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December 20, 2016
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October 17, 2007
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June 30, 1980
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Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOOl30R000600010226-9 10 TOP SECRET 0 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Staff Meeting Minutes of 30 June 1980 The Director chaired the meeting. In response to Mr. Carlucci's query, Lipton explained the HAC hearing scheduled for 2 J Committee's final hearing on CIA's budget amendment request for FY 1981.0 Hetu displayed a notice he is circulating internally which invites employees to avail themselves of OPA's recently produced slide presentation on intelligence and the mission/function of the Agency. Mr. Carlucci called attention to erroneous press reports over the weekend of CIA clandestine radio broadcasts in Iran aimed at undermining the rule of the Ayatollah Khomeini (see 27 June New York Times article by David Binder attached). Noting that Congressional inquiries can be expected soon on this matter, Mr. Carlucci advised that OLC take the initiative and provide appropriate denials. The Director added that Hetu should contact State's newly appointed spokesperson(s) to ensure henceforth that public comment by State regarding matters involving CIA be coordinated with us beforehand. (Action: LC and PA) Clarke expressed concern re today's Washington Post front-page column by George Wilson "Soviets Accused of Cover-Up on Anthrax Epidemic" (attached). He said this article stems from Representative Aspin's disregard for Over- sight Committee procedures for release of HPSCI studies; he said it also poses serious policy problems for the Administration in its handling of treaty violations with the Soviet Union. He asked if there are any steps we can take to deal with Representative Aspin. A brief discussion followed wherein Mr. Carlucci advised that we brin the matter to the attention of House leadership. The Director asked to convey his and the 25X1 DDCI's concern to Hitz, and requested SA DCI to add this item to the 25X1 agenda for his next meeting with Secretary Mus ie. 25X1 Clarke reported (NFAC/OPA) has produced an exceptionally good paper "Cuba's Castro: Reactions of An Aging Revolutionary to His Ailing Revolution." He also displayed a new NFAC report: "Soviet Energy Policy for East Europe." The Director noted he has already read the latter and likes it. noted HPSCI hearings scheduled for tomorrow re four Reserve Releases and a Presidential Finding. Relatedly, the Director questioned the need for from the Reserve for evacuating dependents Lipton explained the cost and said he has coordinated this item with SSCI and HPSCI staffers noting he anticipates approval without serious challenge.) 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOOl30R000600010226-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOO130R000600010226-9 S 9 Silver reported the U.S. Court of Appeals recently held 2-1 that State has insufficient grounds for revoking Agee's passport. The Director said despite the court's decision our effort in this regard has been worthwhile. In response to a query from the Director on where we now stand in the Agee case, Silver provided a brief update. Briggs said he met on Friday with consultant to the Agency re review of certain aspects o Agency opera ions, e.g., the recently completed IG report on our recruiting system. He said also Jim Dick, IOB Counsel, will visit today re two complaints presented to the Board from outside the Agency; Briggs said he believes the Agency will fare well re these complaints. Wortman reported an accident last week caused by the roofing contractor which involved minor injury to one of our secretaries. He said the accident could easily have been much more serious and that other accidents in the recent past by this contractor have now required the DDA to impose a daily security check on the contractor's work procedures. The Director reported briefly from his trip to Africa that our field personnel in stations he visited were highly active an enthusiastic. He said he enjoyed the opportunity to sit and chat with working level personnel, e.g., commo specialists and secretaries. The Director called attention to yesterday's Washington Post article "The Unresolved Questions in the Letelier Case" by John Dinges and Saul Landau (attached). He asked Briggs to look into it. (Action: IG) TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOO130R000600010226-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOO130R000600010226-9 ? 