LEBANON: PROBLEMS FACING PRESIDENT JUMAYYIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001604080008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 15, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For R
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 October 1982
Lebanon .Prob-lem.s. Fading president . JumayyiL
Summary
Lebanese President Amin Jumayyil faces an up-hill
struggle in his attempt to reestablish Lebanon's political
and territorial integrity after seven years marked by civil
war, anarchy, violence and foreign meddling. Following the
assassination of his brother Bashir, Amin was elected
president with the unprecedented backing of nearly all of
Lebanon's confessionally-based factions. The conflicting
interests of these groups, especially the demands of those
who supported his late brother, means that the newly forged
political consensus is fragile and much of his energies will
be diverted into maintainin and strengthening his political
support.
In the month since assuming office, Jumayyil has made
modest gains in returning war-ravaged Beirut to normal. The
greater task still lies ahead, however, as 90 percent of the
country is occupied by Israeli and Syrian forces, pockets of
Palestinian fighters continue- to operate in the north and
east, extralegal militias function throughout the country,
and inter factional violence rages only a few miles from the
capital. _
During:`Jumayyi l,'s visit to Washington, he hopes' tai
further crystallize the extent of US conmitment,-;;.both,-:"to..
L.ebanon-..and. ,Ao:.himself ,.as..its--leader:, He wi l l want US moral
and material support for the rebuilding of his country's
institutions, especially the army, as well as extensive
involvement in Lebanon's reconstruction effort. More
importantly, he needs US diplomatic leverage to secure the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and a
continuing commitment to its territorial and political
integrity.
25XI
This memorandum was prepared byl of the Levant 25X1
Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office or Near East SOUthIAS!a
Analysis. Information as of 15 October 1982 was used in its
preparation. Questions and corn-rents are welcome and should be 25X1
directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, 25X1
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25X1
Fragile Political Consensus
Lebanon's political landscape was changed dramatically by
Israel's invasion on 6 June, and again by the assassination of
president-elect Bashir Jumayyil on 14 September. The political
leadership, shocked into cooperation by these events, has forged
a consensus supporting Amin Jumayyil that appears to be the
strongest in Lebanon since before the 1975-76 civil war.
The new spirit of accomodation is, nevertheless, fragile.
Recent eruptions of interfactional violence in various parts of
the country is indicative of the continued ascendency of
confessional and clan loyalties over Lebanese national
identity.
Maintaining and strengthening this consensus will be a
problem for Amin, who is not yet the master of his own house.
His'most pressing problem is to establish control over the
powerful Phalange militia, especially hardcore militants put into
powerful positions by Bashir. These elements have little use for
Amin, who they see as representing the bankrupt politics of the
old guard. Fears that Amin will not carry through on B ' 25X1
policies may lead these hardliners to consider a coup
Other Christian and Muslim factions have expressed a
willingness to work with Amin. This is not the result of
personal loyalty or particular confidence in his leadership, but
rather because they view him as more reasonable than his late
brother and more open to their influence. If Amin does not
satisfy their often conflictin interests, they can be expected
to withdraw their support.
The Tasks Ahead
Events since his inauguration have illustrated the magnitude
of the challenges facing Amin and the narrow confines within
which he must work. After extensive consultations on the
composition of his government, during which he was unable to
reconcile conflicting pressures, Jumayyil was forced to carry
over former Prime Minister Wazzan and install a cabinet of
academics, lawyers, and other professionals, none of whom have
had much political experience. 25X1
This arrangement is probably only a transitional one, aimed
at postponing a decision on power-sharing among confessional
groups while Jumayyil tackles more pressing diplomatic and
security problems. Most of the political factions seem content
to go along with this for now. US officials believe Jumayyil
favors the formation of a strong central government under
Maronite hegemony as a means of overcoming the internal inertia
that he sees contributing to the country's problems. He has
publicly stated that the longterm security interests of Lebanon's
Christians lie not in the continuation of de facto partition, but
in a united Lebanon.
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Expanding Central Authority
Meanwhile, Lebanon lacks the kind of strong government
needed to expand central authority throughout the country. The
army is also weak, having never really recovered from the civil
war when it fragmented along confessional lines. Although it has
since been reformed as an integrated Christian-Muslim force, the
rebuilding process has been slow and Lebanese leaders have been
reluctant to test it in situations where ethnic loyaties might
again divide it.
