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October 29, 2007
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February 9, 1981
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Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8 ? SECRET 1P 9 February 1981 Staff Meeting Minutes of 9 February 1981 noted three articles which appeared in the press over the weekend which pertain to the Agency or the Director. They were Seymour Hersh's article on the overthrow of Allende, The London Sunday Times interview with Secretary of State Haig, and a New York Times story on terrorism (attached). In response to the Director's question about how the information in these stories got out, said the officials providing the information were not identified, but it was certain that no one from the Agency was involved. The Director questioned the value and appropriate- ness of Admiral Turner's appearance on "60 Minutes." The Director said his policy on talking with the press was that the CIA was in business to collect information not to give it out. Clarke discussed the NFAC/press relationship and said he is attempting to cut back on the number of contacts analysts have with reporters. The Director agreed this was a good idea but said that there may be some times when contact with the press is beneficial for the Agency. Clarke reported that the Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defense is in Cuba probably to discuss the situation in Latin America and Africa as well as Soviet/Cuban and Soviet/U.S. relationships. Clarke reported that the Soviets are building new facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. These are the first major improvements since the Soviets began using Cam Ranh Bay in 1979. Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8 Clarke mentioned to the Director that NFAC had prepared a paper on Guatemala for his use at breakfast with Secretary Haig on 10 February. In response to Clarke's question about additional material, the Director said he could think of nothing further he would need, but if he did he would contact NFAC. last week was good. In response to the Director's question about the 'paper on the freeze exemption, Fitzwater said that the paper is in good shape and that he was convening a meeting of senior officials after the staff meeting to discuss the final paper. The Director announced that for the immediate future staff meetings would be held on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. He hoped that in the future they could be held once a week. Attachments: As stated Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8 ~ NEW YORK TIt-M S 0.1 FAO ?~ 9. FEBRUARY 1981 : New Evidence Backs Ex-Envoy on His Role in Chile' rr By SEYMOUR M. HERSH For six years Edward M. Korry, United States Ambassador to Chile from 1967 to 1971, has insisted that he. was not involved in and indeed tried to stop White House efforts to induce a military coup in Chile in 1970-to prevent Dr. Salvador Al- lende Gossens, a Marxist, from assuming the presidency. Evidence has come to light suggesting that Mr. Kerry, despite his strong appeal-? tion to the Allende candidacy, was frozen out of the. planning for a proposed mili-. terry coup and warned the White House that it would be risking another "Bay of Pigs" if it got involved in military, plots to stop Dr. Allende's election. Mr. Korry has not worked in his profes- sions, journalism or public affairs, since 1974, two years after the columnist Jack Anderson published International Tele phone and Telegraph Cornoration docu ments that seemingly linked Mr. Korry to joint I.T.T: Central".Intelligence Agency operations to block. Dr. Allende's elec lion. _ Mr. Korry expressed particular bitter ness toward The-,New York Times for- what he said was unfair reporting about. { his role in articles in 1974 that revealed the C.I.A.'s activities in Chile and refusing in later years. despite his-en-' treaties, to investigate rus actions accu- rately. Mr. Korry, who lives with his wife in Stonington, Conn., insists that his sullied reputation and his early inability to get appropriate work stem from publication of the I.T.T. documents and from two ple, an "eyes- only" internal C.I.A. re- Port, filed in early 1971 and not provided National Security Interests to the Intelligence Committee, shows that Yet, he said, his story is not just an- senior agency officials were aware that other account of a frustrated "whistle! " Wash-j an operative had entered Chile under a blower," nor is it simply another false passport and posed as a member of ington morality story." The inability of the Mafia in making contact with anti-Al- the press and the Senate investigators to lende forces. reach the truth about his involvement, he - In another internal 1971 report, William: insisted, "tells about our country and the V. Broe, then chief of the agency's clan.way Washington really works when the destine service in Latin America, was ambitions of. its most important people formally advised that an operative had' and the interests of its most powerful representative of the Ford; groups come into conflict with the na- Foundation and the Rockefeller Founda-i tional security interests."