ACTING DCI MEETING WITH WEINBERGER AND CARLUCCI, 12 NOVEMBER 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001604090006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 12, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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ADC I
MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
12 November 1982
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MEETING WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER
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Agenda
1. Weinberger Trip to Far East Tab A
2. Pakistan
-- Redeye Missiles Tab B
-- F-16 Radars Tab C
Estimate Tab D
-- Israel/India Tab E
3. SATCOM Support Tab F
4. NFIC-FY 84 Budget Follow-up Tab G
5. MX Recommendation to the President
-- OSWR Analysis Tab H
-- Townes Panel Report (Separate Folder)
6. Cuba Policy Review
-- Clark Memos Tab I
-- DO Input Tab J
-- NIO/LA Input Tab K
Other Items of Possible Interest
7. Iran-Soviet Relations
8. Afghanistan
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Acting DCI Meeting with Weinberger and Carlucci,
12 November 1982
The following subjects were discussed:
-- Soviet Succession. There was a brief discussion of Andropov's
selection as Party Chief and the fact that he has never been
to the West. Prospects for his leadership and policies were
discussed. The ADCI commented he is.likely to be a tough person
to deal with.
-- Weinberger Trip. He briefed at some length his recent trip
to ASEAN countries, New Zealand and Australia. He mentioned that
all of them want warm relations with the US except the Laborites
in New Zealand. He commented that the current government in
Australia is being threatened by the labor party. He mentioned
his offer to Hayden for a briefing on the Soviet threat. The
ADCI mentioned that he will work this out with the Ambassador
and Director of DI -
25X1
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New Zealand and Australia 25X1
both have agreed and are anxious for US Navy port calls including
ships with nuclear weapons. Neither New Zealand or Australia
will contribute forces to the MNF in Lebanon for budgetary reasons.
In addition, New Zealand is going to recall its contingent in
Singapore. His trip to Indonesia was a success, finding Suharto
to be very helpfulai4 making a pitch for F-16s. Weinberger
didn't think that Defense. would agree to that request. SecDef
raved about Singapore, whose economy is booming, and commented
that Lee Kuan Yew wants closer ties with US. The Thais,
meanwhile, are concerned about a Vietnamese invasion through
Kampuchea and want more of everything.
Pakistan. Regarding the Redeye issue, Carlucci confirmed that
Defense will go ahead with the 100 missiles and the Army is
assessing the possibility of the sale of 3dO more. Regarding
the ALR-69 radars, Carlucci is reserved because of the possibility
of them being passed to Chinese. The Air Force is against and
Weinberger is n tral. The ADCI then briefed on Pakistan's
nuclear program 25X1
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-- SA'TCOM Support. The ADCI mentioned our mid-October letter
re uesting support for Central America. Weinberger mentioned
that Defense is looking at three different ways to solve the
PPoblem. They will take care of us one way or another.
MX./Dense Pack. The ADCI asked if there was anything the
Intelligence Community could do to support the MX basing scheme.
He added that the Intelligence Community could not get out of
briefing Congress. SecDef mentioned that he was not concerned.
He asks that the'CIA address how soon the Soviets can respond
to Dense Pack and with what. (The ADCI wants to forward to
Weinberger a copy of our analysis before the upcoming NSC
mEeting). Weinberger added that they plan to design the MX
deployment with BMD in mind but will not initiate at this
point the BMD program. He also asks our input on how we can
becst present the case to Congress. The ADCI asked if the
construction of the silos for Dense Pack would not be a violation
of` SALT. Weinberger responded that Defense lawyers believe
ttt these can be considered capsules not silos, and that they
will be somewhat mobile. He mentioneAthat Townes wonders about
the actual hardness of Dense Pack because it has never been done.
-- Kam- Deployment. The ADCI mentioned that the SPD in Germany
may press for a delay in deployment and that the Laborites in
Norway are threatening to hold up the Defense budget if INF
is supported. Weinberger is confident that INF deployment will go
ahead on schedule.
-- Smya Radar. Weinberger asked where it is. The ADCI responded
bui declined to go into the budgetary aspects which he prefers
to, do with Carlucci alone.
