LIKELY EVOLUTION OF LEBANON SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001603950006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 17, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
This is the coordinated version of the Lebanon
crisis evaluation of which we spoke on Wednesday.
NIO/NESA
FORM n USE PREVIOUS
55-76 1 ^ FOITIONS GPO : 1981 0 - 345-783
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 CFrorr
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17 June 1982
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
Likely Evolution of Lebanon Situation
The following is an Intelligence Community assessment, coordinated at the
working level, of what the likely evolution of the key elements of the Lebanon
crisis will be, and what the situation will look like in 60 days -- i.e. mid-
August.* The assessment assumes no major deviation from current US policies,
and an Israeli willingness to agree to a phased withdrawal from central
Lebanon under four general conditions: elimination of the PLO armed presence,
except in the northern Biqa' and north Lebanon, which are largely Syrian-
controlled; establishment of a strong international force to prevent the
reestablishment of a PLO armed presence in southern Lebanon; establishment of
a Christian-dominated coalition central government in Beirut with a military
force able to replace withdrawing Israeli troops; and removal of Syrian forces
to the central and northern Biqa'.
1. PLO
-- The Israelis will have effectively eliminated the armed
Palestinian presence in Beirut and areas under their control. As
this process is completed, they will turn over the area to an MFO,
the Lebanese central government, or to Christian militia forces of
the Phalange or Major Haddad. This will be a difficult
operation. A residual PLO political presence may be tolerated.
-- Surviving PLO armed forces will be reorganizing in remaining
Syrian-controlled or influenced areas of Lebanon.
-- Armed Palestinian resistance inside Lebanon against the Israelis
and their supporters will continue and could become a problem.
PLO elements will also likely resort to increased acts of
international terrorism against Israeli and US targets and
interests.
* State/INR representatives believe this is only one possible scenario for
evolution of developments over the next several months. It is premature
to forecast the likely situation in mid-August.
This assessment has been prepared under the auspices of the NIO/NESA and
has been coordinated at the working level by CIA, DIA, NSA, State/INR,and the
intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Marine Corps.
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-- Arafat's leadership, if he survives, will be severely weakened but
he will remain the predominant PLO leader. Although he will
likely sanction a PLO terrorist campaign to make clear that the
PLO remains a force to be reckoned with, he will not abandon his
effort to make the PLO a politically respectable organization and
allow it to become simply another terrorist group.*
-- The PLO conventional and insurgency warfare capability in Lebanon
will have been largely neutralized. Whatever conventional force
is ultimately reestablished will no longer be able to operate
freely anywhere in Lebanon but will be under tight Syrian control.
2. Lebanese Political Structure
-- A stronger cabinet, including some Muslim leaders, could be
formed. Such a cabinet would be heavily weighted in favor of
Israel's Maronite Christian allies but could include some major
Muslim, Shia, and Druze leaders. Such an arrangement would not
endure unless meaningful powersharing arrangements were created.
-- The month-long election period for a new president of Lebanon
officially begins on 23 July. The likely outcome will be heavily
influenced by the Phalange which will push for the election of its
militia chief Bashir Jumayyil or another hardline Maronite who
would be more acceptable to Muslim deputies.
-- The central government's control over the country will be fragile
and ultimately depend on the nearby presence of the IDF. Its writ
on the coast will run from Jubayl in the north to Tyre in the
south and east to the ridgelines overlooking the Biqa'.**
-- Assuming no miscalculation that results in a major conflagration,
Syrian forces will retain control in the central and northern
Biqa' without a serious Israel attempt to expel them. Prime
Minister Begin has, however, stated that the Syrians must
ultimately withdraw completely from Lebanon and has linked a full
withdrawal of Israeli forces to such a Syrian pullback.
* State/INR representatives believe that PLO decisionmaking has been
fundamentally disrupted by the invasion. It will take time for the PLO to
decide on a future course. The organization will be torn between the
temptation to resume international terrorism and the realization that such
a campaign would destroy the PLO's chances to operate in the diplomatic
arena.
** CIA believes there is a good possibility that Israeli or Phalange forces
may attempt to expel PLO forces from Tripoli to bring this large port city
under firm Lebanese government control.
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-- As for reconstituting the Lebanese army, this will be a slow
process and the Phalange will seek to dominate it. The Muslims
will be reluctant to participate without some guarantee that they
will be given a larger role in it. Muslim militia leaders will
not otherwise want to give up their arms to a Christian-dominated
army and a resumption of some intra-Lebanese hostilities is
possible, particularly in areas evacuated by the Israelis.
3. International Force
-- It may not be possible to form an acceptable international force
in the next 60 days. When one is formed, the most likely shape it
would take is a multilateral force organization, not a revamped or
expanded UNIFIL, except for an initial 90-day extension. If
invited by the Lebanese government, the French might be willing to
assume a leading role in any such force, and the Dutch have
evinced some interest in participating. US forces are desired by
Israel but are not essential for its formation. The mission of
the new international force would be to ensure that armed
Palestinians and heavy weaponry do not find their way south
through the zone between the Litani and the 25-mile line. It
would also have security duties in this zone. It may also
gradually assume duties in the southern Biqa' area in place of
Israeli troops there.
4. Soviets
-- Moscow, in an effort to repair the damage to its prestige caused
by its relative inaction in the face of the PLO and Syrian defeat,
is likely to increase its military assistance to Syria. This
probably would result in a larger Soviet military presence
there. The increase will most likely take the form of replacing
destroyed fighters and air defense equipment, sending additional
advisers, and probably increasing Soviet usage of Syrian naval and
air facilities. It is possible but less likely that the Soviets
would send their own air defense fighter or SAM units.
-- The Syrians, despite their disillusionment with Moscow, probably
will request an increased Soviet military presence, at least in
the near term. Assad will attempt to get the Kremlin to clarify
and increase the level of Soviet commitment to Syria. However,
Moscow's reluctance to provide the extent of guarantees requested
by Damascus will further strain Soviet-Syrian relations.
5. Syria
-- The Syrians will esssentially accept a continued dominating
presence in the central and northern Biqa' valley and parts of the
remainder of northern Lebanon as meeting their minimum objectives
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at this time. They will continue to have influence with some
political factions in Beirut.
-- Tehran sees military support for the Palestinians and Syria as
both a duty and a way to demonstrate its claim to be chief
defender of Islam. It will attempt to gain propaganda mileage
from its willingness to enter the fray. Tehran likely will have
several thousand soldiers in Syria and possibly in the Syrian-
controlled part of Lebanon. While these forces will not pose a
significant military threat to Israel, they could provoke clashes
in Lebanon. Should their presence in Syria prove destabilizing,
President Assad will waste no time in forcing them to leave.
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