A SIX-MONTH LOOK AHEAD - MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001604070010-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 7, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP84B00049R001604070010-8
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 8107-82
7 October 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDirector of eputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Charles E. Waterman, NIO/NESA
SUBJECT: A Six-Month Look Ahead - Middle East
The following is a non-coordinated projection of where four key Middle
East crises will probably stand in roughly six months time - i.e. early
April 1.983. This assumes no major change in US policies on these issues.
A. Lebanon
-- Beirut and its environs will have been decisively pacified.
The central government will have consolidated effective control in
this limited area.
A phased Israeli-Syrian mutual withdrawal agreement (including armed
PLO will have been reached well before year's end. The initial
phases will have occurred, and be sufficient to have brought about a
disengagement of forces in the Biqa' Valley. This disengagement,
combined with in could
of
permit withdrawal
year, if desired.
Whether or not all Syrian and Israeli forces will have withdrawn, an
armed a estinian presence wi either remain or return to the north
and the northern Biqa' Valley. This presence may increase by
returnees from the Beirut o a pora. Palestinian civilians from
Beirut and south Lebanon, intimidated by central government
activity, will probably also find their way north - either directly
or via Syria after expulsion from Lebanon. Over time, this will
feed armed militias with new recruits. All of this will permit a
continued Syrian.zone of influence, given their partial control of
reinfiltration and supplies.
-- In a similar manner in the south, Israeli troops may or may not
remain in areas designated for final withdrawal. Armed Lebanese
elements responsive to Israelrsecurit needs for a cordon sanitaire
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will remain, either via a security agreement with the central
Le anese army or with continued existence of the Haddad mi itia. I
suspect a combination of both will have occurred, althoug probably
not an overt formal Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty by 1 April.
-- The net result of these events will be a continued Palestinian/
Syrian zone of influence in the north and a central Lebanese
government/Israeli southern security zone. As an intermediate range
situation while Lebanese central army strength slowly grows, this
situation is "tolerable" from the point of view of US interests.
B. US Palestine Initiative
-- Intermediate-range requirements of the US initiative are to narrow
positions in the following areas:
1) The Arab consensus position must move from its present vague
formulation of "security for all states in the region" to one
which explicitly states an Arab willingness to recognize
Israel under appropriate circumstances.
2) The Israelis must move towards a willingness to recognize the
principle of territorial exchange in the West Bank/Gaza for
recognition and security guarantees, as opposed to their
present formulation of autonomy for inhabitants only.
-- In six months, I believe it is realistic to anticipate one or two
explicit Arab statements of a conditional willingness to recognize
Israel in return for a complete withdrawal to the 1967 lines. Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco are of course the prime candidates.
This statement would not be sufficient for any Israeli change, but
would increase pressures for some form of reciprocity.
-- The Begin government will not have accepted, in six months, the
principle of territorial exchange. However, serious debate will
have increased in Israel on it, perhaps including the Likud.
-- As debate in Israel intensifies, it will increasingly focus on
differences between the Labor Party "Allon-plan" - which envisages
an Israeli security belt including most of the Jordan valley - and
the concept of "minor border rectifications" which previously
comprised the American position.
-- Overall, I suspect a narrowing of positions along the above lines
will have occurred in six months time. If some modification in
Israeli governing circles also transpires (i.e. perhaps dropping of
Sharon or even emergence of a weak Labor coalition government) -
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which is not predictable at this stage - then initial progress
toward an ultimate solution will have been made.
-- Egyptian-Israeli ties will continue totdetet orateAif Bandntstays in rev power.. Cairo's ambassador will not
rhetoric on both sides will especiall~ visits
Egypt. A complete break in
.
will be continuing in six months. time, Under
these stances, the
s
significantly threatening the other.
war's continuation is tolerable from the point of view of American
interest. its The Iranian regime will probably ofcthe,rughtoortleftthas suffgcientn i
power. No opposition movement are at strength to change this situation. ofPrecentuIragpoair attacksaon1.5
million BBLS/day, even in t
Kharg Island, and this output level will probably continue.
-- Iranian subversive ihenBahraithe
uniformly inept whe
in Mecca. Presumably, elements in the Iranian hierarchy will be
continuinq these efforts in six months time - probably with the same
lack of success.
No mitigation of hostility oadthndUcationstofeIraniankSoviet
There are increasing non-definitive
friction - especially in the Afghanistan istantborter area - and relations
may have deteriorated further in six 0. Political Im act of Continuing Depressed Petroleum Market
The current Saudi Arabian ol production expend5tureslliOver
BBLS/day at $34 price is not
the next six months, the Saudis will make every effort to maintain
prices at the $34 level, fearing that an indication of their
Saudns ecouraqe serious
will belunableetoutting
willingness to cut prices will
by other OPEC members. The
increase significantly production from the current level, but modest
world economic recovery and rebuilding 1overgthof stoks e sixcmonthyperaise riod.thTo meet
ve to
production/export level s will -' .
4-L- +hP isu
pr ay
C. Iran-Ira uinj -- All current indicators Point ow rd slevel~norderswareoftattrithe war
I suspect a relate y
effort
ide
either
n
6
its financial re uiremeth
t
l
e currenteveoaproximae drawdown reserves from
Ilion.
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-- This situation could start to require a reduction in spending in six
months, presumably in the following order: external security/
economic assistance and the internal development program. Military
budqet and state welfare programs are seen by the Saudi regime as
essential to maintain. They would be cut only in the event of
financial problems much more serious than those likely to develop
over the course of the next six months.
-- The security assistance drawdown may ultimately adversely affect US
security programs in Morocco, Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan, Jordan, and
Lebanon.
-- A drop in development expenditures will adversely affect large
foreign exchange earnings transferred home by workers from several
East Asian as well as Islamic countries.
-- In summary, the security and economic situation of a number of third
world US allies will suffer, and this process could have commenced
in six months time.
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