SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF ARMS AGREEMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001800210009-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 1, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

THE HERITPAGE FOUNDATION ? 513 C STREET, N.E. ? WASHINGTON, D.C. ? 20002 ? [phone]
Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements
Ni NY..
On June 2?9, 1982, the United States and the Soviet freeze agreement. Without such verifiability, freeze ad .
)a will tformally begin strategic arms reduction vocates are relying on Soviet compliance with an interna-
'3 ART) tall'.-s. This development comes just after both tional agreement-a dangerous assumption given the
U.S. andjt the Soviets have formally articulated initial historical record of Soviet activities over the past 65 years.
rgaining puasitions on arms reduction. In the previous edition of the National Security Record,
The Unite& States has proposed that both nations sub- the flawed premises and mistaken assumptions and logic
stantially reduce their nuclear weapons capabilities, includ- behind the nuclear freeze concept were analyzed.
ink a reducticon by one-third in the total number of nuclear However, the more basic fatal flaw behind the nuclear
warheads depployed by each side on long-range ballistic freeze approach is simply the failure to understand the
missiles. nature of the other party to such an agreement, as well as
The initial Sioviet response has been harshly negative. its ideological and practical approach to international
Soviet Fader-13rezhnev, while indicating a willingness to treaties.
_uss arms; rceduction, dismissed the U.S. proposal as On a practical and historical level, the record is littered
:nreaiistic"'Land "designed to insure American superior- with treaties and agreements unobserved or broken bthe
ity." At the: sname time, Brezhnev, seeking to take advan- Soviets. At least it can be said that the`-'0`4(:' 'ii e tage of the un-:ilateral arms reduction sentiment found in ent and do not discriminate; they hav
some sectors cx~f the U.S. and Western European populace, all kinds and on all levels. But for the pi;:..--ses of exa..
called for a straitegic arms freeze to begin as soon as possible. ing the practicality of a freeze proposal, oi: 01lic.? s
Nuclear wezr.?pons possess the most awesome destructive particular attention on Soviet compliance wtih a
capability of aany weapons in the history of mankind. This range of arms agreements, from bilateral non-a221es-i:,
stark reality limas periodically prompted many individuals treaties to strategic arms agreements to restrictions oii
and groups- to passionately pursue arms control chemical warfare.
a.,reer.t~~ts.
Hc' .. c.: er admirable the objective of averting nuclear HISTORY OF SOVIET ARMS VIOLATIONS
war may tine narrow-minded pursuit of seemingly at- The entire history of the U.S.S.R. reveals it 1h-is b.
tr acti mss i limitation proposals may, in reality be a trustworthy as a participant in any agreement ti i --r ,
ur,?... azrns agreement would actually lead to a more published a detailed accounting of Soviet::~_:,t? Lit
;t:t;=edictable nuclear environment, and thereby agreements it made during the first 45 1:_a: t'?ia ex-
inc.e::_: .,~nrssibilitis of a nuclear war. - istence of the Soviet Union. -
T..is i-_,-:e s'?iSy for any proposed nuclear arms agreement In May 1920, the Soviets signed in-
to be , ? ar axtrd verifiable is particularly relevant at the dependent Georgian Republic pledging ;,aer . e,-,re in
present time,, ggiven the intense public interest that has its internal affairs; less than one year Iaier, Soviet i ;i?;
arisen in conj;unction with the proposal for a "nuclear invaded the country and incorporated it into the
freeze." The Soviets signed similar bilateral agreemer.:;
Especiall:; '>n light of the apparent increase in attention Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, ;' ;:.r? '
to the nuclear. `freeze concept, as well as the recent Reagan Romania and Afghanistan; eventually the Soviet
and Brezhne% statements, it is very ili:portant that the true took military action against all of these treaty partn,:
situation with.-respect to verifying Soviet compliance with imposed new Soviet-oriented governments on them.
existing arms muclear treaties be understood. In the area of In recent years the Soviets have demonstrated a particiz-
nuclear arms,. there is no margin for error. Research and lar unwillingness to abide by any agreements de:_iing ui;h
development con, or actual possession of,' a new or their armaments programs. On a wide range of ;s sues the
s'.rategically'dcecisive weapon system could well mean the Soviets have stretched agreements to their limits and tt:e:n
d`fference be'hveen victory and defeat, survival and often proceeded to break them, not only in spirit, `.. ' ,
c: rr..,ction. substance. For example:
:'i+:,i i., w ';"he naive assumptions made by some ad- Nuclear Test Ban: The Soviets have conducte. a;
of a ;.;clear freeze must be examiried. In par- eight underground nu:;ear tests of over 150 k'.ot?.;i
nucleair freeze advocates have not dealt adequately direct violation of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban
it?h r?;;; necesssity of strict and complete vex habiiity of any Radioactive Debris: The Soviets have nn qt least thirty o -
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casions vented rjrI lioactive debris from underground tests
in clear ?violt,tior'ni of. the 1973 limited Test Ban Treaty.
These actions rezz+, ilted in radioactive debris spreading out-
side the Soviet lir` ;pion.