40 NEW YORK TIMES 27 June 1980 Anti-Khomeini ro rc c is U.S. Co c e d It Is Bel n WASHINGTON, June 27 - American officials acknowledged today that the United States was responsible for clan- destine radio broadcasts aimed at under- mining the Iranian rule of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The programs, broadcast in Persian from transmitters in Egypt, one believed I to be near Alexandria and the other near the Suez Canal, appear to have begun in the middle of May, the officials said, and were set up by the Central Intelligence Agency. , Spokesmen for the C.I.A. and other in- telligence agencies, asked about the broadcasts, said they could not help in terms of denials or confirmations. . The idea for the project, one of a num- ber conducted. by the C.I.A.'s "unconven. tional broadcasting" section, was do- 'scribed by the officials as having come up during the winter. President Anwar el- Sadat, who inherited a large radio-trans mitting capacity from his predecessor, Gamel Abdel Nasser, is said to have given personal authorization for the use of free time for the broadcasts. - Broadcasts Heard in Teheran "American correspondents who were in Teheran in mid-May said that the nightly broadcasts featured music by Gagoosh, a popular female singer from Iran, and news broadcasts aimed at undermining Ayatollah Khomeini's Government. The nonentertainment portions. of the 'broadcast, which were identified as com- ing from"The Free Voice of Iran," con- tained appeals to the Iranian Army not to engage in combat with Kurdish rebels. Some-of the-broadcasts indicated support for the exiled former Iranian Prime .Minister, Shahpur Bakhtiar, who has been attempting to mobilize anti-Kho- mein forces from his base in Paris. The broadcasts included a call for "lib- eration of Iran," a description of Ayatol- lah Khomeini as "racist and fascist" and an appeal to Iranians to "take guns into your hands" in preparation for action. . The C.I.A. connection in Egypt was de- veloped late last year after a White House meeting of the Special Coordinating Com- mittee on Dec. 11 conducted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national se- curity adviser. The focus of the meeting, about five weeksafter 53 Americans were taken hostage, was ways to. expand American broadcasts to the Moslem world, including Iran and the 50 million Moslems inthe Soviet Union. Facilities-Thought inadequate - The Special Coordination Committee was appointed by President Carter two years ago to authorize and oversee covert operations by the C.I.A. and other intelli- gence agencies. - Mr. Brzezinski and his adviser on Mos- lem affairs-and radio broadcast matters, Paul B. -Henze, who is a former C.I.A- officer,_were described after the meeting as being dissatisfied with the capacity of the Voice. of America, which was then broadcasting two hours a day in-Persian, and with-the-American-sponsored Radio Liberty, which was broadcasting a rather weak signal--in some of the languages of t Soviet Moslems.-- 'It was decided after the meeting, the Wficia1, said. to explore the possibility of i acgairing air time on the Egyptian traas- 'rnirers tar broadcasts to Iran and Soviet Cecm'ai Asia. i Pty-Sadat,.wbo was a. target of Iranian attacks long before he provided exile in Egypt for the deposed Shah of Iran,.agreed to the White House request, the American officials said. American of- ficials said they believed Egypt had been' promised additional transmitter facili- ties by the United States through the Agency for International Development to compensate for the Egyptian facilities 1 used by the C.I.A. But a'spokesman for { the aid agency said the only equipment of which he was aware was a set of radar and radio control centers designed to im- prove communications for users of the. Suez Canal at a cost of $17.7 million: The::. equipment for that project arrived.?in Egypt only last month, then spokesman, added. ? Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOO130R000600010226-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOOl30R000600010226-9 ? WASHINGTON POST 30 June 1980 Soviets: Ace Usei .