and to rationalize weapons procurement. These were the important principles
behind her shopping list. Secretary Weinberger said DoD was aware of the
importance of defense sales going both ways and agreed on the need to equalize
the balance. In response to her comment that NATO must get better value for
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money over and above 3 percent, Secretary Weinberger agreed that every effort
should be made to rationalize arms procurement, and he also agreed with
Sir Frank Cooper's statement on the air-to-air missile family that all partici-
pants had. to play fair and have confidence in each other. The Secretary
intended to pursue the question of arms cooperation further with the UK.
6. (C) UK-NATO Study Initiative. Mrs. Thatcher restated the UK desire for a
NATO study to look at how NATO could become more cost effective. Lord Carrington
noted that NATO spends much more on defense than the Warsaw Pact, but gets less
out. Everybody wants to do everything and the result is greater cost.
Mrs. Thatcher said that Chancellor Schmidt's reaction to the study idea was that
it would only help other Allies do less. She recognized it may not be the
right time to raise the issue and that it must be carefully handled. But it
must be looked at.
7. (S) Southwest Asia and Persian Gulf Security Referring to the Rapid
Deployment Force RDF , Mrs. Thatcher said the UK was anxious to help. She
noted that most UK forces are committed to NATO and it is difficult to
detach them. But it has to be done. Secretary Weinberger said the RDF was
another item he and Secretary Carlucci were studying. They are not satisfied
with the concept. He believes it essential that planning for use of the RDF
in the Middle East must be done in concert. The French were being very helpful.
Lord Carrington observed that it is easier for the French because they do
not assign forces to NATO. All UK forces are so assigned. One way for
the UK to contribute is to get the Germans and other Allies to fill the gap
if UK NATO-assigned forces are assigned' elsewhere. Secretary Carlucci noted
the UK already has assets in the area. The policy of the present Administration,
unlike the previous one, is to seek greater collaboration of Allies out of the
area. Secretary Weinberger said it is very important to keep the Middle East
free. of Soviet influence. It would be very useful if agreements could be
worked out with the Germans, Italians, and others to fill the gap of UK NATO
forces assigned elsewhere. US-UK cooperation on this should be done quickly;
we are not as far advanced as we should be. The US is seeking a permanent
military presence in the Gulf. Diego Garcia is a long way away. The F-15-
deal with Saudi Arabia is designed to help. We already have an effort in
Saudi Arabia, but we need a troop presence and a good solid base from which
to land and operate. This is the only way to deter Soviet probes. Mrs. Thatcher
agreed that a permanent presence is the best way to deter. Secretary.of State Nott
can pursue RDF further with Secretary Weinberger on 11 March. Secretary
Weinberger agreed.
RICHARD C. BOWMAN
Major General, USAF
Director, Eur& NATO
Affairs -
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