As a first step, the-army has been sent in to demilitarize
Beirut. In part a confidence-building measure, the move has not
been without controversy. Search operations and arrests,
initially limited to predominantly Muslim West Beirut, have led
to charges that the army has acted like an occupation force and
served Christian interests. While Muslims generally favor the
goal of disarming extralegal militias that have controlled West
Beirut since the civil war, they insist that the Christian
Phalange military force must also be disarmed. Jumayyil has
promised that this will be done. His delay in carrying through
on this commitment, however, probably reflects an inability to
assert control over the militia leadership, which is determined
to preserve its strong role in Lebanon. 25X1
Withdrawal of Foreign Forces
Jumayyil is committed to securing the withdrawal of Syrian,
Palestinian, and Israeli forces from Lebanon. Because of the
weakness of Lebanon's institutions, especially the army, this
goal can only be achieved through a combination of international
political pressure and a strong military peacekeeping presence.
While Lebanon can work toward negotiated settlements with Syria
and Israel, Amin has no leverage with them. Nor has it any way
to evict Palestinian fighters in the north, a problem Damascus
insists must be resolved directly by the Lebanese government and
the PLO. In the south, Jumayyil is up against the Israeli
insistance on iron-clan security arrangements in which the
Israelis want the forces of their agent Major Saad Haddad to play
a key role. F_ I 25X1
The presence of the multinational force has been critical
for the Lebanese Army to succeed in the pacification of Beirut.
Jumayyil recognizes that the multinational force will be
essential in order to extend the authority of the central
government beyond Beirut. During the period required to rebuild
the armed forces, Jumayyil will want an expanded mandate for the
multinational force, or for Unifil if need be, to accomplish this
task. The government is hesitant to test the army in
confessional-based rivalries, let alone against foreign elements,
that might result in its being routed or Possibly lead to its
disintegration as a unified force.
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Relations with Syria and Israel
Israel has dropped for now its insistance on a peace treaty,
but still wants a written security agreement covering the 40
kilometer zone in the south. It may be difficult to formulate an
agreement that will be satisfactory to the Israelis and at the
same time not alienate the Lebanese Muslims whose support
Jumayyil is trying to retain. Israel is contemptuous of the
Unifil forces stationed in the south, and may be cool to any
other international force unless its mandate for maintaining
order is broader and it includes US troops. Defense Minister
Sharon has made it clear that only forces Israel controls or in
which the Israelis have complete conf can be counted on to
adequately patrol the security zone. 25X1
The Israelis will probably keep up pressure for a statement
.or agreement on non-belligerency, looking ultimately toward a
treaty. I
Jumayyil's Goals in the US
Amin Jumayyil will be seeking both material and symbolic
returns from his Washington visit. He hopes for tangible
achievements in order to establish his legitimacy, especially
with hardline elements of the Phalange militia.
Amin would like to bind the US to Lebanon through a
continuing commitment to his country's unity and sovereignty. He
has repeatedly told US officials in Beirut that Lebanon wi11
become America's best Middle East ally.
This attitude is generated not only by his desire for
material assistance from the US, but also by his need for a
strong political buffer against the internal and external forces
that traditionally have compromised the initiatives of the
central government.
Rebuilding the Lebanese Army
Essential to Amin's.hopes for the future is a vastly
strengthened Lebanese Army. Jumayyil will ask the US to
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F777 49
underwrite his plans to create a force large enough to present a
modest deterrent to Lebanon's neighbors and to control its
borders. In the short-term he envisions the expansion of
Lebanon's 23,000 man army to 43,000, plus supporting elements.
In the longer-term he has in mind a 60,000 man force.
Recruitment poses the major obstacle to the expansion of.the
LAF. Since the civil war the Lebanese government has attempted
to maintain a balance between Christians and Muslims in the armed
forces. Although the Defense Law of 1979 provided for national
conscription, this provision has never been implemented. As a
result, the army relies upon volunteers. Recruits are easily
obtained from among the poorer Muslim community, particularly the
Shi'a. Competition from the private sector and the fairly well
organized Christian militias, however, has reduced the number of
Christian recruits available to the army.