- ~ ~6~ ~ . If I er- p o . t o E a ea ,c By George C. Wilson:,-- I The: House Intelligence -.oversight subcommittee accused the Soviet -Un- ion yesterday of -covering up the facts about an anthrax epidemic at.:Sverd lovsk in April 1979. On the basis of -secret and -open hearings, the subcommittee concluded that the Soviet explanation that peo-? ple died in Sverdlovsk from. eating meat poisoned with ?anthraxis,"incom- plete at best and at worst, k-fabrica- tion." W hat really, happened, accordine to the subcommittee report. and `inter- views with U.S. intelligence-, officials, is that an explosion at Military Com-. pound 19 at Sverdlovsk blew a cloud of anthrax spores into the open air. That compound has long been sus- pected of germ warfare activity by U .S. intelligence. ='= A south wind'took the deadly an- thrax spores to the outskirts- of Sverd- lovsk, a city of ?1.2?million-87h-miles-i east of Moscow. -U.S. officials estimate-, that.: as- many . as ..1,000 - people'.., may, have died from, breathing in the:. ...spores. -Subcommittee Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.) said."all arms. control conven . tions -are 'threatened by, the. Sverd+ lovsk cover-ups ',_ Rep. John Ashbrook of Ohio, rank- ing Republican on the subcommittee,-, said that Sverdlovsk proves that the, United States should not sign any, treaties with the-Soviet Union "unless they are self-enforcing or if we -have the capability to fully monitor them." On the basis of reports :from per: sons-inside the Soviet-Union. at the time of the epidemic and -other evi ` dence;-U.S. intelligence officials-have concluded that 'the' symptoms dis- played by the.. afflicted Russians at, Sverdlavsk:-could:. have, come ?only> -from breathing- in anthrax germs,: note from eating them in diseased meat, as Moscow-said--was the case-2--,-- BY: calculating how many anthraat spores it would take to kill -the.=4O'ttr 1,000 Russians who are believed ` ta ,have died at-Sverdlovsk from. the,anA thrax, U.S., intelligence-- officials be-. lievelthe- quantity,far exceeded'the, amount needed:,=for-.the laboratory.:ex-j periments allowect_"under, the 1975 bio ! logical warfare treaty.=: One U .S.- lnfelligence, estimate.";I that 5,000 to- 26,000 ; anthraxc spores were released -into - the open` air at'. mittee noted in its-report yesterday, no U.S. intelligence agency has made the corporate judgment that the-'Sovi-i ets definitely violated the treaty.-., . ~. The -1975 treaty,: signed; treaty,- .b United States;-the Soviet Union. and.'. 111 other countries, prohibits the pro-.,: duction of anthrax or any other bio logical agent for germ warfare. How-`i ever, laboratory quantities, .of such germs can be produced to enable a na tion to develop defensive measures.or. conduct peaceful experiments: ' - The - subcommittee 'in ".its report noted that the 1975 treaty did not set a specific' limit on how much anthrax. or other biological agents could be produced before the, quantity would4 amount to a violation. Therefore, said the subcommittee;- it--would be diffi- cult to prove on the.basis of current information. whether the Soviets -vi o--' ' lated the treaty or not.... This leaves it to the nations' that'- the epidemic in Sverdlovsk dem9n-11 a- Soviet. violation, the' !sub- committee said. It said it .had' looked into reports.; that the Carter administration had suppressed evidence and hampered probes by U.S.?'intelligence agencies of the Sverdlovsk epidemic for fear the findings- would keep the strategic . arms limitation treaty (SALT II).from being approved by-the Senate. Concluded the subcommittee:'." "There- is no persuasive evidence to support allegations that the U.S. gov- ernment suppressed intelligence about the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk, or that it delayed acting on this matter out of concern fora SALT II or any other political mo- tive." Speaking for -himself, Aspih said, "The evidence is fairly good: that the Soviets have. cheated on,,the -treaty dealing with. biological weapons. That:j combined with, the lousy way this has J been handled. by the ' administration threatens not-only this treaty, but all- arms control conventions." ..: a The State Department insists that it is pressing the Soviet Union to dis close the full story on Sverdlovsk but is trying to do it. within diplomatic channels rather than publicly. How- ever, the department concedes that "it .I has not yet received satisfactory rep- lies to' its -questions-about the epi- ?