PERSONNEL SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403590011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 8, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

pproved For Release 2007/04/26: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403590011-3
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FROM: (N me;. arm, mbol Agency/Post)
D/ ve secretary
--.-10 -June 1981
 Approved For Release 2007/04/26: CIA-RDP84B00049R00140359001,
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
JUN 8 19%1
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Personnel Security
This is to inform you of a critical situation the
Department of Defense is facing--concerning personnel
security investigations--and actions we are taking to bring
about a prompt and positive resolution.
In 1976 the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) suffered
a 40o congressionally-directed resource cut; subsequently,
personnel security investigative requests have increased by
27%.
Consequently, completion times for background investi-
gations have gone from 60 days to over 155 days. They are
estimated at 171 days by the end of this fiscal year.
Moreover, the DIS investigative backlog at that time will
approach 100,000 cases. For the past year DIS has opened
1,000 cases more per week than they closed.
Under these circumstances the overburdened investiga-
tive system simply cannot deliver a product of the required
quality, and the number of personnel, including industrial
contractor employees, who cannot be utilized productively in
programs at all levels of sensitivity--for lack of clearance
over extended periods of time--continues to increase. The
resultant impact upon DoD operational readiness/mission
accomplishment is simply unacceptable.
Last year OSD effected a very sizeable augmentation of
DIS and,.additionally, made a number of policy readjustments
designed to insure a more efficient investigative effort;
however, this has not proved to be sufficient. I have found
it necessary to take further measures.
Accordingly, the following actions are being implemented
this date to continue until the situation is brought into
proper balance:
o A moratorium has been placed on -
all--Periodic.-Reinvestigations.
o Background Investigations of persons requiring
only Secret access are to be discontinued.
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o Background/Special Background Investigations will
be discontinued for summer hires. (Access will be
limited to Secret.)
o The Personal Interview-Oriented Background Inves-
tigation will be conducted in lieu of the BI.
o Heads of DoD components are to make heightened
efforts to upgrade the effectiveness of command
internal security programs (including those
required by DCID 1/14)..
The measures outlined above do represent a departure,
from routine practices. But we believe they are necessary
for more effective use of our investigative resources.
Moreover, implementation of the Personal Interview-Oriented
Background Investigation will significantly improve the
quality of our investigative effort. This, combined with
increased emphasis upon command security programs, should
have the net effect of overall enhanced personnel security.
There is a way in which you might help us. Within the
body of sensitive compartmented information, there is infor-
mation of varying sensitivity. We would like you to assist
us by addressing the extent to which the amount of compart-
mented information might be reduced, thereby reducing the
requirements of personnel for such access.- If such 'a reduc-
tion cannot be accomplished, the pressure on DIS resources
will be compounded; moreover,- we will be faced with an ever
increasing number of personnel "cleared" above the level
which their duty functions actually require, thus potentially-
exposing intelligence sources and methods to unnecessary risks.
Moreover, consideration is being given to utilizing the
new type-BI (described above) in lieu of the present SBI.-.I
have asked the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
to obtain comments from the heads of DoD Components affected
and give me his recommendation on this-proposal within
thirty days.
Finally, in order to increase the capability of DIS to
meet the greatly expanding workload,.we are taking several
emergency actions. First, the Military Departments are being
requested to provide investigative personnel to DIS on a
temporary detail basis. Second, we intend to enter into
personal service contracts with retired Federal investigators.
This pogl of experienced talent can provide some.quick
assistance in clearing out the DIS investigative-backlog.
Third, I am directing a significant augmentation in DIS re-
sources for FY 1982.
`'. I wanted you to be aware of this situation and will
certainly keep you posted on developments.