SOVIET AND LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR S LEFTIST INSURGENCY AND RELATED PROPAGANDA

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CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2
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May 9, 2007
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4
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June 22, 1981
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MEMO
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Approved For Release 2007i05110TMRDP84B00049R001800110004-2 --" Central Intelligence,4gerxy STAT MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Secretary of State SUBJECT: Soviet and Latin American Communist ? Involvement in E1 Salvador This document has been declassified and can be used publicly. I would strongly recommend that. The attached version includes some minor editing so that it can be used in toto. STAT William J. Casey Att Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 SUBJECT: SOVIET AND LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR'S LEFTIST INSURGENCY AND RELATED PROPAGANDA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since early 1980, the Soviet Union, assisted by Cuba, has been involved in a massive overt and covert disinformation campaign on E1 Salvador. The campaign is directed at Western Europe, Latin America, the U.S. and to a lesser extent Australia and New Zealand. Up until now Moscow's primary interest in conducting the campaign was to divert public (mainly European) attention from the invasion of Afghanistan. Besides overt propaganda, the campaign is characterized by the use of forgeries, communist international fronts, communist parties, covert media placements and staging of demonstrations and protests. Those involved in the campaign are the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the DRU/FDR (policy planning organization of the insurgents and their political front charged with international representation). The campaign is also accompanied by diplomatic efforts and official propaganda. Diplomatic activity includes USSR and Cuban . efforts in international organizations to gain acceptance of the DRU/FDR, and sponsoring travel by FDR rEpresentatives to the United States, Europe, and Canada. Official Soviet propaganda stresses the theme of U.S. intention to intervene militarily in E1 Salvador. INTRODUCTION Since early 1980, the Soviet Union has been involved in a massive covert disinformation campaign on the subject of U.S. policy towards E1 Salvador. The campaign is directed at Western Europe, Canada, and the U.S. and to a lesser extent Australia and New Zealand. In 1980 the Soviet Union also caused weapons and ammunition to be sent to the insurgents by the Bloc countries, the PLO and others. The Soviets are being helped by the Cubans in the disinformation campaign, but the campaign is ultimately a Soviet operation. Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 SOVIET OBJECTIVES Although the USSR clearly wishes to see E1 Salvador ultimately become a Communist state, Moscow's primary interest in early 1980 in conducting the disinformation campaign appears to have been influenced substantially as an effort to divert public attention from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The campaign. was designed to criticize U.S. "intervention." Propaganda stressed "U.S. militarism," identified the U.S. with "atrocities" in E1 Salvador, and stressed throughout the campaign that the U.S. was poised to invade E1 Salvador. In early'1980, instructions went out from Moscow advising there was a new propaganda policy. Instructions were to begin immediately stressing "militaristic" policies of the United States in the strongest terms. By June 1980, the theme of U.S. militarism was particularly important for propaganda going to Western Europe, especially West Germany. Soviet instructions to their media offices said that both in the short and medium terms it is necessary both strategically and tactically to reduce world attention on Afghanistan. Instructions also said that on E1 Salvador the Soviets should proceed with a great deal of caution and delicacy. BACKGROUND The Soviets had been in touch with the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCES) for years. The Soviets were monitoring armed insurgent activity in Nicaragua during 1979; however, the Cubans were closest tof the insurgents at that time. In early 1980, Soviets, Cubans and Salvadoran insurgents (the A PCES was represented) met on twc occasions that were significant. As a result of the first meeting, t:~e Frente Democratico Revolucionario (FDR) was established. As a result of the. second meeting, the United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) was established. The FDR is the political front organization which represents the insurgency abroad. The DRU is the central planning and tasking organization of the insurgents. The DRU plans both internal military and international political strategy.' ~In March 1980, a PCES representative travelled to Moscow in the company of other insurgent leaders. He met with CPSU officials. From there he travelled to a. World Peace Council Conference where~.~he met with an East German official who promised financial and other.'aid for the insurgents. From there, the PCES rep travelled to other East Bloc countries, ? Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 In April 1980, PCES representatives and leaders of other insurgent groups met at the Hungarian Embassy in Mexico City with representatives of the GDR, Bulgaria, Poland, Vietnam, Hungary, Cuba and the USSR, and made "certain requests," probably weapons. In May 1980, "Aide et Amitie," an organization founded by the late Henri Curiel to provide support to natyional liberation movements, met in Paris to discuss requests for support and training of cadre for the insurgency in E1 Salvador. There are reasons to believe that Curiel had links with the Soviets and that the organization may ultimately.be responsive~to Soviet guidance. The Curiel groups, even at this early date, expected a major military offensive in November, 1980. In June, Shafick Handal (head of the PCES) traveled to Moscow and met with the Deputy Chief of the Latin American section of the CPSU. The Soviets suggested that Handal trave'. to 'Vietnam to seek arms and offered to pay for Handal's trip. Hancal during June obtained promises of weapons, training or financial assistance from Vietnam, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Ethiopia. An examination of E1 Salvador related events during 1980 and early 1981 shows that the Soviets and their Cuban and Salvadoran clients engaged in covert activities to influence public opinion in Western Europe, Latin America, Canada, and the U.S. These activities included fabrication of forgeries, use of front groups, covert placement of media items, and staging of demonstrations and protests on E1 Salvador. They also engaged~~in overt diplomatic activities to gain recognition for the insurgents in international organizations, and in overt propaganda. R _ __ AnnrnvPrl Fnr RPIPasP ~[107/05/10 ~ C;IA-B DP84B00049R001800110004 'Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP~4B00049R001800110004-2 STRATEGY ~-'` The Salvadoran DRU, central planning and tasking organization o e insurgents, was established in a meeting in Havana at which the Sovie .~we~re~presen~t~ in June 1980. a exac r t~etin is uncle'? cr~th~ "v e~ s at ,~_ _?.w_ ___~~,~ a ~me-et`ing~ ~est~ablished a strategy fo ~n e~-r atonal,,~.po itical campaig,~:~Eleinents of'~tha~-str to egy; t' en ~r'am captured documents,. are as follows: 1. Propaganda: Spokesmen should emphasis that the Salvadoran revolution represents the people. The people are fighting against oppression, for independence, and for freedom from outside intervention. The people oppose the imperialistic designs of the U.S. The U.S. seeks to intervene militarily in E1 Salvador to keep the Junta in power. . =.~~nternational Support~/Representatives should gain ecognition na d support"~for a insurgents in the following organizations: Non-Aligned Movement, International Christian Democratic Movement (to undermine support for the Junta), European Parliament, Socialist International, Council of Europe, UN, OAS, and the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. They should also gain allies 'n: the German Christian Democratic Party, West German Parliament, Italian Christian Democratic Party, Italian Communist Party, the Italian Parli~l~ent, and the COPEI party in Venezuela. 3.~ U.S. Initiatives: Representatives should strengthen ties with the National Council of Churches and sectors of the labor movement. Representatives should make approaches to Senators and higher levels of the Conu~ess to gain allies for the FDR. 4. Other Initiatives: Representatives should seek endorsement` from the World Council of Churches, Amnesty International, and the International Tribune of the Peoples (Russell Commission). 5. Public Posture: From the outset, representatives should call for a dialogue to seek resolution of the conflict. "The policy of a dialogue is a tactical maneuver to broaden our alliances, while at the same time splitting up and isolating the enemy." Representatives should take up the banner of peace, and maintain that we seek only lasting peace and justice. 6. Humanitarian Or anizations:: The DRU should establish a front organization to unnel aid and money from European and. Canadian Catholic, Protestant and Humanitarian organizations, like the Catholic Relief Services, International?Committee for the Rec2?Cross, and others. Approved For Release 2007/05110 :,CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 A comparison of DRU strategy laid out in captured documents with actual events shows that the insurgents followed this strategy very closely. CUBAN AND SOVIET STRATEGY A Cuban official ~~told a leader from a radical leftist party in Central America that the Soviet Union and Cuba were engaged in a world wide campaign to block U.S. aid to E1 Salvador. The campaign "will denounce U.S. assistance to and training of Salvadoran military" at U.S. bases in Panama. The campaign will also expose an allegedly U.S. sponsored plot, "discovered" by Cuban intelligence, to invade E1 Salvador using the armies of Honduras- and Guatemala with assistance from Brazil, Argentina and Colombia. The campaign will characterize the U.S. plot as a last ditch effort by the U.S. President to turn the situation in E1 Salvador in favor of the JRG prior to the D.S. elections in November, 1980. The themes from the Cuban official's statement were echoed in propaganda put out by the FDR (the political front of the insurgents which represents the insurgents abroad), the FDR's Solidarity Committee abroad, pro-Soviet communist parties, and official Soviet propaganda. Soviet media showed particular interest in printing and broadcasting alleged U.S. plotting to invade E1 Salvador. COORDINATION Captured DRU documents revealed that the DRU coordinates the FDR and the latter's international activities (in the U.S., Canada, and Europe) out of Mexico City. The Soviets ?.n Mexico City have been in contact with the Salvadoran insurgents; however, logistics and international relations policy'is all handled out of Havana. In fact, the Cuban press agency, Prensa Latina, handles international communications for the FDR and its representatives abroad. ? 'Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 THE COVERT CAMPAIGN The following sections describe the covert activities conducted outside E1 Salvador. Forgeries and Documents of False Origin 1. Purported NSC Document Entitled "National Security Council Back round Pa er on Mexico." This document reportedly covered a range of alleged issues in U.S. Mexican relations, but the relevant thrust was that the U.S. was dissatisfied with Mexico's independent stance on Central America. On 26 August 1980, the Mexican press regorted on the contents of the alleged NSC Report; however, there never was any such NSC Report. The U.S. Government has ne-~er been able to obtain a copy of the document from which the article was written. 