TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001503800020-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: January 12, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2006/06/14: CIA-RDP84B00049R001503800020
PART II -- MAIN EDITION -- 12 JANUARY 1982
WALL STREET JOURNAL 12 JANUARY 1982 Pg. 32
Technology Transfers to the Soviet Union
By CABPAa W. WEnvasreose the U.S, or those who participate in the in- present new evidence to our allies on how
A few months ago a fisherman working
off the coast of North Carolina picked up
what turned out to be an intelligence gath-
ering device neatly enclosed in a Soviet
oceanographic current meter. This device
and others like It are used to gather vital
information about the U.S. Navy's activi-
ties and could be extremely harmful to us
If employed in war.
At the heart of this device is a modern
printed circuit board. It and several others
have been brought to my office the past six
months. Most were packaged for military
purposes and all were designed for use in a
wide variety of weapons systems, including
ballistic missiles, "fire and forget" weap-
ons, and guidance and control for aircraft
to name a few.
What surprised me most was that these
sophisticated devices were not made in the
United States. Nor were they produced in
Europe or Japan. They were products of
the Soviet Union.
Specialists in the Department of De-
fense tested these circuit boards carefully.
They found many of the components, par-
ticularly the microcircuits, to be exact cop?
ies of "chips" made in the United States.
In fact, a U.S. chip was put on the Soviet
circuit board and worked properly. Such
microelectronic circuits are used exten-
sively In our strategic and conventional
weapons systems. Clearly the Soviets have
made remarkable progress in being able to
copy and manufacture advanced electronic
equipment of this kind.
Alarming Implications
How the Soviet Union got the manufac-
turing know-how and circuit design infor-
mation to build these components is a story
as complicated as its Implications are
alarming. The simple answer is that the
Soviets have organized a massive, system-
atic effort to get advanced technology from
the West. The purpose of this is to support
the Soviet military buildup.
This unusual acquisition program fol-
lows two paths-openly whenever possible
Ind clandestine when not. The Soviets
make a maximum effort to get technology
from the West by claiming a need for
equipment to be used in strictly civilian en-
terprises. An example is their effort to ob-
tain modern medical equipment such as
CAT scanners which require sophisticated
computer technology to operate.
Using civilian cover, during the 1960s
and 1970s the Soviets moved quicklyto,pur-
chase electronics technology. Our bureau-
cracy was asleep to the danger of this, so
nothing was done to prevent it. As a result,
the Soviets were able to set up a number of
specialized electronics factories - all of
which are operated today as classified fa-
cilities. Where t r~ey were unaeto get eitfier
ternational Control System ICOCOMI to the Soviet Union an arsaw fact are
yield advanced technology, the Soviets em- using Western technology to strengthen
ployed a number of clandestine means. their offensive military capabilities. We
Businessmen, engineers, scientists and want to conclude at that meeting a redefin-
workers have been bribed. Innocent-look- ition of the COCOM international control
ing corporations have been created to buy program.
equipment later sent to the U.S.S.R. Diplo- I am also working to involverNAT'
mats and official visitors have been used to One of the peculiar aspects of the control':
ferret out items of Interest. Neutral and system is that defense interests are poorly
nonaligned states are targeted for exploita- represented. For example, only the United
tion. And, where all else fails, intelligence States sends Department of Defense ex-
missions have been run by Soviet agents. perts to COCOM, even though COCOM's
The Soviets obtain considerable benefit main purpose is. to safeguard technology
The Soviets have organized a massive, systematic
effort to get advanced technology from the West. The
purpose is to support the Soviet military buildup.
from these complicated maneuvers. Each
year they save billions of dollars in re-
search and development costs by "bor-
rowing" Western technology. They get
hardware and know-how that is proven and
trouble-free. These acquisitions can be,
and often are, supported by additional de-
velopments In the West. Indeed, merely
reading the full range of technical litera-
ture openly published gives the Soviets the
ability to repair and maintain products
they have acquired illegally.
But the most significant and troubling
aspect of all this is how the Soviets use the
equipment they have gathered to add to
their military power. And this is our great-
est concern.
An important part of our own national
defense as well as the security of our allies
and friends around the globe is the
"quality edge" we have enjoyed for many
years. This advantage is largely the result
of the talent and skill produced by our free
enterprise. system. We have made use of
this asset effectively in supporting our na-
tional defense programs. It is one of the
pillars of our security.
Unlike some, who from time to time
criticize our defense programs, the Soviets
understand how important the quality edge
is to us. Their actions prove that they
mean to benefit from our technology. Thus,
it is clearly in our best interest to prevent
fhe.., tm,n Aninn en ,,nA that is whet thic
that can be used for military ses by
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. At the
national level, only the U.S. and France al-
low defense specialists to review regularly
proposed technology exports to the Soviet
Union. The result is that many judgments
are made without expert participation, and
a good deal of damage results, as in the
case of highly advanced communication
switching equipment obtained by the
U.S.S.R. from Western Europe. Unfortu-
nately this equipment can also be used to
add greatly to the Soviets' command and
Need Public Understanding
We cannot, however, achieve all we-
In particular we need industry to take the
lead and inform both management and em-
ployes of the dangers. In sensitive factories
out-
awuiOtmIa is l0 C47U w uv.
Preside t Reagan took the lead last
July at the Ottawa summit conference
when he appealed to our allies to tighten
our international control system. We have
worked hard to plan an effective high-level
COCOM conference. The meeting, to be
held in Paris next month, will be the first
broad reconsideration of our technology
control system in nearly 30 years. We will
safeguard essential designs and manufac-
turing know-how. Industry associations can
play an Important part in protecting our
national security by advising member
companies on appropriate measures and
internal safeguards.
Businessmen, in general, can be more
supportive by recognizing the fact that the
long-term interests in peace and security
weigh the short-term gains which the sales
of certain equipment offer. If we ignore
this and proceed with business as usual,
current sales may please some but they
will yield the most unpleasant dividends In
the future.
Mr. Weinberger is the U.S. Secretary of
Defense.
Approved For Release 2006/06/14: CIA-RDP84B00049RO01503800020-8