LEBANON AND PALESTINE TALKING POINTS FOR 25 JUNE BREAKFAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001603960003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 24, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/10/02 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001603960003-9
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
DDI 5214-82
24 June 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Charles E. Waterman, NIO/NESA
SUBJECT: Lebanon and Palestine Talking Points for 25 June Breakfast
1. As you are aware, Lebanese leaders dealing with the PLO have
passed through Habib a proposal for token Israeli pullbacks around Beirut,
introduction of international and Lebanese armed forces, and a promise
that they will then consider their political future under Lebanese
authority. This roughly parallels what the Saudis have been proposing.
The Lebanese say they are convinced the PLO intends to disarm and for
its leaders to leave Lebanon-but later. The proposal is unacceptable to
the Israelis, of course, but in my opinion contains elements which
ultimately may prove useful to us. Specifically:
-- If at some point we serve as the instrument that
engineers a token Israeli withdrawal, it would
assist in our regional relations beyond the impact
of the act itself. Arab regimes, if they choose,
could claim to have influenced us in bringing it
about.
-- The principle of their disarming has apparently
been seriously discussed with the Palestinian
leadership -- and perhaps tacitly accepted.
2. A move on West Beirut by the Israelis is obviously not in our
wider interests. I personally feel it would not be totally cataclysmic,
but many Arabists disagree. If it occurs, it may not initially be the
all-out bloody advance being discussed, but rather:
-- Isolation of the Shia areas from attack, and pressure
on Shia leaders to police their own area. The content
of recent Phalange/Shia contacts seem to indicate
this may be possible.
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-- Attack on the Palestinian camps (largely denuded
of civilians) and advance to the Mazra' area on
the edge of the Beirut city center.
-- Further compression of Palestinian/Leftist/regional
Syrian elements into the remaining area of West
Bei rut.
Negotiations may then begin anew, with the Palestinians in a worse position
than now - if that can be imagined. It is my judgment they would at that
time explicitly disarm within a few days. A token Israeli pullback as a
face-saving device under these circumstances might facilitate this result -
and serve our interests as well.
3. Arafat, Khalaf, and other PLO leaders are not martyrs by temperament.
They may well be able to exit clandestinely during the unfolding of the
above scenario. I continue to judge that many Palestinian fighters, once
disarmed, would ultimately find their way to Syrian controlled or influenced
areas in east or north Lebanon. A continuing Syrian presence there continues
likely.
4. A key to the Lebanon situation's ultimate resolution remains our
willingness dramatically and rapidly to support a new Lebanese army as
soon as the guns fall silent.
5. An important subject remains the reaction of key moderate Arab states
to recent events. There obviously has been an erosive effect on our relations,
and universal condemnation of our passivity or connivance. No specific
actions against us have occurred, however, and it is difficult to envisage
what they can do. It is perhaps only a question of time lag, but I note
two actions this week by Saudi Arabia which seem to indicate continuance
of discreet collaboration in other areas: a continuing request to the JCS
for advice. in choosing a site for an airfield for contingency planning;
apparent transfer of a large amount of funds for the Afghanistan insurgents.
6. NSC staff contacts inform me that President Reagan pressured Begin
hard on a wider scenario for Palestinian autonomy than he now envisages,
I question whether our message has gotten
through, however. The written autonomy plan Begin left, I understand, is
pretty much the same restricted autonomy scheme already discussed by the
Israelis.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/10/02 : CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1603960003-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/02 : CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1603960003-9
Approved For Release 2007/10/02 : CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1603960003-9