ADDRESS TO THIRD WORLD SEMINAR 21 OCTOBER 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001800260001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 21, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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ADDRESS TO THIRD WORLD.SEMINAR
21 October 1982
It would be hard to imagine a time when a seminar like this on the
Third World would be more useful. or more challenging. A crisis of confidence
in international lending is drastically curtailing the flow of capital to
Less Developed Countries. At a minimum the LDCs will have to make strenuous
economic adjustments. At worst these required adjustments may be so severe
as to disrupt economic activity and spur a political backlash against Western
governments and financial institutions.
Throughout the Third World, the continued influence of tribalism and
ethnic cleavages complicates already serious social, political, and economic
problems. This provides an additional force for instability within fragile
political systems, for conflict between states, and for heightened involvement
in the Third World by outside forces such as the Cubans and Soviets. In Africa,
for example, continuing ethnic and tribal tensions have been a factor in he
recent coup attempt against Kenyan President Moi, have led to an intensification
of the border conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, and are threatening to
arrest the encouraging economic development and domestic stability of the new
regime in Zimbabwe., In Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Peru, and
Ecuador, the failure to incorporate large Indian populations into the mainstream
of society has been a fundamental cause of instability. In Guatemala--where
about half the population is Indian--the Cuban-supported guerrillas are
recruiting Indians into their ranks with unprecedented success. I see no
likelihood that these fundamental social divisions within Third World societies
will go away or diminish in importance.
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There are many Third World countries of high geopolitical importance
in which political instability or regional tensions are likely to create
problems of major consequence for us in the years immediately ahead.
Beginning in 1974 and 1975, the Soviet Union undertook a new, much more
aggressive strategy in the Third World. They found destabilization, subversion
and the backing of insurgents in other countries around the world attractive
and relatively risk free. Exploiting the availability first of Cuba and
subsequently of other countries to serve as Soviet surrogates or proxies,
they have been able to limit the political, economic and military cost of
intervention.
In the aftermath of Vietnam, the Soviet Union soon began to test whether
the US would resist foreign-provoked and supported instability and insurgence
elsewhere in the Third World. Fully aware of the political climate in this
country, in the 1970s they. developed an aggressive strategy in the Third World.
It avoided direct confrontation and instead exploited local and regional
circumstances to take maximum advantage of third-country forces (or surrogates)
to attain Soviet objectives. This enables Moscow to deny involvement, to label
such conflicts as internal, and to warn self-righteously against "outside
interference.". There is little disagreement among analysts that Soviet and
proxy successes in the mid- to late-70s in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia,
Nicaragua and elsewhere have encouraged the Soviets to rely on the Cubans,
Vietnamese and, recently, the Libyans ever more aggressively.
Over the last several years, the Soviets and their allies have supported,
directly or indirectly, radical regimes or insurgencies in more than a dozen
countries in every part of the Third World. The United States and its friends
have had difficulty countering these insurgencies. It is much easier and
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much less expensive to support an insurgency than it is for us and our friends
to resist one. It takes relatively few people and little support to disrupt
the internal peace and economic stability of a small country.
Subversion and insurgency exploit instability. We have established a
Center for the Study of Insurgency and Instability which uses a wide range
of techniques and methodologies to provide advance warning of instability
and potential for destabilization in order to protect us from being caught
by surprise as we were in Iran. The small and weak countries in which
.insurgencies can be fostered and developed to overthrow governments do not
need and cannot handle expensive and sophisticated weapons for which
virtually all of them clamor. What they need is light arms to defend
themselves against externally trained and supported guerrillas, good
intelligence, good police methods, good communications, training in small
arms and their use in small unit actions, and mobility to keep up with the
hit-and-run tactics of guerrilla forces. We can introduce an element of
stability into the Third World by helping small countries to develop those
skills and capabilities for a fraction of our foreign aid budget. Governments
facing civil war cannot achieve economic and social progress until they are
able to control internal disruption.
Guerrilla attacks on economic targets impair production, require heavy
expenditures for reconstruction and drive new investment away. This results
in a deteriorated economy which compounds the economic and social dissatisfaction
on which the insurgency feeds and brings in new recruits. Currently in
El Salvador the guerrillas are aiming at damaging cash crops which, if
.successful, will further deteriorate that beleaguered country's balance of
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payments, its reserves and the value of its money. The cash cotton crop
depends on small airplanes which fly over the fields to fumigate insects
which would otherwise devour the cotton. To kill this year's harvest
the guerrillas are knocking these small planes out of the air to make pilots
afraid to fly over the cotton fields. Similarly, they are attacking the
sugar cane as it moves from the fields to the warehouse and similar attacks
are being planned to damage the coffee crop.
In the competition between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World for
influence in the Third World, we have passed through a decade in which the
Soviets and their proxies have materially enhanced their presence and
influence.
These are problems and concerns with which the Intelligence Community
is devoting high attention. You have been provided with this document with
its maps showing how the infuence of the Soviet Union and its allies has
increased in the Third World from 1970 to 1982. The text describes the
events resulting in the enhancement
gains and the instruments of Soviet
achieved. The table under the maps
amount of military and economic aid
intelligence officers, military and
country, the number of military and
of Soviet presence, the resulting Soviet
diplomacy and action by which it was
shows for each Third World country the
provided, the number of officials,
economic technicians present in each
economic trainees from each country
studying in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the strength of the
local Communist Party. It also lists the terrorist groups and insurgencies
operating in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North
Africa, and in East and South Asia.