-) demic. ' Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOOl30R000600010226-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOOl30R000600010226-9 ? WASHINGTON POST - 29 June 1980 OOPERATION' with `friendl3r" uitelligence: agencies was: the established-practice `of.U.S.S embassies and:the CIA abroad,'and that included granting visas toaknown agents to conduct intelli gence missions, in the United. States- ; But some ` Landau received: in late July 1976 from'a Para guayan government official' i -Asuncion; aroused'` The official,-a top aide to Paraguayan Pi*side Alfredo Stroessner, assured Landau. that Chilean;;. President Augusto -Pinochet himself .was` asking:, for a favor.'The: official said 'he_needed.visas-fin-a} mediately for two Chilean Army: 'officers - using Paraguayan passports to travel from Asuncion to,--' Washington on an intelligence:.missio- =- . The. sion, he said, had.been deared.with. the?CIA?sta tion in: Santiago' and the two men would be in -touch with-.CIA-.Deputy Director: Vernon Walters' in Washington_ . __ ;. Ambassador - .Landau, according to his later= testimony, issued. the visas for the two men the.:. next morning.-But his suspicions led.him to take :.'two precautionsc'He=had the. 'agents! false Para-. .guayan' passports= photographed,. and he sent the --photographs to' QlAiieadquarters. with a_ full. acme-- count-of the affair - just in case : the Chilean agent were lying about why they'?were going tai -- Landau's action.wasthefirstbrushby a US of-' ficial with- Chite'sLsecret operations' leading. up to the assassination:' of--Orlando: Letelier : six, weeks.'. later. -In-the-weeks preceding. the"assassination of the leftist former'ambassador and foreign minis- ter; a flurry: of cables and official communications-; went back and-forthbetweenthe U.S. Embassy in Asuncion, the State Department; the. CIA and the Immigration and Naturalization. Service concern-`:; .ing. the two Chilean. agents;.. whose; real identities - not learned until almost:two.years later w_ ere= Michael Townley-rand- Armando Fernandez; the Chilean secret police-agents who led the operation::, to kit .Letelier.. CIA Director George Bush and his deputy;.Gen.:_: Walters, were- among those who personally re ceived and. acted on Landau's warning. The bassador's cable, sent via a top secret State De- partment "back channel," went first to, the office' All that raises a series of disturbing questions. U.S. officials at the highest levels knew. in advance about Chile's undercover mission in Washington] and possessed photos and passport information. Was that information sufficient foreknowledge to have prevented the murders? Once the assassina- tion- occurred, was the information turned . over immediately to the FBI-by the persons, and agen- cies possessing it? . a, -, .. The pictures and the advance information olr? tamed by Landau and others ultimately .pravided .. the keys to solving the case. But,. unlike fictional spy mysteries,. all the pieces of the puzzle did?not.. fall into place with.the identification of the gudty." Instead, the US, agencies involved in . the case? im -' ;posed an extraordinary.mantle.of secrecy over the actions of U.S. officials before and after.the assns ?sination and over the records and files relating- those actions. Given the secrecy about theextent;. those of. U.S. goverment,foreknowledge,..the,questions :.. we raise can only be parti lyyanswered..#.,1,, Y E; According to.our reconstnictionof -events, the Letelier assassination.: was set in motion in late June 1976... Pinochet's intelligence service had. received ''reports of Letelier's recent-: visit to Holland to lobby against a:- $63 million investment by a Dutch:: company in Chile and of confiden- tial meetings in New York between Letelier and a prominent leader of Chile's ' ,ntri t Christian` Demo. cratic: Party. Congress had' just cut? off Chile's- military aid because of human.rights violations. Over the next three Yinontbs, Co!. Manuel Contreras,' chief of '?DINA, the Chilean secret police, dispatched five of his agents on four separate., but interrelated missions to. Wash- ington to carry out the order to killLetelier. Of the four missions that 'made up the Letelier assassination operation, at least two were detected -by U.S. authorities. ,:.The first operation got only as far es Asuncion. DINA agents Townley, and Fernandez went there to obtain`, false Paraguayan passports from the Paraguayan intelligence service and proceed on to Washington. After days of delay, they received the passports under the false names of 1 `Juan Williams" (Townley) and ! "Alejandro Romeral"' (Fernandez). According to Paraguayan intelli- gence chief Col. Benito Guanes, they said they needed the passports fora trip to the United States to buy, weapons and intelligence equipment "for which [they said] they could l count on cooperation from the . A bassador Landau was told the I CIA was aware of the mission, but that it involved surveillance of Chil- ean Marxists who had infiltrated the U.S. offices. of the Chilean copper corporation. P9 11 3 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOOl30R000600010226-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOOl30R000600010226-9 0 0 '.