STAFF MEETING MINUTES OF 27 AUGUST 1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010147-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 147
• Publication Date: August 27, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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27 August 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Staff Meeting Minutes of 27 August 1979
The Director was on leave; Mr. Carlucci chaired the meeting.
Mr. Carlucci announced the appointment of
the new Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking. Mr. Carlucci
expressed his appreciation to for his fine performance in a
difficult job. He then noted extensive experience and
qualifications which suit him well for this appointment.
Stein reported McMahon's return from leave; he said McMahon was
attendin to an urgent matter, thus could not attend the staff meeting.
called attention to Don Oberdorfer's article "Pakistan:
The Quest for Atomic Bomb" in today's Washington Post (attached); he
said the article poses no problem for us. Mr. Carlucci added that, in
his view, Oberdorfer is one of the more "responsible" journalists.
said also columnist Jack Anderson's article "How the Oil
Mess Got that Way" in yesterday's Parade magazine completes this
series; Strong noted no particular problems for us.
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THE WASHINGTON POST
27 August 1979
_D 1, 0 0
.uslan: The Quest for.. Atomic Bomb
Problem Discussed by West, T oscoww, Peking
By Don Oberdorfer Pakistan continues to deny publicly. Pakistan's elaborate international
k
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i
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ing a
om
om
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^/a,amrtoa pmt staff writff that it is see
cap. purchasing efforts, which began in f
Behind an eight-foot-high stone- wall ity. Privately. the Pakistani diplomatic 1977, were detected long before any. response reportedly ranges from flat,.
near the sleepy town of Kahuta; ' 23 body acted to cut them off. The Brit.
{ miles from Pakistan's capital of Islam-- J denial to "none-of your business" to ish government expressed concern, to
abad. a clock is ticking for mankind. tacit acImowled=ent of the uranium.: Washington about the suspicious pur.?
Within three to--fRve years byA offs- enrichment program, together - with I chases in March, 11978, but it took Lon-
vial United States estimate, and statements that its importance is ex don seven months after that to impose
sooner in the reckoning of some,, the aggerated:.. effective export control on key items.
heavily guarded industrial plant un- Inside the- U.S. governments a 'ask ! and it took Washington a full year, In
der construction there will produce force of -. diplomatic, energy,. telii- the meantime important equipment
~ was exported to Pakistam by firms in.
enough highly enriched uranium for.,ence and military officials. was i Britain, the United States and west-
Pakistan to explode an atomic bomb.. quietly formed the third week in June ' ern Europe:
A mushroom cloud rising from a to devise a clearer strategy for deal-, Second, it is increasingly site in that undeveloped and un- in? with the issue. Headed by Ambas- gly clear to
stable nation would have powerful re- sador Gerard C Smith, the top - U.S. American officials that Pakistan's mil-?
percussions on. the world of the 1980s. antiproliferation official,- the Gerry itary leadership has. made a firm na-
" tional decision to proceed with the
It would- benearly, certain to bring Smith South Asian study group" is ex-. nuclear option," as it is politely.
about a nuclear arms race between- ' pected to produce'a set of policy alter- called. The program is. reported- to
Pakistan and neighboring India and natives for high-level, consideration have the solid backing. of Pakistani
would pose a constant threat that, for next month. ruler Mohammed Zia al Haq, who in-
the lust time since Hiroshima and Na- Few promising avenues have been herited it from the man. he overthrew
Sasaki in-1945, nuclear weapons, actor discovered, to date. The more officials and later hanged, Zul kar Ali Bhutto,.
ally would be exploded-to-kill.. have learned about the physical and the father of the Pakistani bomb.
