VISIT OF HORST EHMKE WITH RICHARD PERLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403560044-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: March 27, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DENSE 1 `l
-ECr TA 1\Y OF LLF ENCt
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 ak /Is, 7- -S - - -
rD POLICY
SUBJECT: Visit of Horst Ehmke with Richard Perle (U)
In reply refer to:
1-21052/81
27 March 1981
(U) Horst Ehmke, a member of the FRG Bundestag and a Deputy Chairman of the
SPD Caucus, visited Richard Perle in the office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (International Security Policy) on 25 March 1981, from 1100 to
1200. Main points of discussion were the following:
(S) LRTNF Arms Control Proposal: Mr. Ehmke asked if it might be possible to
table a "politically sexy" LRTNF negotiating proposal in the fall of 1981, prior
to the spring 1982 SPD Conference. He suggested the West could tell the USSR
to take it or leave it and then tell Western publics that resolution was up to
the Soviets; if the Soviets did not accept the proposal the West would go ahead
with LRTNF modernization. Mr. Perle said we should tell the Soviets that the
West was going forward with. LRTNF modernization and if the Soviets were willing
to negotiate seriously the West would be serious. He did not question the NATO
LRTNF decision, but the West was at a disadvantage in that on the Soviet side.
the General Staff wrote the negotiating position while in the West everyone,
including the press, was involved. The question was how can an agreement be
obtained without the Soviets gaining advantage. Mr. Perle then provided an
overview of past SALT negotiations, making a number of observations in this con-
text: constraint was exercised by the US even when there was no arms control;
from the US side it was not true that there was an ever increasing arms spiral;
and funding for US strategic forces and US elements in the strategic balance were
smaller in real terms today than they were in the latter part of the 1960s and
early 1970s. He favored trying arms control but not if the results would be
perverse with the West worse off. One reason many opposed SALT II was that the
protocol established that NATO cruise missiles could not reach Soviet territory
while Soviet SS-20s were unconstrained. He hoped that LRTNF negotiations would
not go forward until the protocol expires at the end of 1981. It was not clear
yet how the US would approach SALT, but it would not be limited to fine-tuning
SALT II. Mr. Ehmke said the West might have to pursue a piecemeal approach to
arms control rather than develop a comprehensive approach. The Soviets appeared
scared by the US defense increases, and they might now be willing to make con-
cessions. Some Europeans were afraid the US would forget about negotiations.
Mr. Perle replied the US wants to deter, not scare, the USSR.
(S) Nuclear Systems and Thresholds: Mr. Perle stated that NATO should make
every effort to raise the nuclear threshold. Conventional forces should be
improved, and some assets assigned nuclear missions, such as some dual capable
aircraft, should be converted to conventional missions. LRTNF modernization
OSD Review completed
CLASSIFIED BY: DIR, EUR & NATO AFFAIRS
DECLASSIFY ON: 27 March 1987
ZFrRFT 360 3
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would make TNF systems less vulnerable to SS-20 attacks. Improved LRTNF
capability would make the Soviets disperse their forces and thus reduce the
effectiveness of their armor. In response to a question from Mr. Ehmke,
Mr. Perle expressed the view that Enhanced Radiation Weapons would not lower
the nuclear threshold; there would be only a very minimal inclination by
leaders to use ERW before they were prepared to use other nuclear weapons.
He favored the least damaging, most discrete weapons to accomplish the task
and was amazed that the clergy argued against more discriminate weapons.
Mr. Ehmke said the clergy and students did not want facts and complicated
arguments; the new generation had not thought its way through deterrence and
defense. Mr. Perle suggested that Mr. Ehmke was in a privileged position to
help educate the public.
(S) Sea-based Systems: In response to a question about Secretary Weinberger's
interest in placing MX on submarines, Mr. Perle said SecDef was considering all
options and that the issue was under study. The US would need survivable land-
based forces; he personally questioned placing MX at sea because of the require-
ments for accuracy and multiplicity of challenges for the Soviets. He emphasized
that the US was not moving toward having no nuclear systems on US territory, offer-
ing to provide a map showing nuclear bases in the US even without MX. Mr. Ehmke
remarked that if the US deployed the MX at sea there would be a rekindling of
arguments in Europe in favor of placing LRTNF at sea.
(S) Technology Controls: Mr. Perle expressed concern that the USSR was catching,
and in some areas, surpassing the US in technology. In recent years the leading
edge of technology in the West had come from the commercial sector, not the
military. He referred to high competition among Allies to do business with the
USSR and asked for support from Germany in US efforts in COCOM to tighten up on
exports to the USSR. Mr. Ehmke, while noting that Germany was not a leader in
many areas of technology and that the Bundestag played no real role in technology
control, expressed confidence that the FRG would be willing to help if the US
makes a convincing case.
(U) At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Ehmke said he would like to have
Mr. Perle invited to a security panel meeting on 19-21 June in Bonn which will
include participants from Allied countries as well as Messrs. Schmidt, Genscher,
and Apel.
Prepared by; Approved by:
James W. Morrison
OASD/ISP/EUR & NATO
GEO v ADER
Dep ty D ector
Eur p eQtLZ NATO Affairs
Distribution:
Mr. Rixse
Dr. lkle
Mr. Perle
Mr. West
- Ms: Frost
MG Bowman
MG Boverie
Mr. Finch
Mr. Estes
Mr. Konfala
Col Johnson
Col Pfieffer
SECRET
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