Ecoiomic Assistance and Reconstruction
Jumayyil's ability to rebuild Lebanon's economy will be an
important test of his political strength. 25X1
I I reconstruction will cost roughly 24
billion. Jumayyil will be accompanied on his visit by his newly 25X1
appointed ministers for housing, and development and
reconstruction. While they will be appealing to the World Bank
and other donors for reconstruction aid., Jumayyil can be expected
to make further overtures to the US to ex and its current $110
million commitment. 25X1
American Security Guarantees
In addition to looking for a reaffirmation of the US
commitment to secure the withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian and PLO
forces from Lebanon, Jumayyil would like to create the aura of a
quasi-US protectorate fully committed to Lebanon's political and
territorial integrity. Moreover, Jumayyil hopes the US will
prove to be an effective interlocutor with states such as Saudi
Arabia f m which he will nPPQ both political and economic
support. 25X1
Jumayyil believes that if he can claim success in moving
toward these goals he will be in a stronger position handle
the internal obstacles which still confront him.
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 Approved For Release 2007/04/23: CIA-RDP84B00049R001604080008-0 ,
 Israeli, Palestinian, and Syrian Troop Deployments in Lebanon
Syrian Forces
Troops
Tanks Artillery
Bekaa Valley
29,000
674
319
Matn Area
4,500
10
18
Northern Area
(Security duties)
6,400
40
18
'Approved' F`or`1765e6se O OT/tY4'1Z CIA=F `DPU4O1 UO`49 O`OTG 8GODS-10 "
Palestinian Fighter*
Troops Tanks Artillery
Regular
5-8,000 - -
Forces
Militia
5-8,000
10-16,000
*Palestinian fighters are scattered throughout
Northern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley/Main areas.
Central
_Sector
Bekaa Valley
Israeli Forces
Troops Tanks Artily
Beirut Area/
4,500
180
48
Central Sector
Bekaa Valley
10,500
300
84
Southern Area
2,000
-
-
(Security duties)
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At the time of independence in 1943,
Lebanese leaders formulated a National Pact
to guarantee the sectarian rights within the
diverse population of Lebanon. An unwritten
agreement, the Pact allocates political and
administrative offices equitably among the
recognized confessional groups according to
the percentage of each in the total Lebanese
population. Using the 1932 census as a base
(none has been taken since then), the
Presidency traditionally goes to a Maronite
Christian, the prime ministership to a Sunni
Muslim and the presidency of the Chamber of
Deputies to a Shia Muslim. The 99 seats of
the Chamber are also allocated proportion-
ately among the religious communities.
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Lebanese Politico-Religious Groups-1982
Thousand Percent of
Persons Population
Lebanese
Arab Muslims 1,150 44
Sunni 550
Shia 600
Arab Christians 750 28
Maronite 390
Greek Orthodox 240
Greek Catholic (Melkite) 52
Protestant = 68
Druze 190 7
Non-Arabs 151 6
Armenian Orthodox/Catholic 150
Jewish 1
Palestinians (roughly one-third Arab 400 15
Christian and two-thirds Arab Muslim)
Residents in Lebanon 2,641 100
Lebanese expatriates (people holding 1,250
Lebanese citizenship or dual citizenship
abroad, mostly in Western Hemisphere)
approximately 3.9 million
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-Al Amal
Imam Musa Sadr; missing since September
1978 and Nabih Barri; Shia
-Islamic Coalition
Sa'ib Salam and Rashid Karami; Sunni
-Islamic Grouping
Shafiq Wazzan; Sunni
-Democratic Socialist Party
Kamal al-Assad; Shia
"National Movement"
(Primarily Muslim Left)
-Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
Walid Junblat; Druze
-Independent Nasirite Movement (Murabitun)
Ibrahim Qulaylat; Beirut Sunni
-Communist Action Organization
Muhsin Ibrahim; extreme left Shia
-Communist Party of Lebanon
Nicola Shawi and George Hawi; pro-USSR
Greek Orthodox Christian
-Baath Party-Iraqi Wing
Abd al-Majid Rafai; Sunni
-Nasirite Corrective Movement
Isam al-Arab; extreme left Sunni
-Syrian Social Nationalist Party (PPS or SSNP)
Inam Raad; left Greek Orthodox Chrisitian
-Popular Nasirite Organization
Mustafa Sa'ad; Sunni
-Baath Party-Syrian Wing
Assam Qansu; Sunni, pro-Syrian
-Arab Socialist Union
Abd al-Rahim Murad; Sunni
National Front
(Pro-Syrian Left)
-Nasirite Organization
(Union of Working Peoples Forces)
Kamal Shatila; Sunni
-Arab Democratic Party
