PRODUCTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON US AND SOVIET FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001603930013-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2007
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: May 21, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/06/27: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1603930013-1
21 May 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR:I I Special Assistant to the DDCI
Chief, Europe Branch
Current Support Division
Office of Soviet Analysis
SUBJECT . Production of the President's Report
on US and Soviet Forces
1. The cancellation of Admiral Inman's breakfast today with Mr. Carlucci
precluded discussion of the DoD's participation in the President's Report.
Someone from CIA needs to have Mr. McFarlane on the NSC Staff or a high-level
DoD official direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Fred C Ikle
to proceed immediately with the US forces sections on the Report. C.
25X1
2. The next edition, which will cover the nine-month period ending 30
June, is to be available for President Reagan in mid-July. The DDI team
already has prepared a draft on Soviet forces and will circulate another on 1
June for Community coordination. Graphics work is also under way. The Office
of Net Assessment in DoD has, however, recommended once again to Mr. Ikle that
the joint report be terminated and that they not work on it unless directed to
do so by the NSC. Mr. Ikle supported this view and sent a memorandum to Mr.
Sven Kramer, a junior member of the NSC Staff who did not respond. DoD
apparently has taken this as NSC concurrence.
3. Subsequent contacts by OCPAS, with 25X1
Judge Clark and Mr. McFarlane indicated that the President and the NSC Staff
still want to receive the joint report. Mr. McFarlane has been reminded
several times of the need for him to write a letter to Mr. Ikle, who has
indicated that no action on the Report will be taken until the NSC or higher
officials in the Pentagon direct it. 25X1
4. In the past, it has taken the DoD and CIA teams about three months to
publish the Report. We now have approximately seven weeks left before the
deadline. The DoD manager of the US sections for the Report says he believes
he can still meet the deadline if he is allowed to begin next week. If not,
the quality of the material presented on US forces will suffer noticeably or
the entire process will unravel. If the Report is to be published without US
sections, we need to begin redesigning it immediately.
5. Unlike the National Estimates and other Community publications, this
report has never missed its deadline and has always been available for the
President within two weeks of its information cutoff date. The Report
originated in 1969 when the President asked the DCI for a quarterly review of
Approved For Release 2007/06/27: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1603930013-1
 Approved For Release 2007/06/27: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1603930013-1
Soviet strategic forces. Successive administrations have asked for the
inclusion of theater forces or special topical sections. The Report reached
its present form two years ago when the President's National Security Advisor
requested that it include US forces. The Office of Net Assessment in the
Department of Defense provides the text and graphic material on US systems for
the Report, which is still produced by the Central Intelligence Agency. CIA
is also responsible for the layout and design of the Report as well as the
general comparability of the data on both forces. Both the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence review the Report before it
6. The DoD recommendation against the Report is not well founded. The
Office of Net Assessment wants to rely on the Joint Net Assessment that it is
now preparing with the NIO/SP as the policymaker's single guide for comparing
forces. It is interesting that the Pentagon's complaints center around the
book not being organized to perform net assessment, a function we have been
careful to avoid and one that the Pentagon has insisted the book should not
perform. The Report allows the reader to get a feel for the relative level of
effort each side places in similar programs but never has pretended to provide
a basis for net assessment. Moreover, the net assessment being prepared with
the NIO/SP would not include conventional forces. Without a joint PR, there
would be no agreed comparison of this sort available to the NSC. The Office
of Net Assessment has also complained that the Report's time frame is too
short to be useful for force planning. The Report is not intended, however,
7. The limited feedback we receive has indicated that recipients find
the Report quite valuable. It accomplishes its purpose of providing basic
information on both US and Soviet forces as well as highlighting recent tren
<
and developments and future changes.
Approved For Release 2007/06/27: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1603930013-1