2. Bogus Dissent Pa er on E1 Salvador and Central America. This paper, dated November 6, 1980, was mailed with no return address to several executive departments in Washington and the Congress. It was also mailed to selected government officials in E1 Salvador. The paper charged that an energetic but mainly covert U.S. intervention took place to prevent the crisis in E1 Salvador from climaxing prior to the elections. It has been determined that the document was never entered in the State Department's Dissent Channel (as the paper claimed); however, the provenance of the document still remains uncertain. *Because these activities are designed to conceal the true identity of their originator,?it is often difficult to attribute each activity. Therefore, some activities will appear below unattributed. Where there is clear evi~ence that a~particular group was responsible for a particular deed, the responsibility is noted. Moreover, though there is evidence the campaign was carefully coordinated among the parties to it, one cannot assume that coordination was in such detail that every group had knowledge of every act of every other group. 'Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 The paper makes several false allegations that support Soviet CA goals in Central America. It alleges that the Q.S. has been training (in 1980) Salvadorans at its bases in Panama, "in the largest training program it has ever sponsored for any Latin American country in a single year." The paper also claims that Argentina has become the second largest trainer of Salvadoran officers, and that Chile and Uruguay (two frequent victims of Soviet propaganda) are providing intelligence, logistics and urban and rural counterinsurgency training. The paper goes on to allege that the U.S. knows. of a para- military strike force in Guatemala made up of members of Somoza`s former National Guard., anti-Castro Cubans, Guatemalan military personnel and mercenaries. 3. Bogus Press Release Purporting to be from the Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Relations. This release was sent to a number of newspapers in Mexico City. It falsely announced that the Government of Mexico had decided to break diplomatic relations with the Government of E1 Salvador. A report out of San Salvador suggested that the Salvadoran insurgents hoped for a rupture in relations between Mexico and EI Salvador. 4. Purported Identity Document Taken from a U S Soldier Killed in Action in E1 Salvador. In September 1980, during a secret meeting between members of the Salvadoran Communist Party and the Salvadoran Christian. Democratic Party, the PCES representative alleged that there were U.S. troops fighting on Salvadoran soil, and produced a U.S. social security card allegedly taken from a dead soldier as "proof." Subsequent propaganda echoed this claim while charging that large numbers of U.S. troops were fighting in E1 Salvador. Communist International Fronts The Soviets employed their large front organizations in su~nor 1 . ?'r'h~~tiro~al Union o~ Students ~. This Soviet front group, based in e, f~unden~m -e-r o idarity meetings on E1 ~- Salvador. From~e'arly to mid-April a representative of IUS travelled throughout Central America to organize solidarity functions. 2. World- Federation of Democratic Youths This Soviet front group was p an ing~`Fi'?'~~xn~rnational cori? a ence on solidarity with E1 Salvador to take place in late July or early August 1980. It was .planning to co-sponsor the conference with the International Union of Socialist Youth, the youth arm of the non-Communist Socialist International. '' '~ 'Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 1 Though the conference was never held, it is noteworthy because it indicates that the front groups .were already beginning to plan their support for the Salvadoran insurgency as early as March 1980. ,~ 3. World Peace Council. In December 1980,the Ecuadoran government gave its approval for a World Peace Council- sponsored "Solidarity on E1 Salvador" meeting. The Conference took place in April 1981. The Conference was to be jointly sponsored by the Latin American Association for Human Rights, the Socialist International, and the Permanent Conference of Latin American Political Parties. The WPC was to play a discreet role, perhaps because it is so widely known as a Soviet front. Communist Parties ~Commu~s~t=--pai~t"ies i;ri Europe, Latin America, Canada, and Australia participated in the propaganda campaign and helped organize d emon s tra t i~_r on ~ ~~~i-e~%gr~b~i a E'`i~n ~- ~rr~=i~rur~t~y~'pr i n ~e d-~~-n.~~-`',' t a ion in E1 Salvador, and contributed to the disinformation circulating about the country. For instance, the Communist party of Spain, in its magazine "Mundo Obrero Semanal," amid pictures of blood-covered bodies, accused the U.S. of surrounding E1 Salvador wit~+: the aid of Honduras and Guatemala, of sending tanks and helicopters ' "piloted by yankees," of invading E1 Salvador, and of murdering Archbishop Romero (a leftist Catholic bishop murdered early in 1980 in E1 Salvador). Others examples are the Quebec Communist Party in Canada, which organized a demonstration and carried it out even in a driving rainstorm, and the Australian Socialist Party (pro-Soviet) which joined with Trotskyites and other leftists to stage a demonstration._: against U.S. intervention." In Central America. the Communist parties carried out clandestine activities at the behest of the DRU. They were involved in gun-running, and in planning acts of violence against U.S. Embassies. (This is treated in more detail in a separate section.) No information is available re any Soviet role in the DRU tasking. Fidel Castro also attempted to have the Communist Parties in Central America stage uprisings in support of the Salvadoran insurgents. He tried to have them contribute. personnel to fight in E1 Salvador.. However, he was not successful. 'Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 Solidarity Committees The DRO directed the establishment of Solidarity Committees throughout Europe, in Canada and even in Australia and New Zealand. Their purpose is to serve as outlets for information (propaganda), to serve as conduits for aid contributions, and to organize solidarity meetings and demonstrations in support of the insurgents. In many cases the insurgents established these solidarity committees as. part of a broader "Nicaragua-E1 Salvador Solidarity Committee" or "Guatemala-E1 Salvador Solidarity Committee." In other cases the committees stood alone as "E1 Salvador Solidarity Committees" or "E1 Salvador Support Committees." These committees helped plan, in conjunction with Communist parties and local leftist groups, many of the demonstrations that took place throughout Europe, Latin America,. Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These demonstrations were planned in anticipation of the "final offensive" to be conducted in E' Salvador. Nicaraguan television announced in March 1981, that the "Nicaraguan Solidarity Committees," through agreement with the World Peace Council, would join the fight against TNF modernization in Europe. TNF {Theater Nuclear Force) is an issue on which Soviets have been active in Europe, but the issue has not received any significant attention in Latin America. The World Peace Council; is the Soviet Front Organization that has been in the forefront of opposition to TNF in Europe. Demonstrations and Protests Throughout 1980 press reports, k~oth Soviet inspired and others,, on E1 Salvador in Europe, Latin America, Canada and the U.S., had generally portrayed the Salvadoran government as a "rightist, repressive regime" and created a poor public image. Missionaries and other clergy returning from E1 Salvador also brought with them stories of oppression. The murders of Archbishop Romero, and other Amerman religious workers in E1 Salvador contributed to the perception that the Junta government was responsible _for. outs es._a ainst_ its own peoples. g- g- - rvllowing the January 10 "final offensive" in E1 Salvador and the ~Januarv 16 UsG dPC i c i nn +-n ,-e....._... _ r , _ ._ _ . _ u~,~~~~i~ ~L aL ivns oroxe out in Europe , Canada - -^- ~ _...,_' ,vie U.S. Over 70 dPmnnc+-r~#-;,,.,~ ~....__ ~_ __ ~ Australia, New Zealand and spo'trtaneous; -they had been planned in anti i ~ v W oL . c pation of the final offensive. ' Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 The pattern of dates and places of the demonstrations shows that they were the result of a well-coordinated world-wide effort. Their sponsorship, for the most part, by Communist parties and "E1 Salvador Solidarity Committees" also demonstrates that this was a coordinated effort. However, other groups participated in the demonstrations as well, indicating that parties and solidarity committees were able to draw the participation of others interested in E1 Salvador. Some of the other groups were Trotskyite parties, leftist student groups, and some labor organizations. The largest demonstration thus far was held 31 January 1981 in Frankfurt, West Germany.- Fifteen thousand people attended the demonstration and marched on the U.S. Consulate General. See Apendix for listing of many of the demonstrations. Violence Against U.S. Persons and Installations The DRU urged violence against U.S. persons and installations as a means to protest U.S. "interference"~in El Salvador. Following are examples of violence that took place or had been planned. 1. 28 January. The U.S. Ambassador's residence in Tegucigalpa was under surveillance. A check of the license number of the car used~~ by the surveillant revealed he was a member of the Honduran Communist Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 2. 3 February. The U.S. Consulate in Milan received a threat to "take measures against you" unless the O.S. stopped giving arms to E1 Salvador. The caller identified himself as part of the "Movement of 28 February," a Salvadoran guerrilla organization. 3. 5 February. Tha U.S. Embassy in Stockholm received a letter warning that the Embassy would be bombed in two weeks unless the U.S. stopped economic aid to the Junta in E1 Salvador. 4. 5 February. :The U.S. Consulate General in Amsterdam was attacked and physical damage was such that it closed for five days. This was the sixth security incident since mid-December ~in Amsterdam. No group claimed credit for the incident, but it probably was the work of groups protesting either the neutron bomb or E1 Salvador. 5. 23 Februar ~. The E1 Salvador Committee, which had been protesting U.S. aid to the Junta in E1 Salvador, threatened to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador in The Aague. Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 Covert Media Placements Placing material supporting a viewpoint in local media has also been a feature of Soviet and Cuban propaganda activity in E1 Salvador. An example of covert placement of material is indi- cated by the activity of a Cuban E-^bassy official .in one Latin American country, who obtained a copy of a color video tape made by a gxoup called the "Association of Churches." It depicted atrocities allegedly committed by the Salvadoran Army. The ~fficial!s intention in obtaining the tape i~*as to show it to the President and Vice President of the country and place it on one of the television networks. The official stated that one of the most important things was to show the credits on the tape accurately so that Cuba's non-involvement is made clear. THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT International Organizations ~~`~~ Captured documents indicate that the DRU intended to seer ~'~ recognition of the FDR in international organizations and obtain condemnation of alleged "U.S. interference" in E1 Salvador. The DRU also expected to obtain financial support as well as relief supplies from international humanitarian organizations. The organ- izations specifically targetted by the DRU fora diplomatic effort were: the UN, OAS, NAM, European Parliament, and Council of Europe. Some of the Humanitarian organizations selected for approach were: Catholic Relief.Services and International Committee for