DRAFT MISSION CAPABILITIES TASK FORCE STUDY, NOVEMBER 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001800050005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 24, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Droved For Release 200 u10 31 - ' 8G0050005-2
MEMORANDUM FOR: DC I 4 Dec 1981
We provided these comments on the Draft Nitze
Report to Paul Walsh, but they of cnurtp wprp nn+
aoie to accommodate most of them in their Final
We will be sending you a memorandum early next
week summarizing our comments on the Final Report
and a proposed memorandum for you to use in for-
warding the report to the Secretary of Defense.
FORM USE PREVIOUS
5-75 101 EDITIONS
Lawrence K. Gershwin
00044~O61'$dOD O'O5-8
 Approved For Release 2007/03/10: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800050005-8 .
SECRET NFAC 7599=81-
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
SP - 250/81
24 Noveutsr 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Paul Walsh
System Planning Corporation
FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
SUBJECT: Draft Mission Capabilities Task Force Study, November 1981
1. We believe the task force accomplished the objective of taking a first
step to assess how the Soviets would view the capabilities of their forces to
perform the strategic missions called for by their strategy. We recognize that
the study was an ambitious and complex undertaking completed in a very short time
As an initial experimental effort, the study results should inform intelligence
analysts as well as those responsible for the interagency net assessment of the
US-USSR strategic balance recently directed by the DCI and the Secretary of De-
fense. We find especially valuable, the excellent assessment of how the Soviets
see the future strategic competition (Section IV). Also, the revelation of in-
formation gaps and analytical uncertainties in the study should contribute to our
further collection and analytical efforts on this important subject.
F
2. We have noted in the attachments a number of deficiencies in the analy-
ses used, in the findings and in the presentation of material in the draft re-
port. The most important of these are
--The suggestion that the exchange calculations used replicate Soviet
analyses of the capabilities of their forces. This impression should be
corrected early in the report, as noted in the attachments.
--The use of some important assumptions that minimize US capabilities.
We believe these assumptions are at variance with Soviet perceptions and
planning factors.
--Some key judgments and conclusions conveyed with much greater confi-
dence than justified in view of the serious gaps in the intelligence informa-
tion available and the Uncertainties in the results of the exchange calcula-
tions. The experimental nature an tativeness of the findings of this
study should be explicitly noted. n 25X1
3. We realize that many of our comments and suggestions cannot be accom-
modated at this stage of the study. They may have some utility, however, as part
of a critique of the study aimed at further effor replicate how the Soviets
assess the capabilities of their nuclear forces. repl 25X1
2511
25 1
ATTACHMENTS
Lawrence K. Gershwin
l . Approved For Release 2007/03/10: CIA-RDP84B00049RO018,00050005-8__
 Approved For Release 2007/03/10: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800050005-8
SECRET
-2-
SP - 250/81
SUBJECT: Draft Mission Capabilities Task Force Study, November 1981
Distribution:
Cy 1 - Paul Walsh, System Planning Corporation
2 - C/NIC
3 - D/SOVA
44
5 - SOVA
6 - OSWR/AG
7-
8 - NFAC Registry
NIO/SP:
24Nov81)
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2007/03/10: CIA-RDP84B00049RO01800050005-8
Approved For Release 2007/03/10: CIA-RDP84B00049RO01800050005-8