*. Lion while on special assignment to Chile; Mr. Korry, who is 59 years old, was a In October 1970 - a tactic in violation of a foreign correspondent for United Press ? Presidential prohibition against the use and went on to Look magazine, where he. of American educational and plulan- served as European editor. In 1 he was thropic foundations as covers. The opera- designated Ambassador to Ethiopia by five, in later meetings with Chilean busi- President John F. Kennedy, serving nessmen, made it clear, according to the, there with distinction, by all accounts, C.I.A. documents, that "as a representa-. -until his assignment to Chile. five of American business interests," he- His moment in the greatest glare of was eager "to activate a military take-i publicity came in September 1974, soon over of the Chilean Government." after The New York times disclosed that None of this, it is now evident, was the C.I.A. had spent at least 38 million in known to Ambassador Korry. Chile in an effort to prevent Dr. Allende's . that sou ht to ili i d f , g a ng n ; NotConsidered Trustworthy.i election an make it impossible for him to govern. Mr. - In interviews, a number of C.I.A. offi- cials directly involved in the anti-Allende operations emphasized that Mr. Korry. was 'not: considered trustworthy by they white House or by C.I.A. headquarters. 11 "Korry never did know anything," said an intelligence operative who worked in the embassy under Mr. Korry in 1970. While he was in Chile, Mr. Korry was l known in the Nixon Administration for his outspoken hostility to Dr. Allende and his harsh anti-Communist stance. Mr. i{or y, who acknowledges the severity of bis'views on Dr. Allende, was active in lobbying for a $400,000 C.I.A. propaganda- effort against him and his Marxist views that was authorized by the Nixon Admin- istration in the spring and summer of 1970. Nonetheless, Mr. Korry insists that he repeatedly advised Washington not to take any steps toward a military solution of the Allende problem. On Oct. 9, 1970, for example, he told the White House in a direct message made available to The New York Times that he was appalled to learn that unauthorized contact had been made by the C.I.A. station in Santiago with Patria y Libertad, a right-wing ex- tremist group advocating the~tviolent Korry, with Richard M. Helms, then Di- rector of Central Intelligence, and two senior State Department officials, was accused by members of the Senate staff. of having provided misleading testimony to the Senate multinational subcommit- tee of the Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, which held hearings in March and April 1973 into I.T.T.'s involvement with the Chilean election. tion, which Dr. Allende won in a three- way race by only 30,000 votes of three mil- point.of much of the hearings -a report from two I.T.T. officials In Santiago that the Ambassador had finally received "the green light to move in the name of Richard Nixon" against the new Presi- dent. Repeatedly refusing to answer many Levinson, Mr. Kory insisted that to de- scribe confidential communications and overthrow of the Government. official orders would be "Contrary to the any attempt on our part actively to en-, ? - courage a coup could lead us to a Bay of b Pigs failure," he added in the "eyes only" cablegram. In the interviews Mr. Korry constantly ton duruig These materials raise new questions; focused on his inability to get newspapers about the extent of C.I.A. operations 'ink to publish his view of events after he left Chile in 1970 and the efficacy of the Sen-! Chile. But he says that he perhaps waited ate committee's investistation. For exam- too Icing, until 1976, to begin to tell all knew of the role of the Nixon Administra- hile. -? . tion and its predeeessars in Chile.- subsequent widely publicized investiga-! subsequent tions by Senate committees. He is now al visiting professor of international rela- tions at Connecticut College in New Lon- don. much of the new evidence, including highly classified internal C.I.A. docu- ments, was provided by a former intelli- gence official who had direct knowledge of the agency's activities against Dr. Al- lende, who died in the course of a military uprising against him in 1973. Corroborat- ing information was obtained in inter- views with other C.I.A. and White House officials. Internal documents provided by the C.I.A. to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - and not published by the committee in its reports in 1975 on Chile -have also been obtained. Finally, Mr. Korry made available some of his private communications with Washing- .U 1970 election period. Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8 ? IV i entire moral contract" he had entered into with the Presidents under whom he served. - After The Times account of C.IA in- volvement, he sent a barrage of letters to editors and reporters, pointing to what he cited as errors in the newspaper's cover- age and insisting that his testimony was honestly rendered and that his reluctance to testify more fully was not based,- as was widely assumed, on- inside knowl- edge of C.I.A. and I.T.T. activities, . ; Because it was difficult to believe that Mr. Korry, as Ambassador, could not have been privy to the Administration's plans, few members of the committee chose to believe his assertion that he had not received the "green light" cable. But C.I.A. documents summarized,: by the Justice Department In.. L978 court pro- ceedings but widely ignored at the time showed that -Henry ;D. Heckmher, the C.I.A. station chief in Santiago. had re- ceived the messageti.and,- through Hal Hendrix and Robert Berrell=,_ public relations representatives for.?I.T.T. in Santiago, had forwarded It to the multi- national corporation's home office. Helms Viewed as Part of Plot;, Justice Department hivesgators con- cluded that Mr. Hendrix, Mr. Berrellez and other I.T.T. officials bad conspired with Mr. Helms and other C.I.A. officials. to commit perjury before the Senate mul- tinational subcommittee in' 1973. Mr: Korry, it appears; was in the position of telling the truth about his lack of knowl- t edge of I.T.T. and C.IA operations at a time when other witnesses were tion of 11 ellidiversionarystories. - - Mr. Helms, later Ambassador to. Iran, and Mr. Hendrix were eventuially. con- victed on misdemeanor charges for their. testimony. .- ,> . ., In Mr. Korry's view, the assumption that he was not telling the truth persisted in the 1975 investigation by the Senate Se- lect Committee on Intelligence, which was also headed by Senator Church, into illegal activities of the C.IA.. Mr. Korry was only permitted to testify for a few, moments before a public hearing, he re- lated, and that testimony was not sought until the committee bad published two re- ports on C.I.A. activities in Chile; both of them critical of his term as envoy. His pleas of innocence and his protesta- tions against what he describes as unfair treatment by_ Congress and the",press have generally been ignored.." Direct Order for Intervention - the Senate intelli- Iii published reports gence Committee disclosed that Press, dent Richard M. Nixon, at an Oval Office meeting on Sept. .15,. 1970, ordered Mr.. Helms to prevent Dr. Allende's accession, to power. He was told that he was tooper ate- in great secrecy and not to - info anyone in the State Department, includ- ing Ambassador Korry, of his orders. ; This effort was called Track II by the committee to distinguish it from the so- called Track I,. essentially a series of political maneuvers also aimed at pre- venting Dr. Allende's election, that were carried out with.Mr. Korry's knowledge and approval. Approved For The former- Ambassador defends ,his role in Track I as constitutional and maintains that it did not call for military overthrow. In this period, he said, hel worked closely: with Dr. Eduardo Frei Montalva, the outgoing President, and It was reluctance to mention Dr. Frei's in- volvement that posed problems in the 1973 Senate bearing. Mr. Korry's testimony before the Intel- ligence Committee, which he concedes was: incomplete, clearly contributed:to his credibility problem. While he denied receiving the green-light message,, he re- peatedly refused to answer when he was aske ,:.about his instructions regarding Dr. Allende. He did not claim executive privilege,. telling the subcommittee: "I am not falling back on any legal rights: I am speaking entirely of my own personal perception of my moral responsibility to the :Presidents.: I. cannot in good con- : science wreck an institutional process for Belated Recognition of Bad Choice.. `"` Mr. Korry concedes now that he might :testifying more openly before the multi- national L subcommittee and also by not being more candid with the press about some of the-suspicions he had then about American involvement in .- activities `,against Dr..Allende. Those suspicions, for which he had no. direct evidence, were heightened, he said, when he was repeat- edly complimented by senior Govern- ment officials after the 1973 hearings. "Everybody was pleased as pink with my testimony," he- explained. -"They be. lieved 1 lied." He recalled his sorrow and distress at being Informed in July 1973 by a staff member of.the Senate Intelligence Corn mittee of the Track II efforts. The C.I.A program, as the committee later report- ed, indirectly led to the assassination of Gen..ReneSchneider, commanderbf the Chilean Army, a constitutionalist consid- ered an obstacle to a coup. "Until that date," Mr. Korry said, "I, had . naively assumed I.T.T. was mis- taken about my activities in Chile" - in its various messages and reports that were-obtained and published by Jack An- derson. 