-%Aftariasuing thevises and photo graphing-. the,. - ,"Williams": - and" "feral" passports, Landau wrote- I a long top secret cable to: CI.V Deputy Director Walters, who h6,-- bad been told would be meeting th&~ two Chileans in. Washington.. That' cable remains secret, but we learned' some of its contents. In it Landau- asked Walters to confirm that the Chilean- intelligence mission had:. been worked out with the CIA. He also sent copies of the passports to.'? the CIA via diplomatic pouch. Meanwhile, Townley and Fernan-'. dez, unaware their pictures were now in the hands of the CIA but sus- picious of the long delays in obtain-r'' ing their false documents, returned to Santiago instead of flying to Washington as originally planned. Landau's cable, sent July 28 via the State Department's "Roger" Channel" to bypass regular distribu- tion routes, reached the desk of CIA Director George Bush. Bush handled,: the matter because . Walters, who was about to retire from the agency, was on vacation in Florida. At State,' the cable was routed from Kissing- = er's office to that of Harry Schlaude- man, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs. Landau expected Walters, who had visited Paraguay on agency business only a month before; to 'take quick action. "I sent a message to Gen. Walters outlining the whole matter and suggesting that I pre- sumed that this matter fell within the scope of his agency and that he was aware of all this. I said that if he did not, I suggested he deny them [`WilLams' and `Romeral'] entry at the port of arrival," Landau said in a later deposition. The CIA reaction was peculiar. A week passed during which Townley and Fernandez, had they followed = their original plan, could well have had 'time to arrive in Washington ; and kill Letelier. Walters and Bush conferred about the matter, and fi- nally on Aug. 4 Walters called Lan- dau in Paraguay to tell him that the CIA was "not aware" of the Chilean mission, and wanted nothing to do with it. But Walters, as far as is known, ordered no CIA action to ? stop the Chilean mission or control it in any way. Judging from his actions, Ambas- sador Landau was alarmed. He im- mediately informed the State De- partment that the visas issued to' _ "Juan Williams" and "Alejandro Romeral" were revoked. He de- manded that the Paraguayan official who had requested the visas retrieve the passports from the Chileans and..{ return them so that he could pbysi- cally cancel the visas. Landau considered the matter so serious that he . ordered lookouts posted at all U.S. consulates and ports of entry to arrest "Williams" and "Romeral" if they tried to enter- the United States and to prevent theta from applying for visas in any ' other country. Landau also made to telephone calls to a high Para ofl:cial over the follo gu$yao insist that the Paraguayans weeks to the passports,buayana return ' In Santiago, preparations bega for the second and third DINA mie.aions. Four false Chilean official passports were sent to the U.S. con- sulate in Santiago with government requests for visas to the United. States. On 'Aug. 17. the visas were issued for passports in the names of "Juan Williams," ' . :"Alejandro: Romeral," "Armando Faundez" and "Lilian Walker." Although two . of the names were the same as those used in Paraguay, the DINA agents using the identities of Williams and Romeral were not Townley and Fernandez. They were Capts. Rene Riveros ("Williams") and Rolando Mosqueira ("Romer- al"), who arrived in Miami Aug: 22, .,apparently' on a-mission"to "clear" the use of the names in Paraguay by acting as decoys to test whether U.S. authorities would react to their en- tering the country. Although the two men-were not stopped at Miami Airport, their ar-. rival was detected and reported to Washington., The circumstances and,- records of that detection,. presum- ably made by INS officials-as a re- sult of Landau's lookout notice, re-.