the Red Cross. Captured documents also indicated that the DRU expected the Socialist International to be its ally in this effort. Given the complexity of the Salvadoran situation and the strategy of the DRU, the congruence of positions taken~b such as the Socialist International and other target organizations and the position of clearly identified Communist front. groups should -12- `Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 not be construed necessarily as proof that. all these opposition groups are tools or fronts for the Soviets. Nevertheless, a certain parallelism can be seen.in some of the communiques and statements coming out of Socialist International meetings dealing with the Central America area. European Socialist and social democratic leaders involved in SI matters, such as A'illy Brandt, Have stated that the SI European parties usually defer to the views ~f their colleagues in the area concerned on matters concerning these areas; i.e., the views of the leaders of the socialist parties in San Salvador, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica have been reflected in SI Latin American communiques. Since these Latin American socialists, particularly the leaders of the Socialist party in E1 Salvador, are strongly influenced Tiy DRU positions, there is significant convergence of Soviet/Cuban positions on the E1 Salvador situation and that of the ST. There also are instances of apparent Soviet manipulation of SI statements. For example, a fetter reportedly from the Hudson Institute to the U. S. State Department surfaced at a crucial time. This letter conveyed a list of persons whom, is alleged, that the U.S. Government might wish to call upon to help influence European parties and governments on. the issue of E1 Salvador. One of the names in the letter was that of a delegate to the conference who was falsely identified as from the U.S. Government, if not the CTA, and thereby limited his effectiveness. In this context it is interesting to note that a signed PRAVDA editorial on 1 October, named this person as a CIA agent and said that fie had previously participated in the pacification program in Vietnam during the 1960's and was now "main" advisor to the Salvadoran Junta on agrarian reform. In reality this person worked for the AIFLD in El Salvador as an advisor on agrarian reform. PRAVDA'S accusation against him circulated kTidely among Congress delegates, further ruining his credibility. . Non-Ali ned Movement Ministerial in New Delhi (9 to 12 February At t e N i Ministerial, t o Cubans a sought a strongly worded condemnation of the U.S, and the Salvadoran Junta. They arrived at the conference with a delegation of 30 people and coordinated activities closely with six Soviet diplomatic personnel who were also working the conference. The language of the final communique condemned interference in E1 Salvador from all external parties, and called upon governments to abstain from supplying arms and rendering other forms of military assistance. ? Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-R DF'84000049R00180011g004-2 Thus there was no direct condemnation of the U.S. on E1 Salvador. Tfie final communique did call., however, for the witfidrawal of "foreign troops" from Afghanistan, something whicji could not fiave pleased Asoscow. Human Ri fits Commission in Geneva (2 3 February) . Cuban representatives intro uce a resolution criticising the government of E1 Salvador and received help from the Soviets . in lobBying the Western European delegations. They circulated supporting papers on letterFiead of tfie FDR which referred to captured DRU documents and said tfiat "falsification of documents is a daily duty of American. intelligence agencies such as CIA." They also circulated the Hudson Institute Letter about tfie Socialist International meeting in Madrid, a Nicara- guan denial of Soviet arms sfiipments tfirough its country, ? a.New York Times article Headlined "Solicitor General Call Two Amer cans.Killed in EI Salvador 'Under Cover,"' and an article from? The Washi~n t_o_n Post headlined "Vietnam from the Phoenix Program to El ~ ador:'T Despite tfie heavy lo~,bying effort afar more moderate resolu~ion introduced by the Netherlands..delegation.was adopted. Other Organizations -~ .The DRU had targetted otfier organizations to obtain either publicity, financial assistance or otfier forms of assistance. The insurgent's cause was taken up in the following organizations: 1. EC Commission -~ The EC proposed to send $400,000 EUA in cash assistance and one million in food assistance to ? humanitarian organizations in EI Salvador tfirough tfie ICRC. 2. ?International Permanent Commission of the Peoples (Russell Commission. Tfiis group field a !'trial" of the U.S. for "invading E1 Salvador, and of tfie government of F1 Salvador for "genocide." _ '? 'Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA=R DPS4B00049R001800?10004.2_-- 3. European/Latin American Parliamentary Conference--Socialist delegates to this conference sought a condemnation of the Salvadoran Junta and U.S. support for it. However, a gentleman's agreement among European delegations dropped condemnation of the USSR's inva$fon.of Afghanistan in return for dropping condemnation of the U.S.'s support for the Salvadoran Junta. Travels ~ FDR Representatives Representatives of the Frente Democratico Revolucionario (FDR), including Guillermo Ungo and Hector Oqueli, travelled extensively in Europe, Latin America, and Canada. Same FDR representatives visited Australia. The FDR also sent "permanent representatives" to live.in many European capitals. The Cuban news service, Prensa Latina, provided communications facilities for the FDR representa- tives. ? During .their travels, FDR representatives met with heads of state, members of parliament, socialist leaders, religious leaders, and others to talk about E1 Salvador and secure political support.. They also spoke at demonstrations and rallies. Public statements ? by these representatives generally followed the propaganda line established by the DRU and repeated in Soviet and