A Pakistani: nuclear bomb- also political aspects - of the problem, the The Pakistani high command Is be-
would be a grave setback to the inter- ,greater is their pessimism about halt- lieved to support the program bot , as national effort. to stop or slow down ing Pakistans march toward the a matter of prestige and as a deter-
the spread of atomic weapons. In the bomb. Among the underlying reasons rent against India, which exploded a
for the outlook, often summed up as nuclear device in 1974. The more it is '
view of several, experts, it would be an ,.
are:
important milestone on the way- to a First, ? I obvious that Pakistan is going ahead,
world of "the nuclear armed-crowd," it is thejudgment of JS- the more pressure is on Indian lead-
where a long list of nations and possi technical experts that Pakistan has' ers to respond with an active weapons
bly even subnational terrorist groups ? eons too far to be headed off by the program of their own. The prospect of .
could threaten their enemies, and. ew denial. of sensitive technology or key this, in turn, spurs new fears and new
eryone else with nuclear weapons: ? ' parts essential to the uranium enrich- determination in Pakistan.
ment plant it is constructing. Through
In view of the- momentous- cone- a combination of clever tactics and Third, the Pakistani. nuclear prob-
quences, it is not -surprising that the good fortune, Pakistan is believed to 1em, seen in its full dimensions. is at -
United States and several other-90vhave stolen the technology and devi- the heart of overlapping circles of,-ernments recently have placed Palo ously purchased the crucial compo- complexity involving nearly every
stan high on their agenda of prob" nents for its plant before the sluggish alignment on the world scene.
lens. President- Carter.- and, Soviet..y watchmen of the international nuclear _ : - It is a North-South. issue because-
President Leonid Brezhnev inconclu- establishment woke. up to..what was - - the States, Europe and the dc-
sicely discussed Paklstan's nuclear -ao y - . . _ haPPeIImQ veloped world are seeking to turn`
tivity at last June's- *~*noit' meeting,, Officials of the British-Dutch-Get around a developing country that re-
and Carter has. Initiated secret torte man uranium enrichment plant at Al Gently- joined the- Conference of Non-
spondence on the question with- the- melo, Holland, should have been al-. Aligned States.. Pakistani officials Pl- f
leaders of Britain; France,. West Ger.. ertea to Palistan's potential. if not ready have charged that the ren~~jl of
a
many and Japan, among others. Wash- its intent,, when a Pakistani physicist
ington. also has taken up the matter atemployed there in 1974 was caught
high levels with Pekiag_, ?~ -'r ^ reading secret documents he had nor
In- April, the. United States an-; been authorized to see. -
nounced the termination of economic! . Abdul Qadar Khan, the- scientist in
and military aid to Pakistan because valved; left Holland without fuss in
of its nuclear weapons program, as re?. 1975 with lists of subcontractors and
quired by a U.S. aatiproliieration law, probably blueprthts for the plant, ac-
and the United States as well- as cording to, intelligence reports. Khan
other nations, has expressed -concern reportedly is the director of Paki-
ia private diplomatic talks with,-..Pa- stars Kahuta project, based. on: the
kistani leaders. So far the action and Almelo model
talk have been. to no avail
-.,nor na-
the United States and other
tions to grant debt payment relief at a
Paris meeting two mcnths ago was nu-
clear pressure. The U.S..aid cutoff:
and tali of future economic pressures
are seen in the same light by Islama-
bad.
CONTINUED
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Pakistan is an East-West problem ?
ing , in large part to its adversary, In-
because of its strategic location and dil
increasing conflict with the Soviet Un- This chain of fear and tension is an-
ion. Moscow recently delivered sev- other complicating factor in nuclear
gran stiff warnings to Islamabad re- weapons diplomacy. Pakistan insists
garding alleged help to rebel forces that any self-imposed restrictions also
fighting the ruling regime in Afganis-
tan, Moscow's ally and Pakistan's apply to India. which insists that they
neighbor. also apply to China. which refuses to
restrict itself because of its nuclear
The problem even has an East-West weapons disparity dimension, because the People's Re- with the Soviets.
and d the the two superpowers, , the United
ally, while India is' aligned more.
closely to Moscow.
China has supplied much military
equipment but no known nuclear tech-
nology or help to Pakistan. Chinese.-
leaders are reported to be privately: -
cool to a Pakistani nuclear capability:
although much less resistant than.,
Moscow, a strong. foe of proliferations
.-
east p o
if. is a M
emL. W~ Bhutto began late in 1973, before In-
cause of rumors- that Libya- and per " dia's test but after certain. knowledge sources suggest that the-A. Q. Khan,
haps other Islamic nations support of India's program, to negotiate with the Pakistani physicist wno was.