-_: main unclear even within the FBL The agents, clearly intending to call attention to their presence, in-- formed Vernon Walters' CIA office by' phone that they, "Juan Wil- liams" and "Alejandro Romeral," were in Washington. On Sept. 1, the. two men arrived' back in Santiago. ^ ^ What did the CIA do, if anything? We don't know. It would -have been logical for those who knew of Chile's ongoing covert operation in Wash ' mgton to try to find out what Chile was up to, especially in light of the "Romeral-Williams" team's claim in { Paraguay that their mission had CIA clearance.. It is beyond belief that-l' the CIA would simply have ignored. a clandestine operation by a foreign intelligence service in Washington, .i or anywhere in the United States.' DINA and the CIA were in con atant touch with each other through normal liaison channels. Walters' duties as deputy director included liaison with foreign intelligence serv. 1 ices and he knew DINA chief Con- { treras personally. Did he or director Bush order, their representative in Chile to tell his liaison counterpart in Chilean intelligence, "Hey, we know you're up to something in { Washington, so either tell us what it is or stop it"? ' - Moreover, it was well known in in- telligence circles that DINA had car- ried out assassination of exile lead- ers in foreign countries. Given. -.i DINA's macabre reputation . and. Letelier's prominence in Washing- ton, it would not be difficult - to speculate that if DINA were plan- ning an assassination in Washing- ton, the target would be Letelier. One thing is clear. DINA chief Contreras would almost certainly have canceled the remaining opera- tions to kill Letelier if the CIA or State Department had raised ala- P 'c ai . rums i about-. - tha:?:" Rorietel".: aiid., "Williama"' missions. and expressed: their displeasure to the Chilean gov-. familiar with the case said that any, to cause the assassination to be scut-. 4 tied. :; ? 2..:t.? It wasn't. 01i Aug. 26', Lt. Fernan- dez, traveling as "Armando Faun- dez," arrived in Washington with- DINA agent'- "Liliana -Walker"' (whose real identity has never been established). 'They ,: - conducted 'preoperational' surveillance on Letelier. On Sept. 9, Townley, traveling on an official Chilean passport in the name "Hans -Peterson' Silva," ar- rived to head the fourth and final stage of the assassination operation. He received Fernandez' surveillance 1 report, then arranged with fourI members of a Cuban. exile group in, l Union City, N.J.,.to help him build and plant,the bomb. On Sept.. 21 it_, -exploded under Letelier's legs, killing him and Ronni. Moffitt, who happened to be riding to work that day with Letelier, and her husband. Michael; who survived.'. .,t. J: El....D.. : _ -` Immediately, the..-': assassination ., was put. in the context of prior- at-, tacks: on prominent -Chilean~. exiles opposing the Pinochet government... Two years earlier, in a hauntingly : similar car bombing in Buenos Aires, Argentina, the former' chief of the Chilean armed forces, Gen.. Carlos Prats, and his wife were murdered: One year before, exiled Christian Democratic leader Bernardo Leigh- ton, an advocate of a leftist-centrist front against Pinochet, was shot down with his wife on a Rome street Both survived. DINA was widely be- lieved to have been responsible. It would seem to go without saying that those who had detected DINA's. covert operation in, Washington - prior to ?Letelier's 'assassination would immediately tell the FBI all they knew. The passport photos of "Romeral" and "Williams,'; the Paraguay incident ' and. the actual entry into the United States of Chil- ean intelligence agents were obvi- ously important leads worthy of highest priority in the investigation. Moreover, the FBI's man in South America, Special Agent Robert Scherrer, made a major intelligence breakthrough one week after the as- sassination. He reported that Chile had organized a -six-nation intelli- gence network called Operation Condor, whose functions included . interchanging passports for use on missions to'assassinate exiled leftist leaders. Paraguay was one of the. members, with Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile. Scherrer, even without knowing about the "Romeral" and "Williams" affair in Paraguay, concluded in his Sept. 28 cable to Washington that the Letel- ier assassination "may have been carried out as a .:. phase of Opera. tion Condor." Scherrer's cable was distributed to the CIA and State De- partment. ' What then did Bush, Walters, Landau and others in State and the. CIA do with the "Romeral" and "Williams" photographs and infor- mation after the assassination? The Letelier investigation had Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOOl30R000600010226-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOOl30R000600010226-9 ? ? been i =Assistant US- At: torney-Et Propper and Speccial' Agent L. Carter Cornick of the FBPs Washingtofield'; office. 'Propper,?-` realizing that the investigation could: not go far without cooperation from the CIA, met-Bush two weeks after, the *assassination.` According to one: of those present-, in than meeting,' Bush talked about the importance of Operation. 