TERMS OF REFERENCE AND OUTLINE FOR NSSD 2/82 STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001800150003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

. . Approved For Release 2007/03/23: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800150003-9
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TERMS OF REFERENCE AND OUTLINE FOR NSSD 2/82 STUDY
Introduction: The Soviet intelligence services and their Warsaw Pact/
Cuban allies continue to constitute a strategic threat to the United States,
their principal target. That overall threat, including HUMINT, SIGINT, and
IMINT, has increased over the past year. The Soviet intelligence collection
effort against the United States is concentrated on U.S. military information,
national security policy and advanced technology. The Soviets utilize all
collection techniques with built-in redundancy and central direction; they
command very large resource levels to accomplish their goals; and they take
full advantage of the U.S. open society for acquisition of information. The
details of this and other threats are presented and discussed in the "Hostile
Intelligence Services Multidisciplinary Threat and US Countermeasures" national
assessment issued by the DCI in March 1982.
Purpose: To establish the objectives, policies, required capabilities,
organizational relationships, and resource priorities which in turn will guide
the future efforts.of departments and agencies in countering the wide range of
intelligence collection techniques and activities by which hostile intelligence
services threaten our security.
Issues: The intelligence threat facing the United States from the Soviet
Union and its surrogates is broadly based, coordinated and encompasses all
collection disciplines. The most effective means of countering this centrally
directed multidisciplinary threat is with a broadly based total protection
concept. Inasmuch as such a concept cuts across many organizational, functional,
programmatic and budgetary lines, attention must be given to the strengthening
0 N of the current collegial management to optimize its ability to provide national
a direction and coordination. One solution would be the creation of a single,
central organization, but this alternative has been rejected as inconsistent
with constitutional and statutory authorities and our basic democratic prin-
ciples. In short, total protection needs to be devised and practiced as a
coordinated but decentralized program rather than by central dictation.
Background: NSSD 2/82 directs the Director of Central Intelligence to
undertake a study of U.S. capabilities and requirements to meet the total
threat to our security. He is directed to chair an interagency group to con-
duct this review. The group will include the Secretary of Defense; the As-
sistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Director, FBI; the
Director, NSA; the Director, DIA; and the Chairman, JCS. Participation will
also include the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and others that the
DCI may invite. The review is directed to be accomplished by 15 June 1982.
Definitions:
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Scope: This study will develop U.S. objectives and policies for dealing
with the multidisciplinary hostile intelligence threat to the United States and
will assess the effectiveness of our ability to-respond to this threat.
Paramount consideration will be given to our capabilities, resource priorities
and programmatic development throughout the Government for detecting., _,analyzing
and countering the multiple hostile threats in their totality. The study will
not include the international terrorist threat and its countermeasures.
Further details: of the study scope, as derived from the National Security
Study Directive (NSSD) are contained in the Attachment E outline.
Charge: Prepare a 1985 Counterintelligence Capabilities Plan to be
utilized as guidance for development of programs and budgets over the period
from 1985 to 1990. This will include National Foreign Intelligence Program
(NFIP) activities as well as non-NFIP activities insofar as hostile intelli-
gence countermeasure capabilities are concerned.
Concurrently, identify and study objectives, policies, organizational
relationships and associated matters to serve as the basis for development of
a draft National Security Decision Directive. Present a draft NSDD on "De-
tecting and Countering the Foreign Intelligence Threat to the United States"
for NSC consideration and Presidential decision.
Study Procedure: The SIG-I will constitute the steering group for the
conduct of these tasks, and will use the IG/CI and possible ad hoc IG(s) as
working groups for conduct of the studies. The SIG-I will be chaired by the
DCI. The IG/CI will be co-chaired by designated representatives of the DCI and
the Director, FBI.
All departments or agencies represented on the SIG-I will provide repre-
sentative membership on the IG/CI and possible ad hoc IG(s). The Chairman of
the SIG-I, the Co-Chairmen of the IG/CI or the Chairman of an ad hoc IG may
invite participation by others as may be desirable.
Each participating department or agency will provide from its own staff
such support as is needed to accomplish assigned study tasks.
Methodology and Schedule: Intelligence Community agencies'are requested
to provide input to the study in accordance with the notations in parentheses
on the outline. These indvidual inputs will be consolidated by the Study
Director and his staff and a draft submitted to the Community for coordination.
The schedule, aimed at the mandated 15 June completion date, is as follows:
28 April Receive Community inputs to study.
13 May Distribute initial draft
21 May Receive comments on draft.
26 May Distribute coordination draft.
2 June Receive comments on coordination draft.
6 June Complete final draft with provision for divergent
views if required.
7 June Start publication of study.
15 June Distribute study.
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