Palistan's "Islamic bomb" capability,: France for a nuclear fuel "repro cess trained ur Europe and worked at the-
a concept coined by Bhutto, and fears, Almelo gas centrifuge enrichment .
ing' plant-capable of producing weep-
that weapons material might.- be, . plant, persuaded Bhutto that this was
shared with Islamic nations for use'= was 'signed in plutonium 'March h 1976, to a viable alternative- that should bo,
against Israel TLe . Jewish state, w sign, to the pursued. Funds for this
alarm of the United States and other p purpose. are
,which is believed to have its own nu. countries concerned about. nuclear believed to have been diverted from
clear weapons stockpile, i3 particu? __ ,:r ?.rs ati..s~.:.,Q;erns in ,?fill, the French-related project-
larly vuLuuL7aILIY W dL.UW.L. LulCaL4i ut: that the plant was for peaceful' use
cause of its size. Israeli operatives area only, but virtually admitted the oppo-
believed to have been involved in the site in his final testament, smuggled
sabotage last April of a nuclear reac? ; from his prison cell last year.
tor being built in France for delivery Some of the circumstances of the
to Iraq. ? ? French arrangement have given rise
Both India and Israel have the mill to speculation of a Libyan connection
tary ability to take out the Kahuta? in Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakis-
plant through bombing or commando tani officials recently confirmed that
action. American officials said- such Libya's 2wluammar Qaddafi had of-
action by either of those states seems fered to finance the French reprocess-
unlikely at present, though it cannot.. lag plant in return for access to the
be ruled out U.S. officials tacitly ac- plutonium it produced.' The officials-
knowledge that American covert- ac- said Pakistan rejected ?the?.offer. and-
tion to disable the plant was among. }fiat r.ihva- in turn. canceled a plan to
in August 1978, after most of the dew tip from "a friend who had a friend.".-
-signs..but very little sensitive equip Tr
ment had been supplied..,
Pakistan's effort to obtain weapons- . In-July last year a British- parliar
grade plutonium %?ia the French plant . mentarian, Frank Allaun of the Labor
generated a major diplomatic coup- Party, tabled a question in the House
terdrive by the United States in both of Commons suggesting that equip-.
Publicly, U.S. officials concerned I
with proliferation breathed.a sigh of
relief at the termination of the
French arrangement last august The
decision was made in mid-September
to restore Pakistan to eligibility for
new U.S. economic and arms aid,
which had been 1u;etly suspended a
year earlier because of antiprolifera-
tion laws and policies. A few Ameri-
can officials, however, were aware
States and the Soviet Union, which even as aid was restored that Pakistan
are far ahead of everyone else, con. still was seeking nuclear wea-s+ns ca.
tinue adding to their already vast pability through another, more secret.
weapon stockpiles: route.
As early as 1965. in the wake of the Whilq openly negotiating to buy- a-1
Chinese weapons test the?year before; plutonium plant from France in 1973-.1
Pakistan's Bhutto made it clear that if 76, Pakistan also was working secretly
India developed atomic. weapons, so to obtain a-plant to make highly en-
would Pakistan. Later Bhutto de- riched uranium, an alternative ?weap-,.1
Glared that his country would match one m tenial' as early as- 10'711 ltneri-
now
id
bl
from power that July, orders from
Pakistan are reported -to have been
placed with European firms for compe
nent.parts of a centrifuge. enrichment-
plant. Pakistan was shrewdly exploit-
ing a loophole in the antiprotiieration ?
arrangements of "suppliers club" in--
dustrial nations, which tanned the ex-
port of major weapons material facili-
ties but did not address the purchase
of'cQmponents piece by. piece.
Late in March 1978, a British ems
bassy official in Washington called at
the State Department to discuss U.S.
the many ideas talked about early in
finance a Pakistalni-Frenctr submarine plans to give greater attention to the . '
the options-gathering process, but. production arrangement. The_implica- enriched uranium -. oute to nuclear
they said it was dismissed without se- tion is that the submarine- production weapons. The British official, accord-
rious consideration. was another part of the proposed deal` ing to informed sources, passed on
The Pakistani. nuclear weapons Pakistan's links with Libya were ce? "some disturbing information" that
problem is a classic -case in the chain - mented by a 10-year agreement of coop- Pakistan had placed a suspicious or.