'Condor to the Letelier:', but, did, not,say a word about the "Romeral'-'` and "Williams" pio tares and 'thee-Paraguay, incident.:'. Nor did- Bush, - Walters or anyone -'else from ? the ? CIA subsequently- volunteer= their -information about Chile's covert missions to Washing ton .6 Instead, the CIA seems to have done just the opposite. Stories ap-' peared in Newsweek, The Washing- ton Post, The Washington Star and The New York Times saying the , CIA had concluded that DINA had nothing to do-with the Letelier as- sassination. In one of the stories, -Bush was reported"to have person- ally informed Kissinger of his con clusions about-DINA's innocence. The source cited in the articles suggested a "martyr theory" for the , assassination,' . according to which leftists may have killed Letelier in order to create a martyr and dis- credit the Chilean government at a: . time. Pinochet was improving, his human rights image. At the State Department, some :1 but not all of the pertinent informa. 1 tion. about Chile's secret missions was turned over to the FBI on Oct.' 22, one month after the assassina- tion. The - information-,, included copies of the photographs of . "Romeral" and "Williams" and the fact that two men using-those names and official' Chilean passports had entered Miami on Aug. 22 (but not = that they had also come to Washing.,'., ton). - ? ,4 . But the "Romerat-Williams" in- formation and photographs played no active role for the first 10 months of the FBI investigation. When, in July 1977, the photographs were fi-- nally put to use, the "Williams" Pic-'.. tune was identified and the case was on the way to being solved. The man 'I in the picture, Michael Townley, was I turned over to the FBI the following, March in accord with a secret agree- ment signed by Chile under heavy U.S. diplomatic pressure. Townley confessed and became the prosecu ti on.'a chief, witness. Q 0 In the course of the investigation, ?' there were at least five cases of with- holding, destruction or concealment of key evidentiary documents. These incidents raise the possibility that . an attempt was made from within the U.S. government to sabotage the FBI investigation and divert its governmentr' s i. For more than a year ea"ter-the :-.: ney Propper and the FBI did. not re- ceiveiAmbassador Landau's~cable to Vernon. Walters fully-explaining the 2:.. State Department. Me: desk':. officer.: Robert. Driscoll, who told a superior in a memo that "Romeral" . and "Williams" were in Washington around the time of the assassination, ignored inform the FBL The memo was the FBI from Chile desk files more than j a year after the assassination. . . . ?. Immigration based on Service forms filled out by all foreigners en- ' tering the United States - on three of the five members of DINA's as- sassination. missions were removed. ' from , INS ? computers. The missing listings were "Romeral,". "Williams" (the Aug.. 22 Miami entry with Chit-- ean passports) and "Hans Petersen" (the name used by Townley to enter New York Sept. 9,1976). Moreover, INS officials conducted a fife search in 1979 and discovered the..disap- pearance of all paperwork that nor- malcy would accompany lookout no- tices such as those the State Depart- ' ment ordered posted for "Romeral" and "Williams." ? 4. Someone ,with access to U.S. citizen registration files in the U.S, consulate in Santiago removed the photograph of Townley on file there. . 5. Other evidence in the consulate files was destroyed as well. After Townley's expulsion, FBI agent Scherrer, discovered that U.S.. Con- sul Josiah Brownell had ordered the shredding of consular files that would have included the letters from the Chilean Foreign Ministry re- questing visas-- for `agents. "Hans Petersen," "Armando Faundez" and "Liliana Walker." ' In mid-1977, Scherrer had warned Brownell that the files might. contain-evidence in the Letelier case and should not be destroyed. The unanswered questions do not diminish the achievement of the-U. S. investigators who solved the as- sassination and whose . evidence stood the' test of a jury trial in which three Cuban exile accomplices were convicted. But the actions taken willfully to divert the investigation from its course and delay it for at least a year are also crimes. Those, actions should be subject -to the same scrutiny as the assassination itself. If there are innocent explana-' . tions; they should he made public along with all relevant documenta- tion in. the' case. Only then will the prosecution of the.Letelier-Moffitt murders stand as. untainted exam- .ples of the triumph of American jus- tice. - - Pct, 3 ab 3 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84BOOl30R000600010226-9