RAMIFICATIONS OF PLANNED US NAVAL EXERCISE IN THE GULF OF SIDRA,(SANITIZED)1981

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP84B00049R001503630013-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 13, 2007
Sequence Number: 
13
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 10, 1981
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP84B00049R001503630013-5.pdf461.47 KB
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Approved For Release 2007/03/14 :CIA-RDP84B00049R001503630013-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/14 :CIA-RDP84B00049R001503630013-5 Approved For Release IIv~TERAGFNCi iii2~LLIGE~G?a ':~5,~..,..::_'.~=' 14 e-~iFy,.~t 1981 I2AMIFrCATIGNS OF PLA?T:v~D US >~~~~4~AL I;;?;~RCI5F IN TiiE GULF Or SIDRA, 1.941 503630013-5 25X1 This assessment was prepared at the recruest of the Di.~ector of Central Irtelliger~ce under the auspice:a of the Natior_al Sntell~_~~~r_ce Of~'icer for Near East and South Asia. Contributions Frere pro- w? ded l~v the Bureau of Irtellicencc C:nd R::searc ~, Department of State; tho De fer?se i~]telli crrce Aceracy; the National Security Aea*ZCy; ~_rnVt`~e intellic-~?nce organizations of tt=.~ ?'~rrny, Air Force, Na?,ry, an.c I.1 sine Corps -` has b on caordirated at the w~~rkirg level. SU~iP..FcY COP;CT,US70:~'S -- The Li.~:yazi ^ov;~rn.~nent .s lik alv tc: vier t?~e exercise as a eonsNirac_- directed affairs t it. The ~ossib~_lity of a hostil~~ tac~,._tc~Fl reactian re.~z;ltin-s in .a C~;i_~ri7 sn- ~_s real. Even ~?:w gout. ,4~.c:1~1 a s~._rraish ~~:.he uib~'~u: Co~~~::Y~^~-~~- i .a.a__t"i a. t. Z'clV view tae pen: vr~~~ion of its clair;lad .CZ cni~,~ the United ;~ because of the current sofT,: oil market, == ~',l-es , Italy, and Greece could readily obtain alternate s;:.;~.;.zces of high-ctualit crude. Italian companies operatin in Lib a Sc:ne US and experience short-term supp~ Y ~ however, might For its Y Problems if der__ed L~.byan oil. part, Tripoli's substantial cushion of S1 billion in foreigts alone could finar_;~n r imports . _ more t.ian a.ie 25X1 year of Nationalization. Qadh~." t c:_ .;;_d also cCz-ry c:~~tt his oft-repeated threat to natic . .1., interests of US companies o:-? - the rema, ~?zng ='tYuity believe, however, that suG~-:- :' g ir_ Libya.. Wei ao r_ot Although prone to _ `-?'~-_.reme respo~:se likely. of the early 1970spreC-pitc~-? ~~ctior_s, sincE: i.he _.::cesses Qadliafi ~s ~argely kept `Zis :,._zcs oz"f the petroleum inuustry, regarding it both as lis ~:11arantee of international influence ~.nd as r the welfare society t~ ~ his source ~:,~ ; i:iids for cent. Despite the closinYlaflfkthe p s peopl"e '-arc:.ly au.~.es- 11 lYC1CJII- ington, Libya has continued to treatotl e oil ~~~:om~l zniE(S~) r:-, jo., as potential allies than as tools of JS - ro Qadhafi's response was to inter: or expeloLS~'~~ Y`' however, personnel from tree county ~il company production capability would dec?~,n a few mon~.:is Libya's oil .the order of 700,000 to 1.2 million b/d~~ `"o a level on 25X1 Harassment of US ~'' The most likely Libyan reaction to a US exercises that rltizens, some de ree of esuited in a militarl? incicent wc~a~_-? b g hvera~_1 U't:-US co11 ~. " : on in t.Y~.e e:;erc1 Ce . -- Frar? ___. was been mare supportive . ~: Ca~t;~ Uavi d than othc;: :st European states but ,..~..~~d r_ut undc-rsta.~t.i why t - -_ington would cho~:~se to c:::r,:~"~lic;.te an ~.lread.y~ ' voles ~___. _..~~ Micidl~ East si-:;uation. ~=:ittez~rard would be di~,~~leased at ITS diss`eaard fo~~ his ?.mentions to attempt to improve relations with Libya. Any incident--with ar ~~~ithout cansulatior_---,could set back efforts to coardinafe US and French hTorth African policy. -- Italy would worry morE:.=:^out the safetj- of Italians in Libya and of Libya-.:- ..nd Americans _. 1 Italy than about the im_~r~ediate e- -_:.-amic effects o:_ an eil boycott. -- _Greece would also be - r;cerned far thc~ ~af_ety of Greek workers in Li.~." ~_. Opposi.tien le_.:?er Papar_dreau might use tha US act ~cn---aIld Libyan r~:~,_ .ion to it--as amrau::ition in his electoral car .-?=ic-n against close Greek ties to the United. estates. Arab t~'orl.d Reaction Y~y and within other Arab and. I:~lam- .: >i:ates to any exercise:-related incident wi 11 lar~saly cepen": ox~ whet3.er expanded. ho.:;tilities ensue and an the ~~r~~:~:.;istin J or eni:atiar~ of particular iaaticrs toward the Qa:ihafi ~-~~gir. _ ~t p.rapaa:?~ ~a to be es c,. ;11 stridznt ~ ~- ~~? .~.~ t:re L'..-_,. _:i P - Y in ~ n effort ...o _s States, Ec~r? ~, and Israel whip aligning the ~:;p, ws_th t~~__. Arab states . In addition, Moscow will use t.h~.~ eszr.:nle a W L:S "aggressic;:~ ~.o exacerbate an~i-~'~-~aricun '- ~ -~-- _' ?. G. '.:1 _'_i..~ ilk Y'r `'.~jt~?-... Europe. ;r.: , .~=~iiate Soviet military re action, i~owever, ~i s ?likely to :;, ycw--key and limited to surveil ~ ance by the US~~