ASSIGNING A SENIOR U.S. MILITARY OFFICER TO THE DO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001603940017-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: June 3, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP84B00049R001603940017-6
4
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Assigning a Senior U.S. Military Officer'^to the DO
FROM:
DC/PCS
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE 3 June 1982
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1 C/PCS
3
UN 1982
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DDO
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C-'
a -A),
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FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
1_79 EDITIONS
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP84B00049R0016 - 25X1
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff
SUBJECT: Assigning a Senior U.S. Military Officer to the DO
Herewith a few preliminary and random thoughts on Frank Carlucci's proposal
to assign a senior U.S. military officer to the DO:
1. This will obviously require careful consideration. A number of
objections, many of them bureaucratic and otherwise negative, will be raised
within DoD and the military as well as here in the building. Many will feel
threatened.
2. The individual selected should be a senior Army officer with a back-
ground in operations1command and staff work rather than intelligence. So that
he will retain his own motivation and influence within DoD his next assignment
in the military should be identified before he comes to the DO and it should
be one of the more sought-after billets for senior Army officers on the rise.
3. His primary role would be as a link between the DO and the non-intel
components of the military. He should also become involved in the policy
aspects of DO contacts with military intelligence.
4. For example, he could breathe some life into the military's tasking
of the DO, hopefully to the point that makes our wide-ranging military
targeting, recruitment and collection activities even more relevant to the
military's actual intel needs and better appreciated at the military command
level. He could also be of assistance in helping us get a better handle on
the military's foreign liaison contacts that are intelligence related. This
would include improving procedures for managing the disclosure of intelligence.
SECRET
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6. His time and attention should not be encumbered by involving him in
the process of coordinating the military's routine proposals for clandestine
collection.
7. This could be a useful arrangement for both sides but only if they
select the type of officer indicated above. Frank Carlucci will encounter
considerable resistance from entrenched elements in the intel bureaucracy at
DoD. For this reason I recommend that we in the DO avoid raising this with
any of our military counterparts below Carlucci's level at least until he has
had time to think-about it further and lay the groundwork.
SECRET