world-wide Com- munist party propaganda. These ranged from statements that the U.S. is planning to intervene militarily in E1 Salvador, to claims - that invasion was already a fact accompanied by great detail on. the ''thousands" of U.S, troops, tanks, helicopters supposedly in the country. FDR representatives always maintained that the insur- gents were ready any time to "dialogue" with the Junta, and charac- terized the Junta as "rightist, military, repressive, and genocidal." ~OFFICIAL? ?FROP.4GANDA Soviet Media Commentary on E1 Salvador ~~ Overt Moscow media comment on E1 Salvador has attempted to dis- credit U.S. policies by convincing inter-national audiences that U.S: actions are?motivated by narrow self-interest and constitute a threat to all of Central America. As in its comment an other Third World areas, Moscow accuses Washington of supporting tyranny and of attempting to suppress popular struggles for legitimate social, economic, and political goals. The Soviet Union is portrayed in this propaganda as a champion of .people fighting for freedom and .sovereignty. rioscow publicly acknowledges Soviet political and moral support of the Salvadoran insurgents but dismisses :.charges about Soviet arms supply as fabrications aimed at justifying U.S. interference in the country. ? Annrnved For Release 2007/05110?: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 ' A-pproved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 Moscow's propaganda line is conveyed to foreign audiences in .more than 1,800 hours of broadcasts per week. Of these broadcasts, slightly over 108 hours per week are beamed to Latin America, pri- marily in Spanish and Portuguese. The major part of this broad- casting comes from the official Soviet radio, Radio Moscow. Some 14~hours per week are beamed to Latin America over the purportedly u~lofficial Radio Peace and Progress--a~radio using Radiv Moscow transmitters but claming to speak for Soviet public opinion. In addition, the Moscow World Service, established in June 1978, is~ An the air around the clock in English to international audiences; some of its programs can be heard by English-speaking people in Latin America. Soviet international broadcasts first stepped up attention to E1 Salvador in early January 1981, with commentary supporting Salvadoran guerrilla plans for a "final offensive" against the government. The volume of broadcast attention to the subject peaked in mid-January in reaction to the U.S, decision to resume military assistance to E1~Salvador. While the volume of comment then diminished, the tone became much more strident in early February in response to statements by U.S, officials linking the soviet Union with international terrorism and charging the Soviets with helping to arm the Salvadoran guerrillas. The preponderance of Soviet broadcast comment on E1 Salvador _in the past three months has been directed at audiences in Latin America and West Europe. The targeting and content of this material suggest a dual purpose: to exploit. Latin American opposition to increased U.S. involvement in the Salvadoran con- flict, while isolating the United States from its NATO allies. The use of Soviet international broadcasts to serve both objec-~- tives was demonstrated in mid-February, when U.S. envoys were visiting Europe and Latin America to seek support for U.S. policy and to document Soviet and Cuban involvement in the"Salvadoran conflict. During the week of the vis=ts, 16-22 February, 99 percent of sampled Soviet broadcast comment on E1 Salvador was beamed to audiences in ..Latin America and West Europe. While the volume of Soviet braodcast attention to E1 Salvador has been greater in recent weeks than the negligible attention Moscow usually gives to that country, it has not approached the magnitude of other propaganda campaigns. A week's sample of Soviet broadcasts in mid-January, at the, height of Moscow radio attention to E1 Salvador, revealed that only 5.5 percent of Soviet commentary was devoted to the topic. B?y contrast, a comparable sampling. of -'~ Soviet broa_ dcasts during the anti.-neutron~iomb;~issue. In normal times Moscow radio se -om mentions E1 Salvador. Even~at the time of the coup in E1 Salvador in~October 1979, less than one percent of Moscow radio comment dealt with events in .the country. /b ? Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 The principal themes of current Soviet media commentary on U,S, policy toward E1 Salvador are identified below in descendin order of frequency: g 1? The?United States is fomenting trouble in EZ SgZvador by arming an unpopular regime and sending. in agents disguised as technicians, Moscow has attempted to refute recent statements b Secretary of State Haig that the United States is not going to y expand the scope of its. current military assistance to the Salva- doran regime, Soviet corr`mentators~have argued that Haig's assur- ' ances.regarding the limited scale of U.S, involvement in EI Sal- ` vador are unconvincing, Typical char es a radio broadcast in Spanish to Latin Americaponr2dMarch;Moscow As reported by the American press itself, Washington is planning to allocate to the anti-people regime more than .. 