Nassib al-Khatib; Tripoli-based Alawites
-Independent Parliamentary Bloc
Sim'an al-Duwayhi and Butrus Harb; Maronite
Pro-Syrian Christians
-Zgharta Front
Sulayman Franjiyah; Conservative
northern Maronite
"Lebanese Front"
(Primarily Christian Right)
-Phalange Party (Kataib)
Pierre Jumayyil and Amin Jumayyil
Maronite and Greek Catholic
-National Liberal Party
Camille Shamun (President of Lebanese Front); Maronite
-Kaslik Front
(Order of Maronite Monks) Bulus Na'man, Maronite
Clergy, extreme right
-Guardians of the Cedars
Etienne Saqr AKA Abu Arz; extremist Maronite
-Al Tanzim
George Adwan; extremist Maronite
Independent Christian Right
-Maronite League
Shakir Abu Sulayman; Maronite
-National Bloc
Raymond Edde; Maronite, anti-Syrian
-Free Lebanon Movement
Major Sa'ad Haddad, Maronite/Shia, pro-Israeli
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 Approved For Release 20071
-President~`Jumavyl's Reconstruction Program
Goals: Jumayyil wants to prove he can run a strong and
effective central government. His ability to
rebuild the econom will be an important test of
strength. I Y-
I reconstruction will cost roughly $24 billion.
Although Lebanese banks can finance a large
part
this, they cannot go it alone. 25X1
Government Jumayyil must: maintain law and order so that
role: Lebanon's vigorous private sector can get on with
rebuilding; restore essential public
services--roads, water, etc; help rebuild homes and
commercial buildings. One guess is that 25 percent
of the buildings in West Beirut are damaged or
destroyed.
Progress: The private sector is already clearing rubble and
reopening ,for business.,
Government reconstruction efforts have not yet
begun. Jumayyil is asking for money from the US,
World Bank, Arabs and others to get started.
Obstacles: Lebanese bankers will be reluctant to lend to the
private sector unless they are confident that their
investments will not be destroyed in more fighting.
A World Bank role will be important in persuading
other countries to donate. But the Bank will only
lend if Lebanon already has a strong central
government that controls the entire country.
The Arabs are long on promises but short on
delivery. They do not want Beirut to compete with
their own financial centers.
US Jumayyil wants the Palestinians to leave Lebanon
concerns: altogether, and is reluctant to rebuild the
shattered refugee camps. However, we have insisted
that our aid go to Palestinians as well as
Lebanese. Winter is coming in Lebanon and thousands
of Palestinians are still homeless. 25X1
US Aid: We have committed $110 million, including $30
million in guaranteed housing loans and $10 million
reserved for reconstruction in West Beirut.
25X1
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Lebanese Crisis Chronology:
April 1975 Civil War begins. Shooting of a Christian
Phalangist by Palestinian and retaliatory
Phalangist ambush of Palestinian school bus
triggered full scale fighting in Lebanon.
May 1976 Elias Sarkis elected President of Lebanon to
succeed Sulayman Franjiyah; he was not installed
in office until September 23, 1976 because
Franjiyah would not step down early.
June 1976 Syrian troops intervened in Lebanon as
peacekeeping force.
October 1976 Riyadh and Cairo Summits of heads of Arab states
arranged an end to hostilities in Lebanon and
created 30,000 man Arab Deterrent Force to police
ceasefire.
March 1978 Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon in
retaliation for Palestinian terrorist
attacks--"Litani operation".
June 1978 U.NIFIL?arrived to take up position in southern
Lebanon under the agreement for Israeli
withdrawal.
July 1978 Israelis withdraw from Lebanon.
July 1980 Phalange defeats Camille Shamun's National Liberal
Party militia; virtually eliminates rival
Christian militias and allows Phalange to emerge
as dominant Christian force in Lebanon.
May-July 1981 Israeli shelling of Palestinian targets in
southern Lebanon in retaliation for Palestinian
rocketing of northern Israel.
July 24 1981 Ceasefire arranged by Ambassador Habib.
April 3, 1982 Israeli diplomat assassinated in France by unknown
assailant.
May 9, 1982 Israeli aircraft make first airstrikes against
Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon since
ceasefire. Palestinians retaliate by shelling
northern Israeli settlements.
June 3, 1982 Attempted assassination against Israeli Ambassador
to London.
June 6, 1982 Israeli ground forces invade southern Lebanon.