THE PUZZLE PALACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00148R000100330001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 5, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE. MARYLAND 20755
Serial: N1143
5 October 1982
SUBJECT: The Puzzle Palace
I am forwarding for your information a copy of an NSA
presentation on 23 September to the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence on the subject of the recently released book
The Puzzle Palace. A similar presentation was made to the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
LINCOLN D. FAURER
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Encl:
a/s
Copy Furnished:
D/DCI
This cormsnancar,_e may be
dec's,;icied upon removal
of 'rla inc'csure(s) and
physical removal of the
QL,veat notation,
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 SECRET
Director of Policy, National Security Agency
to the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Concerning
"The Puzzle Palace"
(Please see footnote. on bottom of page 1
added to text on 29 September 1982.)
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Cla &d BY NSA/CS5M t*anep rmlr tin egolr"
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INTRODUCTION
(FOUO) Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased
to be here today to discuss James Bamford's recently released book
about NSA - entitled "The Puzzle Palace." I intend in my presenta-
tion to respond to the questions raised in the Committee's letter of
20 September. In my position as Director of Policy for NSA, I've
spent a fair amount of time over the past 2 1/2 years worrying about
this book. On the one hand, as initial denial officer under the
Freedom of Information Act, I have been overseeing the release to
Mr. Bamford under the Act of a large quantity of NSA materials,
including a long string of NSA Newsletters and a quantity of
unclassified articles written for various NSA technical journals.
On the other hand, I have been involved in a fairly intensive - but
unsuccessful effort - to prevent the publication by Bamford of
information that was known to be classified; and more recently, I've
been concerned with the compilation of an assessment of damage
believed to have been caused by the book.
(C) With this brief introduction, I'd like to spend the
remainder of my time describing the book itself, our assessment
of the damage caused by it, and some legal measures that are
being explored in conjunction with the Justice Department.
(C) Let me begin by saying, that Bamford's book does not -
with one major exception which I will describe later - contain
specific, identifiable items which are clearly classified and
which might constitute a definite and unambiguous basis for
pursuing legal sanctions against the author.* At the same time,
it is possible to say that the book as a whole is quite damaging
to the U.S. intelligence effort in a variety of ways which
I will comment upon in more detail in a few minutes.
* NOTE: As of 29 September 1982, further information has become
available in the continuing NSA review of the book which may cause
us to modify this statement to reflect that there are additional
places in the text where classified materials appear.
_ EGRET
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first book ever written on the National Security Agency and claims
that the author traces NSA's origins, details its inner workings
and explores its far flung operations. To quote from the dust-
cover, Bamford ". . . describes the city of fifty thousand people
and nearly twenty buildings that is the Fort Meade headquarters
of the NSA - where there are close to a dozen underground acres
of computers, where a significant part of the worlds communications
are monitored, and where reports from a number of supersophisticated
satellite eavesdropping systems are analyzed. He also gives a
detailed account of NSA's complex network of listening posts -
both in the United States and throughout much of the rest of the
world." Reference is also made to certain communications as
examples of NSA targets to include a Soviet general picking up
his car telephone to call headquarters, a New York businessman
wiring his branch in London, and the British Admiralty desiring
to know the plans and movements of Argentina's fleet in the
South Atlantic.
(FOUO) This mixture of fact and fiction is carried on through-
out the text of the book in a way which can't help but leave the
unwitting reader with the impression that the NSA and its technical
capabilities are able to monitor at will the communications of
individuals - including U.S. citizens -- on a world-wide basis.
(FOUO) In fact,. in a theme which is prevalent throughout the
text, Bamford observes in Chapter 1 that: ". . . the very same
capabilities that provide the United States with its greatest
intelligence resource also provide the nation with one of its
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greatest potential dangers." In another quote from the concluding
pages of the book, Bamford makes the following statement: "Like
an ever-widening sinkhole, NSA's surveillance technology will
continue to expand, quietly pulling in more and more communications
and gradually eliminating more and more privacy." I submit that
this is not a very reassuring picture if you are a reader in
middle America whose only exposure to NSA is through the pages
of Jim Bamford's "Puzzle Palace."
(FOUO) In a similar vein, Bamford appears to be preoccupied
both in the text of his book and on a variety of current radio talk
shows with an implied lack of control and oversight over the.
activities of NSA. He is clearly concerned with NSA's lack of
a formal, statutory charter and he also asserts that the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has enough
loopholes and exceptions to render it nearly useless (p. 378).
This approach is not calculated to reassure-citizens with respect
to the activities of the NSA and the mechanisms which have been
established within the Executive, Judicial and Congressional
Branches to monitor and oversee these activities.
(FOLIO) What did Bamford write about? - The book contains
references to most of the publicized, significant events pertaining
to NSA that have occurred during its 30-year history to include:
the Martin and Mitchell defections; the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty;
the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo; black bag jobs; the watch lists
(MINARET); and the arrangements with the cable companies (SHAMROCK).