200 million dollars--a fabulous sum for such a small country, ,We do not even mention the fact. that the number of Pentagon and CIA "advisers" in E1.Salvador is continually growing; they are not only acting as instruc- tors to the punitive detachments of the junta but are taking a direct part in the operations aimed at smashing the patriots, 2, U. S. charges of Soviet and Cuban involvement in the su arms to the Salvadoran guerriZtas are contrived to ppZy of military intervention in the ,conflict. Soviet propagandists~con- tend that U.S. statements about arms shipments from Moscow and Havana to the Salvadoran insurgents are a smokescreen that has failed to mask increased U.S, intervention. Thus Moscow radio f,. told Spanish-speaking audiences in Latin America on 4 March: The main claim of U.S, propaganda is that international conspirators and not the Salvadoran people are fighting the Salvadoran regime, However, despite all their efforts the North Americans have not managed to make anyone believe their lies, 3. The United States is attempting to revive gunboat diplomacy in Central America and is contributing to the repression of the Sa,Zvadoran masses in order to protect U. S, interests in the region. Moscow routinely plays on the theme that U.S. actions in E1 Salvador run counter to the legitimate interests of the Salvadoran people. The fallowing example is drawn from a commentary by Latin American affairs commentator Leonid Levchenko, broadcast by Moscow radio on 4 hiarch to a variety of audiences: The U,S. Administration tries to shore up -the reactionary ? regime in EI Salvador and protect the order against which the people of that country have risen in rebellion. ,. /7 Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 -~ The people of E1 Salvador have risen against a system of oppression and repression. In these conditions the United States has made a choice in favor of a tyrannical regime responsible for the deaths of many thousands of ' people. +4: Washington has failed in its e European allies for U. S, initiativesoinsEZoSaZvadore sSeekin otoits undercut the U.S, position that external communist militarygznvolve- ? went has become a crucial factor in the Salvadoran conflict, koscow portrays West Euro can arguments and as persuadedeTOnethe contrary,jthat UYSwaintegfon's is the troublemaking factor. The Levchenko commentary cited abovee also touched on this theme: The public of Western Europe and Latin America are showing concern over America's increasing military interference in. El Salvador. The majority of America's allies have mzde it quite plain that they do not only refuse to give support to the American intervention~in E1 Salvador, but treat very negatively Washington's attempt to keep the junta in power. 5.. U. S, interference in EZ Salvador is only part of a larger U. S. plan to put an end to revolutionary upheaval in Central America. This theme underscores Moscow's charge that Washington's support for the Salvadoran junta may presage more forceful U,S. action against other leftist movements in the region, particularly against the Sandinist-led government in Nicaragua, A commentary by Leonid Levchenko broadcast by Radio Moscow's World Service on 17 January.=' said: According to the U.S, magazine NATION, a.war in Central America would be a fine excuse for sending U.S. Marines and crushing revolutionary upheavals in that region once and for all. As it is preparing for a direct armed intervention in E1 Salvador,_the United States would like at the same time to bring down the democratic system in Nicaragua and to help the dictatorial regimes in Guatemala and honduras to make short work of the mounting opposition movements in those countries. 6. U. S, charges against the Soviet Union to the contrar the United States, not the Soviet Union, which uses terrorism as an instrument_of foreign policy. Moscow commentators typically avoid coming to grips with rthe substance of the U.S, charges, dis- missing them as attacks against the Soviet Union's policy of sup- porting "national liberation struggles." The following passage appeared in a Moscow radio commentary broadcast to Soviet domestic as well as worldwide foreign audiences on 3 February: ,~ /B ' Approved For Release 2007i05110~ : CIA-R.CTP84Bfl00~9R001800110004-2~, The efforts of those Washington figures who are blithely huxling accusations at the wrong target and are at the same time giving moral, political, material, and mili- tary support to repressive and terrorist regimes look - like hypocrisy and sanctimoniousness. 7~ The ~U~zted States has prepared a number of military options, tineZuding direct U. S, armed intervention in EZ Salvador, to prevent a takeover of power ~y Salvadoran leftists. Seeking to bolster the view that Washington is resolved to save the Salvadoran junta at any cost, Moscow has long contended that the United States is pre- paring to intervene in E1 Salvador, either directly or through the use of Latin American expeditionary forces. Moscow first warned of possible U.S. military involvement in E1 Salvador in mid_February 1980 following Washington's decision to provide.military aid to the junta. These warnings peaked in December 1980 and January~198I as the~scale~of the war between the junta and the leftists intensified. Recent Soviet media commentary on the Salvadoran conflict has included mention of a possible U.S. military role, but with Less frequency than. during the December-January period. Touching on this issue last December, .a commentary by Leonid Levchenko broadcast over Radio Mosco?~r's World-Service on the 24th said: The special presidential expert commission on EI Salvador is knovtn~to have recommended direct military intervention __ in that country. This intervention is to be launched in different forms. The commission suggests, for example, sending into E1.Salvador troops of the member countries of the Organization of American States.~But if this tactic cannot be applied this time because of the oppo-,~.? sition by most members of the organization, then it is proposed to support the junta by sending in troops of the United States, Guatemala,. and Honduras. /9 '? 'Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84 000498001800110004-2 APPENDIX Demonstrations and Protests A ainst U.S. Polic in E1 Salvador DATE PLACE NO.~ SPONSOR 13 Jan. Montreal 40 Comite Unitaire De Solidar.ite P6ur Sa.l.vadone 16 Jan. ~ Bern ~ 800 "Usual run of left-win third-world interest groupsh mostly Swiss but with a smattering of Latin American participants .'~ _ 16 Jan. . Panama City _ Federation of Panamanian students, Revolution Student Front. There was also an~attempt to firebomb the Embassy. 16 Jan. -~---~ Sydney ' - 40" - :: "Australian Social~'st k~orkers Party" (TrotyfCYite) (NOTE: Some Chileans were to participate, according to permit, 'fiat were.not seen at site, 16 Jan. Managua 300 Al] U.S. Citizens, mainly Plaryknolle~s, and others describing themselves as tourists, 17 Jan. Georgetown 40 peoples Progressive Party (Pro-Soviet 17 Jan. Brussels 250 "A sma]1 local 7rotskyite,.party'_'..and other.Leftist groups. 