reaction that threatens to spread pos- peration signed in 1974, and they have der with a- British firm for inverters; . !
session of the bomb throughout much continued to be close. Pakistan sup- : sophisticated voltage control -mecha-
of the world: The first U.S. atomic ex- plies military advisers and training ? nisms that could, be used either for
plosions (1945)'Ied to acquisition of at- personnel to Libya, as well as. to sev- ? coaventionahind-ustry or a nuclear en--:
omit weapons by its. adversary, the; eral other Arab ountries.? American '. richment plant - }
Soviet Union (1949), which spurred on officials said that, despite rumors and ' "Wei didn't even know what an in -L,'
that nation's, adversary, Ch ma (1964); allegations to the contrary; they have . verter was." said a State Department
whose weapons - program stimulated no evidence of a Libyan-Pakistani official later. But a series of diplo-
its adversary,. India, to explode an at- deal involving Islamabad's. current nu - matic and intel isenre exchanges in
omit device in-.1974. Pakistan is react clear effort. But they; concede they, the summer and fall of last year-.
cannot be certain there is no- such ar- heightened-the knowledge and inter.rangement. est in several capitals. '
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? - 4
The British government responded Pakistan's repeated public denials I
to- Allaun's question by saying the of a nuclear weapons program are
equipment was not subject to existing- given no credence by American offi-
controls. Before London slapped. on cials. Photographs of the heavily
tighter controls last October, Emerson guarded and elaborate Kahuta plant
Electric Industrial Controls (a subsidi- as construction proceeds make it clear
ary of the C.S. firm Emerson Electric) that its purpose is uranium enrich-
had shipped 31 complete inverter sYs- ment. according to L.S. intelligence..
tems capable of regulating a large. And Pakistan has no civilian-require-
number of centrifuge machines, wiucii --? -
are the essential part of an uranium ment for large amounts of enriched
enrichment plant of this type. Emer m.uy .
son was working on 100 more. Invert-
that
ers?for Pakistan when the export con- three The to f ive years years s estimate is and
?trols were tightened to stop the ship- construction menu- - operation will be needed for the plant
to turn out enough highly enriched
An elaborate purchasing- system op-
l uranium to make a bomb. This as-
t
d b
P
ki
t
i
d
ffi
i
gra
e
y a
a
or
s
an
ance o
a
c
from an embassy office near- . Bonn slimes: as officials do, that the P ugh
placed large orders for industrial corn- tams Will be able to procure enough
natural uranium, from one source or
ponents in Switzerland, West Ger-
mi Some offi-
amany and other European countries. .as raw material.
ht be read
b
b mi
ak
id
h
omm
y
g
ave sa
a
s
as well as Britain. The number two o
man in the Pakistani embassy in. as soon as two years hence; others be-
man that unforeseeable construction
Bonn. Abdul Waheed,. is- the first
s might con-
and operating problem
cousin of Pakistani President Zia..:A
career diplomat. WVaheed denied any., same mucn more time and might even
involvement in- a nuclear purchase prove insurmountable.
_-?-- - Pakistan's uranium enrichment ef-
progra and said reports of a weap- fort has cost somewhat less than $100
million in the past four years, accord-
nnc nrm ana ern'- repo is ".a weap-
Pascswn ordered w um a California is likely to be several hundred million
firm, which U.S. officials will not dollars, a serious economic drain but
identify, about a talf-dozen inverters well within the ability CA a nation with
evidently intended for the uranium a military budget of about $1. billion
enrichment plant. These, were shipped annually. one major worry is that to
from the United States last fall, after capitalize on its investment, Pakistan
Washington had heard about,. Paki- might some day export highly en-
stan's efforts -but before export con- riched uranium.
traks were tightened this arch 23, Pakistan also is believed to be con-
specificallito ILA inverters and',other tinting work on the French plant,
key components. State Department of- without French help. This would take
ficials said there was no indit!ation six to 10 years, according to informed
that other essential components for estimates, to produce bomb material.
the Pakistani plant originated in the - And Pakistan also is believed to have
United states. a pilot "hot cell" reprocessing capabil-
The decision to restore Pakistan to ity at its Institute of Nuclear Science.
eligibility for U.S. aid last September, and Technology at Islamabad, where a
amid rowing indications of a drive to small amount of bomb material could
obtain a secret uranium enrichment be produced relatively quickly if the',,
plant, was a ticklish one. Some.offl right ingredients were available.
dais suggest that U.S. Intelligence _ How much time is available is a cru-
was still uncertain at a time that cial question for American officials.