Detente Pact: 7' ';"le Soviets violated the 1972 Basic Prin-
c pies of US-Soy i ? let Relations during the 1973 Yom Kippur
War. In this case :e, the Soviets reneged on their 1972 pledge
to engage in rnuttltual consultations in the event that nuclear
war was threatenE'.'d, and they sought unilateral advantage
by encouraging t?. he Egyptian attack on Israel. They also
threatened unilatateral intervention against Israel.
Cuba: Despite tithe 1962 Kennedy-Khruschev Agreement
not to station ofo4fensive forces in Cuba, the Soviets have
proceeded to incttcrementally station such forces there. Since
1970, the Soviets=ts have deployed Golf and Echo class sub-
marines carryingng, long range nuclear missiles, as well as
nuclear capable .e MiG-23 fighter bombers and long range
Bear bombers.
Poland: High Reagan Administration officials have
charged that the ?T_ December 1981 imposition of martial law
Poland was directed by the Soviets, and that the Soviets
directly thre: -atoned military action against Poland, in-
.-'_':ated its leas.--;ders, and ordered basic human rights of
Polish people)!e to be violated by the Polish Communist
Party and Pol:l'sh Army. ACDA Director Eugene V.
Rostow even : nt so far on NBC-TV on December 22,
1981, as to ge that the Soviets have violated the UN
Charter I.. ; :-~:: . gressive actions in Poland. Other high
Rea,2clopnent of of a rapid!'. ;Scptoyat'r, ABM, also for na-
d nse.
Soviet deployment of the heavy SS-19 ICBM as the rcpl,cc:n-nt of the
light SS-1I ICBM; this is the most dangerous of all Soviet SA'_T'.iola-
tions
Soviet failure to deactivate old ICBMs on time, and falsification of of-
ficial deactivation reports;
Bringing back ICBM equipment to deactivated ICBM coi.:plexes;
Keeping 18 SS-9 ICBMs at an ICBM test range ill.gally, operational;
Soviet deployment of IIIX silos with a configuration too similar to a mis-
sile-launch silo;
Soviet massive use of deliberate camouflage, concealment, and deception;
this actually increased after 1972:
-Encryption of missile telemetry
-Camouflage of ICBM testing, production, deployment
-Concealment of SLBM submarine construction, berthing, dummy
subs, berthing tunnels;
Constructing over 68 strategic submarines, when only 62 were allowed;
SS-20 IRBM deployment, which should count as ICBM deployment;
Violation of Brezhnev's pledge not to build mobile ICBMs;
Deploying SS-11 ICBMs at SS-4 MRBM sites, probably having a covert
soft launch capability.
Keeping about 1,300 to several thousand old ICBMs stockpiled for both
covert soft launch and rapid reload of silos for refire..
SALT II VIOLATIONS
A SALT II Treaty was signed by the Carter Administra-
tion, but it was never approved by the United States
Senate. Nonetheless, the Carter Administration took the
position that the U.S. would observe the terms of the
treaty unless and until the Soviets "undercut" the treaty.
Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration has chosen to
go along with this approach, and has failed even to ask the
Soviet Union for a specific public statement, such as the
U.S. has given, of i- nt to observe the treaty. In fact, the
Soviets have ...:' atively stated several times that they
are not bound :.amply with SALT 11 until the U.S'.
ratifies it.
At present, the U.S. has pledged to observe the treaty
provided the Soviets also adhere to its terms. This prompts
the obvious but often neglected question of whether the
Soviets are now in fact violating SALT 11. The evidence
clearly indicates that Moscow has once again been con-
sciously ignoring treaty limitations.
First, the Soviets have reportedly continued, and even
increased, their. missile .telemetry. si ona1 encryption ac-
tivities, despite SALT H provisions which require the ac-
cessibility of all telemetry needed by the U.S. to verify crr-
tain parameters. This continued encryption violates Artic;e'
XV and its Second Common Understanding. The SSN-2O
Typhoon. SLBM is reportedly being encrypted almost
totally, which actively interferes with U.S. ability to deter--
mine whether the Typhoon SLBM is a banned heavy.
SLBM. The Soviets are also reportedly almost totally en-
crypting the SS-18 Mod X, interfering illegally with the
U.S. ability to determine the number, size, and type of
warheads carried on it. Moreover, the Soviets reportedly
are almost totally encrypting the telemetry on their SSN-19
SLCM. This encryption interferes with the U.S. ability to
determine whether this SLCM has a prohibited range
longer than 600 k0orneters or carries. multiple warheads.,-
Finally, high levels of SS-20 encryption reportedly con
tinue. i_;is encryption hampers U.S. ability to determine
whether SS-20 range is being extended or whether fewer
warheads are being tested.
Second, the reported Soviet stockpiling of over 100
mobile SS-16 ICBMs circumvents the SALT II provisions
which ban SS-16 production and deployment. This action
directly violates the. Protocol to the SALT 11 Treaty.
A; t:,rcover, up to 200 mobile SS-1 6s have reportedly been il-
legally deployed at the Plesetsk test range.
1, and most serious, the Soviets are reportedly
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