19 Jan. Bilbao 40 ~iem6ers of the Faculty of Theology of the University of Deusto 20 Jan. Barcelona 50 Liga Comunista Revolucionaria, Movimiento Comunista de Catalun.ia 20,Jan. Vancouver 75 E1 Salvador/Nicaragua Support Committee. 20 Jan. 4lellington 8 ~ Nicaragua Solidarity~Committee 20 Jan. Quito unk ~~ '~ ~ ~ Leftist students from Catholic University - ~ . Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B0 - 20 Jan. Rome Unk Committee of :,?olidarity with the Salvadoran People. Speakers included Brazilian labor leader and Communist "Lula" Uruguayan Ernesto Gogi, and others 22 Jan. USUN 200 - Committee in Solidarity with the People of E1 Salvador 22 Jan. Bilbao 3 Communist Party of Euskadi, Basque Regional Branch of Spanish Communist Party. 22 Jan. Bogota 35 Colombian Communist Party (pro-Soviet] 22 Jan. Managua 15 Group describing itself as American Professional people.f.rom New York and Cal ifornia 22 Jan. -San Jose un[c Unidentified group, mainly foreigners. . Tfie Government of Costa Rica subsequently expelled l6 foreigners including 3 U.S. citizens for demonstrating illegally. 24 Jan. ~ Stuttgart 80 Amnesty International., Association of German Catholic Youth, Action Committee Stuttgart, Communist-Party of Chile, -_-_ - ~ Latin American Comm., Stuttgart, Movement of-the Revolutionary Left, Socialist Party of Chile, Socialist Party CNR, Chile. ' 24 Jan. -Calgary 2Q0 Committee of Friends of E1 Salvador New Democratic Party, the U.S. Association, tfie Inter-Church Committee on Numar Rights in Latin America - . 29 Jan. Vienna 1,500 Anti-U.S, campaign spearheaded by Austrian Communist Party. 29 Jan. Dusseldorf -100 Working Group for E1 Salvador, Neuss; Central America Committee, Wuppertal; Nicaragua Information Office, Wuppertal; Initiative Group for the Third World, Neuss; Working Group of BCKJ For The Politics - of Development; ASTA (Combined German Student-:Committee; Professional Group of the PN,' Neuss; ~p~ovec~Fo~'~ 4-2 ~' 29 Jan. Dusseldorf 100 (Cont'd.) Evangelical Student Committee, Dusseldorf; . 4lorking Group for Alternatives in Social 4lork; The Foreigners Group, Bilk; ' Action Alovement for Housing, Dusseldorf; Independent Medical Group; Biker-Base Central Book Assn.; . Saegewerke, E. V.; Children's Book Store in t~uppertal, Third ? ~torld Section; Provincial Association for the North Rhine-Westphalia "The Green Ones" (An Environmentalist Political Party); Free International University.. 31 Jan. Mexi'co~ ~ 10,000 (Not attributed 6y Embassy report 31 Jan. Frankfurt 15,000 Informationsstelle E1.Salvador. Marchers included several hundred masked leather- jacketed rowdies" and "a number of orderly Turks and Chileans." The keynote speaker . Nras. Karsten Voigt. There. were acts of violence. 31 Jan, Stockholm 400 Guatemala-El Salvador Committee. Vast majority of demonstrators were Latin .. _._ _ Americans, from Latin American exile groups. 3 Feb. Milan -- ~ r Telephone threat against U.S. Consulate in t4ilan 6y group calling itself MOVEMENT OF 28 FEBRUARY. Caller said in Spanish that?~ U.S. must cease giving arms to Salvadoran ~~unta or his organization "will take measures against you." 6 Feb. Melbourne unk Nicaragua Reconstruction Committee, Socialist Workers Party, Spartacist League of Australia, Tnternationai Socialists, Communist Party of Australia. 10 Feb. San Jose 8 Partido Revolucionario de Los 7rabajadores. Demonstration followed series of radio ? announcements claiming Feb. 10 would be day of world-wide demonstrations against E] Salvador 6y the Fourth International " ' Partido Mundial De Los Trabajadores." 10 'Feb. Mexico 150 Partido 06rero Socialists, Liga Obrero . Marxists, Partido r4arxista De Mexico, Juventud Democratica Mexicans 10 Feb. Lima 15 "Leftist and C ommu-~ist Demonstrators, organized and led by Senator Cesar Napuri (POMR) and Diputado Enrique Fernandez (PST . ?Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 10 Feb. ~ Paris 500 Organisation Com~nuniste Internationaliste. 10 Feb. Hamburg 10. Unattributed 10 Feb. Frankfurt 5 Protest letter delivered by reps of Internat~onaler Arbeitskreis Frankfurt. ' 10 Feb. Lima 15 ~ Persons representing various political . parties, including the trotskyites. 11 Feb. Quebec_ 8 Communist Party - These demonstrators showdd up during a driving rain storm for . demonstration. 13 Feb. Perth 6 Unattri6uted (Perth OOgO} 14 Feb. Amsterdam 2,500 E1 Salvador Committee, together with the the support of other local anti-American protest groups and United Uruguayan Group In Solidarity With El Salvador. International :." Communist League, Convention tlacional de Trabajadores del __.._ ~ Uruguay, IKB - Grupo Combate. 17 Feb. D-~61in 35 E1 Salvador Support Committee. (Note: the Embassy in Dublin reported this was the Fiftfi demonstration by this group.) .~,? 20 Feb. Oslo 200 iinattributed. 25 Feb. Paris 1,000 Comite Soutien au Peuple du Salvador, Comite du i~icaragua, Comite du Guatemala. (all These groups were organized by the . Organisie 4E Internationale, a Trotskyist groupj. 26 Feb. Stuttgart 15 Same groups as Jan 24 demonstration. 26 Feb. Rome 35 Partito Democratico Unione Proletario Movimiento La6oratori Per I1 Socialismo. `Among the group were six parliamentary . reps of the PDUP. 27~Feb. Edinburgh 75 ~ Latin American Solidarity Campaign Of Edinburgh. Some damage was done to the Consulate door?by battering it. 28 Feb. Vancouver 5f70 ~~ ?-~E1~ Salvador/Nicaragua Committee. 07/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 `Approved For Release 2007/05110: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2 28 Feb. Quebec 500 Quebec/El Salvador (~1FI) ' 6 Mar. Adelaide 30 Socialist Party of Australia, Socialist Workers Party, Communist Party of Australia. 3 i'gar. Copenhagen" 1,500 "Several Danish political organizations from Center-left of Communist"~ Chile- Nicaragua Allende-Uruguay Co~-unittee. 10 Mar. Toronto 200 E1 Salvador Support Committee. Droved For Release 2007i05~10 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2