ACCESS TO TELEMETRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001604030009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 9, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

? Approved For Release 2007/07/06 :CIA-RDP84B00049R001604030009-4
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NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: Access to Telemetry n
9 September 1982
This note is "heads up" for a coming problem and offers you the
'opportunity to give me some guidance on this subject. ~~
ACDA, in studying this issue so far, has asked for access to telemetry
analysis information. The data they say they want are:
-- relevant parameters we have and need in telemetry land
implicitly why, as well as how, we use such data);
-- tf~e impact on sources and methods of giving these parameters
to the Soviets.
The idea is that this intimate information will be placed in policy review
papers for the Executive Branch to decide how much access to telemetry, and
other similar issues, is acceptable. In my view, only the Intelligence
Community should make such judgments.
Moreover, while I am willing to share our most intimate details about
sources and methods with ACDA officers, or anyone else, who has a need-to-
know, I am opposed to a broad dissemination of this tender information
throughout the policy community -- because, in general, such detailed
information is only the business of the Intelligence Community. I don't,.
belive the Intel`l'igence Community should share the intimate details of
telemetry collection, processing, or exploitation with the policy world any
more than we do so for CQMINT, imagery, or any other generic class of
intelligence. And we do not, in general terms.
I hold these views very strongly because, in my view, some policymakers
know too much information about sources and methods, and because some of them
want to know more about our business than they know about U.S. weapons
programs or diplomatic issues of comparable significance. In my view, this is
in part because intelligence officers have wanted to be helpful and res onsive
-- even when the need-to-know principle was being grossly violated. ~ 25X1
Acceeding to ACDA's blanket requests for access to details, in my view,
will lead in due course to more compromises about our telemetry capabilities
and to policy agencies voting on how much, and what types of, telemetry data
the U.S. should try to negotiate with the Soviets so that U.S. intellligence
can monitor Soviet compliance. Both ideas are craiq as hell, in my view. ~ 25X1
It might be a good idea for me to raise the issue formally in the SALT
Monitoring Working Group. ~~ 25X1
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There is a working group meeting today at 2:30 where this issue will be ?'
discussed. Unless I hear from you by around 2:00 m eople will be - ~~?
instructed to take positions along these lines. ~ ""25X1
If there is anything I can do for you here, please let me know.
Arms Control Inte~~l-i~ence Staff
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25X1
25X1
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