(C) Where did Bamford get his information? - There is no
question that Bamford's research was extensive, wide-ranging and, in
some cases surprisingly successful. .(As an example, he was able
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to find and to get declassified and released to him by the National
Archives a manuscript sealed by the U.S. Government forty-six
years earlier after seizure from a New York publisher by Thomas
Dewey, then an assistant U.S. Attorney in New York City. The
manuscript, prepared under the guidance of early code-breaker
Herbert Yardley, dealt with the Japanese role in the arms
limitations conference of 1921-22 based on a large quantity of
intercepted Japanese messages decoded in Yardley's Black Chamber and
provided to the U.S. negotiators in the conference).
(FOUO) Bamford made extensive use of the Freedom of Information
Act, conducted research in private libraries, compiled much material
from previously published articles and Congressional reports
and was able to lend some authenticity to some of his observations
through interviews with a variety of individuals familiar with
NSA operations including several senior former employees or
assignees of the Agency. The book is extensively foot-noted
and, in many cases, material which on first glance appears to be
highly classified is seen to be derived from a New York Times
article or a Congressional report.
(FOLIO) NSA first became aware of Bamford's intentions to write
a book in March 1978 when we received the first of 11 FOIA requests.
Our relations with him since that initial contact, though proper,
have been conducted at arm's length. We have responded to his
FOIA requests; we refused requests for interviews with senior
personnel; and we responded positively to requests that we felt
to be of the sort which any citizen should receive, for example
access to our recruiting offices both here and in Boston and
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` 'a ' c otbi f~ c am
DOJ DOCUMENT
(S) There is one incident involving the FOIA that deserves
particular attention here. This incident concerns the dis-
closure of classified information in a document that was
improperly redacted by the Department of Justice and provided to
Bamford in 1979 in response to an FOIA request. The classified
information disclosed concerned not only NSA but also CIA and
the FBI, although the most sensitive information pertained to
a certain NSA operation (MINARET)
(S) In April of 1981, Bamford sent a copy of one of the sensitive
pages from this DOJ document to a British liaison officer stationed
at NSA, with a letter asking some pointed questions which
indicated that Bamford clearly understood the significance of
what he had. This incident led to a decision made jointly by
NSA and Justice to have Justice approach Bamford to discuss the
improperly redacted materials and the possibility of their return.
A preliminary meeting with Bamford in July of 1981 went quite well,
though a subsequent meeting the following month did not. In
September of 1981, Justice notified Bamford by letter that he
was currently in possession of classified information that requires
protection against unauthorized disclosure. The letter also
advised Bamford that it was his duty and obligation as a U.S.
citizen to return the information to the Department of Justice.
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Bamford, through his ACLU lawyer, refused to do so with the
result that the material of concern to both the U.S. and
British Governments has been published not only in The Puzzle
Palace but also in a number of newspapers both here and in the
U.K.
(S) The Senior U.K. Liaison Officer to NSA has expressed to us
his Government's displeasure and disappointment with our inability
to devise any effective legal method to address this unauthorized
disclosure which must be considered to reflect adversely on our
general ability to protect classified information provided to the
United States by a foreign government.
(S) We are in current dialogue with the DOJ on this subject
and both NSA and Justice have tentatively concluded that a criminal
prosecution for publication of the classified information does not
appear to be feasible for reasons both of substance (in that the
proof of criminal intent necessary for a conviction is thought to
be very difficult - a view that we do not necessarily share)
and for procedural reasons (i.e., inability to control publicity,
which is quite naturally of great concern to us).
(C) In a related development, we have recently learned that
Bamford has served in a fully cleared status with the Naval
Security Group during the mid-1960's. This fact is of special
interest because it could provide the basis for a Snepp-type
civil proceeding, a possibility which we are continuing to explore
in detail in conjunction with Justice. Our thinking in this regard
has to do with the fact that Bamford, as a former member of the
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Naval Security Group, probably had access to classified SIGINT
information and thus should be held to some obligations with respect
to his usage of classified information, however obtained. The
Navy has provided NSA some information germane to a possible civil
action and further investigation is continuing.
RESPONSES TO COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
(FOLIO) Your 20 September letter requested that we provide a
review of the methods Bamford used to acquire the information which
he has revealed in the book and options for limiting the availabi-
lity of these methods in the future. You also requested a review
of NSA's procedures for limiting publication of potentially
damaging information of the sort contained in the book.
(FOLIO) Bamford's sources of information and methods of acquiring
that information are quite easily described. So far as we are
able to determine, he used sources easily available to any serious
researcher, to include unclassified or declassified records in
the National Archives and public libraries. Congressional
reports were used extensively as was the Freedom of Information
Act. Finally, Bamford was able to arrange interviews with a number
of individuals who had some knowledge of NSA's activities. Some
of these were former employees or assignees of the Agency.