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you left with Carlucci two weeks ago, he
commented last week that Defense was not yet
ready to assess the impact of the sale of 300
additional missiles. They are planning, however,
to inform you of their response this week,
including the possibility of substituting the
newer but more expensive Stinger missiles.
F-16 Radars. You may wish to mention orally to
Carlucci the essence of your written response
regarding the risk assessment done by DDI on
the transfer of the ALR-69 radars to Pakistan.
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SA/DCI/IA
SUBJECT V : Meeting with Secretary Weinberger, 12 November 1982
briefed the Director on his recent trip to Latin America.
ecord. I know that Fred Ikie attended along with Carlucci, and
st week's meeting, so I was unable to produce a Memo for the
T I understand that both Weinberger and Carlucci will
e in attendance this week. I got very little feedback on
2. The following items are on your agenda:
-- Weinberger Trip to Far East. Weinberger will
brief you on the results of his recent swing through
the Far East.
~(,,,dc,~
-- Pakistan.
-- Redeye Missiles. In response to the note which
-- Estimate. Finally, you may wish to mention the
acct that the NFIB approved the new estimate on
Pakistan and that we received a
am ".sure that the Director had in.hand the
week, so you may wish to advise Weinberger on the
status of our intelligence assessment on Pakistan's
nuclear program. ~ ik Jt ~~ fK rt~ull~-;
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results of last 25X1
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FY 84 Budget. Last week the Director discussed
this a bit with Carlucci, as you know. You may
wish to inform Carlucci of any additional informa-
tion resulting from yesterday's NFIC meeting. In addition, I just learned from '-./ 25X1
of the IC Staff that Carlucci plans to initiate o.
"
dialogue on who should pay the bill for the
L., I J 44
r
Reconnaissance Satellite Survivability Program. /.fihi IC Staff is sending over a position paper for
our use
y
MX/Dense Pack. As I mentioned to you this morning,
Weinberger reportedly met with the President
yesterday and may have officially made his
recommendation to the President for MX deployment.
You may wish to ask how he came out, particularly
regarding BMD deployment. Included for your
reference is a copy of the OSWR analysis of how
long it would take the Soviets to react to and
counter Dense Pack. In anticipation of the NSC
meeting next week, and OSWR are 25X1
expanding their analysis to include a description
of how the community analysis differs from that
of the Townes Panel and others. 25X1
informed me that Sandia and Lawrence Livermore have,
in fact, adjusted their assessments so that they
are now closer to our own. He reports they previously
had failed to factor into their time lines decision-
making and deployment. They had really only focussed
on the laboratory development time. A copy of the
Townes Report is attached in a separate folder if
you care to skim it. (FYI: If Defense, in fact,
proposes BMD in conjunction with Dense Pack in order
to insure survivability, we are talking about an
expensive program. Dense Pack buys us maybe five
to seven years of survivability but the BMD seems
to make the critical difference: because of the
uncertainty introduced into the attacker's prospects
for success. It would seem to me more cost
effective and only slightly less survivable to
deploy MX in current Minuteman silos protected by
2
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BMD. This would save the cost of the Dense Pack
construction, and would be more palatable as far
as SALT restrictions against the construction of
new silos. It seems clear that land based silos
are almost obsolete as a viable deployment scheme,
and we should cut our losses as far as any major
future capital outlays.)
-- Cuba Policy Review. For Weinberger's benefit, you
may wish to share some of your thoughts on this
exercise in light of the inputs from
and Dewey.
3. I have included a couple of additional items that
are somewhat interesting and if time permits you may wish to
mention them:
Soviet-Iranian Relations. Given Weinberger's
strong feelings of anathema towards the Iranian
regime, you may wish to call his attention to
perceptions that Soviet-Iranian
relations seem to be deteriorating. a CQCJUCS~
Rv %1 eaV'k S
Afghanistan. The NID feature the other day suggests
t at the stalemate in the fighting will continue,
and the recent reports of Soviet and Afghan deaths
in the Salang Tunnel are noteworthy.
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