Annrrnwarl Fnr Ralaaca 7(1(17/r)R/r4C$ l-RfPR4R00049R(OIR00260001-9
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We have ready for consideration by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board national estimates dealing with the Soviets in the Third World and
evaluating where instability and regional tensions could impair Western
interests.
In retrospect, during the 30 years of US-Soviet competition for Third
World influence, the Soviets have enjoyed several advantages:
- The United States has been linked--however unfairly--to the
colonial policies of its West European allies, whereas most Third
World countries have had no experience with the USSR as a colonial power.
-- The long-tenured Soviet leaders have displayed considerable
continuity in their policies toward Third World countries, in contrast
to US policies that have often moved by fits and starts.
-- Moscow has been better able to identify itself with widely held
positions in two of the most prominent and volatile issues in the less
developed world: self-determination for Palestinian Arabs, and black
majority rule in southern Africa.
-- The United States, unlike the USSR, often has been blamed by
Third World countries for actions taken by allies not subject to its
control.
-- The centralized, authoritarian political structure of the USSR
has been widely seen as a more suitable model by many Third World
leaders.
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-- The USSR has delivered arms faster, and attached fewer strings to
them, than has the United States.
-- Soviet leaders have been much less constrained by parliamentary
and public opinion than US leaders, and thus freer to use armed force
to support the USSR's clients.
-- Friendship with the USSR often has brought with it tangible
assistance from Cuba--which offers a form of military aid unmatched
by the West--as well as from the East European states and other
Soviet allies.
-- Moscow has been willing to use subversion or military
intimidation to pressure Third World countries into cooperating with it.
Nevertheless, the US has offsetting advantages--several of which are
likely to become much more important during the coming decade:
-- The colonial era has virtually ended, and the USSR's role in the
Third World has reached the point where it must defend its record there
as much as the Western powers do.
-- The USSR has mismanaged its relations with several Third World
countries, suffering embarrassing setbacks as a result. Its intervention
in Afghanistan and its subversive efforts elsewhere have angered and
alienated many of. these countries.
-- Most Third World leaders now recognize that the United States is
in a better position than the USSR to contribute to resolution of the
disputes over the Palestinians and southern Africa.
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-- The United States is a more successful model of economic
development than the USSR, a contrast that has become more widely
recognized as modern mass communications have exposed more people to
the affluent US lifestyle.
-- There is widespread recognition that the United States is
better able to provide the types of economic assistance, investment,
and technology--agricultural as well as industrial--that are most
likely to raise standards of living and sustain economic growth
in developing. countries. The USSR's economic problems, meanwhile,
restrict its ability to make costly new commitments in support of its
clients.
-- The United States and its Western associates control the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, whose resources
are of major importance to Third World development.
There is a widespread preference for the individual freedoms
found in the United States, and a general recognition--despite
Third World rhetoric to the contrary--of their relative absence in
Soviet society.
But we should--and we can--do more. In a nutshell, we need to fully
understand the political, economic, and social pressures under which already
weak Third World countries operate. And we need to respond effectively to
these pressures.
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For example, Third World economies are always fragile. It takes so little
effort to destabilize them. Increasingly, Third World leaders are signaling a
willingness to cast their lot with our side--or at least to cast off from
their Soviet bloc moorings. In return they need to show their people why this
sort of reorientation is beneficial. They need a quick pay-off--something
they can point to as a sign of more to come. In this regard, we'will need to
do better in the quick provision of security assistance and economic aid--not
just government aid but infusions of private enterprise capital, technical
know-how, and Western presence.
We in the Intelligence Community are working to enhance our government's
capacity to compete with the Soviets in the Third World. We are devoting more
resources to Third World activities, including analysis of Third World trends
and requirements. Our newly-created Instability and Insurgency Center is
designed to provide timely warning of future Irans, countries that are faltering,
and that are coming under severe internal or outside pressure. The Center's
analyses of these countries' problems and immediate needs should help
policymakers to respond quickly and effectively.
The nature of intelligence analysis has changed dramatically over the
past decade. The 1950s and early 1960s were a time of great investment in
developing encyclopedic knowledge about all countries. This effort was labor
intensive and used up many resources. The Vietnam War,. however, diverted
resources from this effort resulting in the lack of a-basic encyclopedic data
base in Third World countries. Today our analytic data bases run the gamut
from narrow tightly focused collections of data that are maintained by a
single analyst to enormous collections of data that are maintained and
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processed by entire divisions in very complex computer-based models.
Unfortunately, mostly the former is true of the Third World data base.
As new issues.arise and the analytic questions that must be addressed
by the Intelligence Community become more complex, new data bases and models
are developed by analysts, external contractors or institutions.
However, many of:the collections of basic intelligence data on the
Third World have not been maintained centrally since the National Intelligence
Survey series was terminated about 10 years ago. We look to Automatic
Information Systems to help us find, sort, and manage the data more
efficiently and accurately, and to make it widely available throughout the
Intelligence Community.
We see a clear need to develop two very different types of data bases:
quantitative and descriptive. The quantitative data bases lend themselves
to a centralized computer-based approach that can be merged and managed
centrally. This data includes trade flows; demographic statistics; order.-of-
battle; economic data of all kinds;. and polling results. Our other major
need for basic data concerns descriptive intelligence such as studies of a
country's banking, transportation, or shipping system. We will look to
independent contractors to do some of this work where practical.
Those of you assigned to geographic panels are charged with an especially
important task:. to identify Third World countries of vital and moderate
importance to the United States as targets of continuing high interest--and
to provide a rationale for your selections. I understand you will also
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develop a general view on the problems, issues, and trends that are likely
to affect US security in the next five to ten years in these Third World
areas. You will-get some important briefings over these two days. I look
forward to the results.