Pakistan was - going for a nuclear They do not believe. rumors, evidently
weapons capability- via a. new route. - originating in India,- that a Pakistani
(Members.- of Congress have been told explosion- could- take. place this fall;,
by the Central Intelligence Agency but they have been surprised before
that a `prepon erance ox evidence" to and are wary of being surprised again:
support this conclusion was available it is highly uncertain how the time
early last fall). Others involved'in the will be-used, whether it is three- to
decision said the U.S. sought to "plant fi+e' years or a shorter period.. The
some carrots" by promising new eco- U.S. task force 'in search of a policy
nomic and military programs to ere- - has yet to find an acceptable answer
ate bargaining leverage with Pakistan.- - to Pakistan's nuclear quest.-
By last January, the evidence lit Also contributing to this article were
Pakistan's program was unmistak Bonn Com_,potdent Michael. Getter_
able an the United-States began diplo. and staff researcher .'Karalee Schwartz
matic talks- with Islamabad on the
subject r fter Deputy Secretary ' of I' - - -
State Warren Christopher failed in a
special mission March 1-2 to- persuade
Zia to call off his effort, the United - i' -
States ordered a new cutoff-of eco-
nomic and military aid under the anti-
proliferation law. This was made pub-
lic April 6. after inquiries from the
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0 THE WASHINGTON P O?
0 26 August 1979
Attorney General Se-es 11110 Evidence
Of Israeli. Tap of Young-PLO Meeting
itnfedPreaatnternsctonai and there was no evidence of a bug-
Attorney General Benjamin R. Civi- ging by U.S. agents, "not by anybody."
letti said he has no evidence that Is-
raeli intelligence agents ? bugged An-
drew Young's secret meeting- with a
representative of the-Palestine'.Liber-
ation Organization.
"Based on the .1mowledge. rve-r&
ceived ... I have no reason to believe.
the meeting, was? tapped. bugged or
.surveilled," . Civiletti told reporters
Friday night" :: >
Young resigned is U.N.-ambassador
after it was disclosed that he met July
26 with the PLO's-.:U.N. observer,
Zehdi Labib 'Peru; 'and failed-to in-
form the state department about the
session fully. U. S. policy prohibits
diplomatic contacts with the. PLO.
There-has been speculation that-
Is-raeli agents planted. ant electronic - lis-
tening device in the- holne of the Ku-
waiti ambassador, where the secret
session was held, then tipped News-
week magazine about the meeting.
Newsweek's inquiry to the State
De- partment set off furt' r questions
,'that forced Young's. resignation.
Some members of Congress, dis-
turbed at! reports of a possible Israeli
bugging, have called for a Justice De-
partment investigation. The Omnibus
Crime Control -Act 'prohibit. e''-ec-l
tronic surveillance unless,_it is author
ized by the Jnstica!Lep enr:-'
Civiletti said"he nss Baked'the
the State,- Department- and- all' othe
concerned agencies about the inciden
. "Do we have any probable cause to:,
believe there was any bugging?" Civi.
letti asked. "No. We have no basis (to
investigate]. Nobody's furnished us
with any basin I've seen some. reports
in the newspapers, and some opining
based on those reports.. I've- seen no
facts."
. .
Civiletti stressed that there are le-
gitimate Ways for. intelligence agents
to get information.a ut secretmeet-
ings without bugging- He referred to
reports that the-. Israelis might have
intercepted' an overseas.- telephone
call.
Civiletti said that if.* he receives
proper evidence he will orderposecu
tion of illegal intelligence activities,
by foreign governments. , _ .. ? .
"If any person bugs intentionally
and deliberately, without the' consent
of the lawful owner or, parties, and
not within- title III. (of the- Omnibus
Crime ContrlAct] or the Foreign In-
"telligence Surveillance Act,..then it is.
probably a:. violation of : American'
law," he said.
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