SACEUR INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001800280022-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: July 16, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP84B00049R
B-7cr?iO. ~tiAf't , 43>i
SHAPE 11-70-82
16 July 1982
ITIRU: The Permanent Secretary of the Co-ordinating
and Planning Committee
TO: The Head of the United States Clandestine Service
SUBJECT: SACEUR Intelligence Requirements
I 'am writing to you, after consultation with the Executive
Croup of the Co-ordinating and Planning Committee, to define
more closely -my intelligence 'requirements in time of war.
My main concern lies in 'the earl ecQ ii Lion of Warsaw Pact
pre-p:
rations for conflict. The period leading zap to war can
be expected to be one of heightened tension during which most
'of our normal sources of intelligence (diplomatic, commercial,
etc.) will have been severely curtailed. Enemy activity may
well be cloaked by a Cover or Deception plan which may leave
little time for their intentions to become obvious; however,
their preparations will surely include the co-ordinated move
forward of reserve formations. from the Warsaw and Soviet
border 1ilitary Districts, There inay be movement of supplies
and nuclear warheads as well. I need to know about such
detailed m ove_ment,
I
This period will be a time of considerable activity between
SHAPE and NATO IHQ, I -,must have sound, reliable intelligence
to support xity submissions to the NATO political authorities
if I am to' obtain timely authorisation for, the various states
of readiness. In "my view, this intelligence comes best from
multi national, h-ur-an intelligence sources and it is for this
reason that I will. be looking to any Allied Consultative and
Co-ordinating Group (ACCG) to assist in providing it. Of other..
; possible sources available to -me,' technical means, as single
source intelligence, may tend to lack credibility, and until
hostilities ca hence I cannot use military assets.
The requirements above deal in the main with the Central Region
and with the period before General Alert, Once hostilities
I envision two .f-ur_ then requirements, Although
Unconventional Military Forc_es will be providing intelligence
at this time they will be 'largely limited to operations in. thr:1
country-side, For information on enemy activity in the towns
I would aga.iri look to the ACCG,. Finally, I see a need' to know
what is happening in the neut.r,zl or semi-neuutral_ countries
around Europe. Information on local. attitudes and degreeees of
Soviet influence will be important from such countries as
Finland, Yugoslavia, Syria and'Lib'ya, though this list is riot:
exhaustive,'
TIIIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 2 PAGES'
'
Not referred to COD - On file
release instructions a ppl .
Approved For Release 2007/06/04:'CIA iRDP84B00049R001800280022-4
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July 1?82
In conclusion, may I say than this letter no t xkcled' to
cut across established channels but rather to Produ e some
positive guidance which I understand would be appreciated
generally by the Clandestine Services of the Alliance,
The sensitivity of this matter_ is appreciated and l':nowledge of
this letter is limited to , only three of my staff.
BERNARD W ROGERS`'-J
GENERALF. UNITED STATES ARMY
SUPREME: ALLIED COMMANDER
Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800280022-4