'It:,finally was apparent to me. that there was a calculated scheme to lay off the blame for.Chile upon me," he went on "This. disclosure shook a reference point in my. life. In other words, the I.T.T. green-light cable had-been. true in sub- stance, if wrong about me. I.T.T. plus C:I.A..officials and others in government. had in fact lied under oath to the Senate and had then conspired to hide froma the public and me its activities." Approaching reporters again, Mr. Korry was determined to tell his full story. But with the exception of a series of articles in 1976 and 1977 by J. Trento of The News Journal of Wilmington, Del., his account was ignored. This corre. spondent, in long conversations with Mr. Korry In 1975, concluded his account was too self-serving to be credible. In the recent interviews Mr. Korry ac- knowledged that he was concealing infor- mation about C.I.A. operations in Chile when he refused to testify before the Sen. ate subcommittee in 1973, but his special 'knowledge dealt not with 1970 and Dr. Al. lends but.with the extent of C.IA. pene- { tration. of all aspects of Chilean society `? under the Kennedy and Johnson Adminis. trations. Those C.I.A. activities were known to Ralph A. Dungan, his predeces. .to President Frei, head of the Christian ! Democratic Party, which had C.I.A. sup- L He was concerned in 1973, be said, that if he began talking about intelligence ac- tivities, he would lose the right to with- ' hold such potentially embarrassing points of information as these: 9American funding in support of the Frei presidential campaign in 1964 to- taled well over $20 million, much of it fun- neled through C.I.A. and Agency for In- ternational Development conduits, not the $3 million reported by the C.I.A. to the Senate Intelligence Committee. 'IWith the full knowledge of Chile and the United States, millions in C.I.A. and A.I.D. funds were allocated to Roman Catholic groups opposed.,- to "laicism, Protestantism. and Communism. Key unions also received election funds. . 9Pre`sident Kennedy was personally in- volved in urging large United States cor- porations, -including LTM. and the' Kennecott and: Anaconda:-copper con- cerns, which had big and profitable hold- ings in Chile, to work closely with the in- telligence agency in bribing local offi- cials and supporting political parties to further American foreign policy. BHush money was paid. to senior Chil- can politicans who aided the White House in its pro-Frei programs in 1964. One of the defeated candidates In the 1964 elect lion was Dr. Allende. Predecessor Supports Account 9Ambassador Dungan, on leaving Chile, provided Mr. Korry - with the I names of 15 residents of Santiago whose companionship and friendship he particu- larly commended. All, amongthem three clergymen, had been "funnels and instru- ments of important C.I.A. programs." Mr. Dungan, told of Mr. _Korry's re- cos~xT~~a S M, -I, lL4 - I-" Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8 ? marks, commented: "That's true. Any ambassador who wasn't aware of C.I.A. activities in his country wasn't worth a hoot." The former envoy, now a United States executive director of the Inter American Development Bank, added that he consistently sought to make the Chris- tian Democratic Party more viable while he was in Chile in the mid-1960's in an ef- fort to reduce the scope of the C.I.A. Mr. Korry is most critical now of the Senate Intelligence Committee investiga- tion, which he insists was biased, incom- plete and distorted. He was not permitted to testify fully about his extensive knowl- edge of earlier C.I.A. activities until Feb. ruary 1976, he said, when he appeared be- fore an executive session largely at- tended by staff members. His full state- ment was not made public, nor, he said, has he been able to obtain a transcript of his remarks. He maintained that Mr.. Church and other Democrats on the com- mittee deliberately suppressed his testi- mony about C.I.A. activities in the early i1960's to shield the reputation of_Presi- dent Kennedy as well as to prevent em- barrassment to the Roman Catholic Church and unions. - "No one in authority," Mr. Korry said, "wished the full 11-member committee, even in secret session, to be compelled to confront the past." Senator Church has repeatedly denied Mr. Korry's allegations. Mr. Korry also accused the committee of suppressing hundreds of his confiden- tial cables that he turned over in 1975 and that show, he maintains, that while Am- bassador he sought to reach a "fair un- derstanding" with Dr. Allende on many key issues. A Charge of Suppression The committee, Mr. Korry maintained, also suppressed evidence showing that in the fall of 1970 he repeatedly urged Presi- dent Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, then the President's national security adviser, not to get involved in scheming with the Chilean military. Mr. Korry has copies of documents that appear to demonstrate that he did give the White House such ad- t vice, but no mention of this aspect of his role was included in the committee's final reports on Chile. Mr. Korry also asserted that committee staff members made no effort before publication to discuss with him the messages and other documenta- tion about his role, with the result that the ! Mr. Korry emphasized that he did not believe any individual or group conspired to deny him a chance to get his views known. What did happen, he said, is that those who were being investigated and t cse who were investigating set limits on the extent of the facts they wanted known and thus "conspired to cave r eh o her " "Their common interest in preventing the full Senate committee from having' them confront the truths I would tell in se. cret led to my exclusion as a witness and to the issuance of reports concerning Chile which coupled each truth with a lie, with a half truth or with a deliberately misleading statement," he said. Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8 ?Z -r Y :1 .?s :S T i : ! j' # t .S T i4 E_i}? E T:J }i:,s ~ f T - f ! tr - Ti- rill !S:- a E t{ i1 i- riE~ t r Tl1 Z is ~ .Z is i_ !DF- '} F F-l..av:L~?r - }:.i t_ _.: _ _ _ - - .. w. i ... w .. w . ? i t t i .. i t . i > - - w. . .- . i i .. -i .t . i i :. i a ? ? 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IIi. } i:? ii: Fi - i 'isz:. Fit .. s i al i! t F3...Fi:. w...... fi P it Y L rS T n r, L: -i.~. !! E__N Y L { ~ r L ? " ~ ~ ! HON- T [ '!ZL i L LM M k' F i P TT ? %: r? = yf rr-- ''? ?! _ Z tS !iTTn TYT a t E F F: i-t) 1 .i?_f !::ice #: ? `- ? r i lUul I C = .ir U1?1i 1 S Tf? cN:i-,L !} - !T yri F? i i.'.?i.a{ L. D , I. ts. TA T : T L T?- F i.; C .i. :iii f L T:TE F -'r' E. H 1! T Jt T 1 Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8 both allies of the Soviet Union, and in China. The specialists in terrorism re- ported that other training had been pro- vided in Czechoslovakia for-Italy's Red Brigades and in. North Korea for the Japanese Red Army. Cuban Link Is Seen Cuba is also thought to have trained terrorists for action in Latin America and to have been a conduit through which weapons, either captured from the United States in Vietnam or obtained from the Soviet Union, have been shipped to Latin America. _ -1., The diplomatic note from the Soviet Union that was reflected in a dispatch carried by Tass, the Soviet press agency, said that the Soviet Union had supported. Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8 =it"=ice'''u1 eel ?..tQ ,~4' NEW YORK TIMES 9 FEBRUARY 1981 'roof of : Soviet- By RICHARD HALLORAiN '' SM"toTheNowYork Times. . WASHINGTON, Feb. 8-Officials with Government said it was important to dis- ' measures to prevent air piracy. Another tingush between Soviet support for what i Tass dispatch said that the Soviet Union the Communists call national liberations had criticized the seizure of the Ameri- cans diplomats in Iran. movements which the Soviet U i , n on ices say they have little evidence to sub- I avowedly supports, and genuine terror-1-The note defended a Soviet right to as- ...ate auu "Uti ala- '--- _.??~?? ~? . Ucperu- Haig ,. Jr.'s allegation that .,the Soviet) ing its allies in Vietnam and the Palestine ; ence. The Tass dispatch said that Mr_ Union, as part of a "conscious policy,-. groups, the specialists said, would most undertook the. "training, funding and . likely have-appeared whether they had, equipping" of international terrorists. He, Russian. help or not because they were f i asserted that Moscow:- fostered, sup- products: of political. forces -within their ported and expanded that activity. own countries. . But officials in the Central Intelligence .'`.The specialists said, however, that Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency some Russian help to terrorists might and the State Department, asked to docu- have come-from. Libya, which has been meat those charges, said. they were.un- the recipient of large shipments of Soviet able to do so. "There's just no real evi- arms that later were sold or distributed dence for it," said-an official: to terrorists. B1ocHasHad Few Attacks Some organizations that have carried out terrorist attacks, such as the P.L.Q., Mr. Haig also asserted that Soviet sup. have also sent people to the Soviet Union port for international terrorism.:: was for training, the specialists said. A Pales- "surprising" because "the Soviet,.Union tinian terrorist, Adnan Jaber, who is in itself has been victimized by it.'.' prison in Israel, said last year that he had Reports made public by the C.IA said been given six months training. in. the A hat about 5 percent of the victims of ter- ' Soviet Union in weapons, tactics and ex- rorism were nationals of the Soviet Union , plosives, . omits East European allies. Relatively .'t . He also said that similar training was -1"Z UaLCLY for international terrorists. concealed to Communists in'21ir- Soviet diplomats said that their Gov- key. ,ernment had filed a note of protest to Mr. - Little Evidence Is Available Haig, denying that. the Soviet Union en- gaged in terrorism and, labeling Mr. But those specialists said there was lit- Haig's accusations a "gross and, mall- tle evidence to show that the Soviet Union cious deception." _ S xa ; had formed,- trained or directed terrorist Secretary: Haig said on. Jan._28 in his organizations such as the Red Brigades first news conference that., the. Soviet ! in Italy or the Japanese Red Army. Those rasen pace insiae the Soviet bloc. A recent study of 18 embassies under siege, written by Brian M. Jenkins of the Rand Corporation, a research institute, showed that no diplomatic posts of the Soviet Union- or its. allies had been at- tacked and that only one. embassy in a Communist country had: been invaded. An and-Castro Cuban kidnapped the Bel- gian and French . ambassadors at the French Embassy in Havana in1973, rorists out of George Washington and other early American leaders. Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8