(U) In considering this case as a whole, we believe that the
first and most obvious problem relates to the substantial risks to
intelligence agencies caused by the Freedom of Information Act.
Secondly, we would note the ineffectiveness of formal legal
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 proceedings to minimize the consequences of or punish unauthorized
(FOLIO) In regard to the FOIA, we believe that the procedures
used by NSA in processing and releasing to Bamford of volumes of
unclassified materials were performed in accordance with the
language and spirit of that act. With one major exception, we
envision little or no change in what we believe to be these
careful and deliberate NSA review procedures. The one major lesson
we learned relates to how we publish our internal, unclassified
Newsletter. Based on our experience with Bamford, this document
now receives a careful review before publication to ensure that
it contains no sensitive - albeit unclassified - personnel or
other organizational data.
(FOUO) Although all information released to Bamford under the
FOIA was carefully reviewed and no classified information was
released by NSA, it is clear that Bamford was able to use the NSA
released information in interviews and in his other researches in
order to develop-a picture of the Agency that, as a whole, has to be
considered damaging and that would not otherwise have been
possible.
(U) In our view, this suggests, as has been proposed to the
Congress before, that intelligence agencies and intelligence-
related information should be generally exempted from the scope
of the FOIA: the reason, to reiterate, is not that Agency
releases will not be properly reviewed and classified information
extracted but that almost any information obtained from an
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 intelligence agency can be put together with other information so
as to provide information revealing of the intelligence Agency's
functions.
(S) The other area of the law most clearly implicated by The
Puzzle Pa-:ace is the lack of utility in our statutes protecting
classified information. Notwithstanding DoJ's skepticism that a
good criminal case exists against Mr. Bamford, on balance it is
clear that Mr. Bamford violated 18 U.S.C. ?798(a)(3) by publishing
the exerpt from the DoJ report revealing GCHQ SIGINT activities:
he was warned that he had classified information and from our
counsel's contacts with him and his lawyer it is clear he knew
what the classified information was. Despite this, his publication
will almost inevitably go unpunished, because any criminal pro-
ceedings against Bamford would, through its public-character,
simply publicize even more the classified information which we
would desire to protect through the prosecution. The self-
defeating nature of legal action with respect to unauthorized
disclosures is not news, of course, but in this situation, where
the individual had been warned yet chose to proceed and publish,
the Government's inability to take effective legal action both
frustrates those conscientious employees who know of it and creates
well-justified doubts on the part of our allies concerning our
ability to control access to classified information.
(C) It would, of course, be desirable to learn from this
experience and to be able to propose to the committee some statutory
change which would permit the more effective protection of
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classified information. Practically, however, we recognize that
legislation in this area is most unlikely, and that many of the
problems encountered in using law to protect classified information
simply reflect the realities of life in a free and open society.
Yet, it is fair to emphasize to the committee that unauthorized
disclosures of intelligence information in general, of which
Mr. Bamford's case is simply a recent and rather special example,
do endanger our national security and do adversely impact NSA's
ability to perform its tasks. In this regard, the committee
might wish to consider whether special, closed hearings at
which the deficiences in legal methods of protecting classified
information could be explored in detail and candor might be a
productive enterprise.
ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE
(S) Finally, in terms of assessing damage, the book contains
a wealth of detail on NSA's physical layout, some analytic
techniques, our own communications nets, pinches, wiretaps,
break-ins, intercept sites, reconnaissance planes, SIGINT and -
photo satellites, success or intercept against several target
countries or entities, and relations with friendly foreign SIGINT
services. it is difficult to make a persuasive case that any of
these particular items will in and of itself, likely have a +
harmful effect on us either because of the lack of specificity or
the datedness of the material. On the other hand, the cummulative
effect of compiling such information into a single document could
easily stimulate a current target of NSA to upgrade its communications
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security efforts in order to deny us further access. Fiction has
the potential of hurting almost as much as fact when the two are
intermingled as they are in this book. In this context the book,
in our opinion, must be regarded-as damaging to the U.S.
intelligence effort.
(FOLIO) It is also our view that the book gives undesirable and
unwarranted adverse publicity to the NSA organization and to the
operations and personnel of the United States SIGINT system.
It is a fact that current employees do not appreciate being so
identified; and also, information in the book based on interviews
with former NSA personnel is almost certain to spark further media
approaches to other retired individuals, making it more difficult to
maintain the customary discipline.
(S) One unfortunate by-product of the book that has occurred
already is the attention that has been drawn to various NSA
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(FOUO) In summary, the book is not going unnoticed. In fact,
it was listed by the Washington Post last Sunday as being ninth in
sales among non-fiction books in the Washington area. We understand
that it has gone into its third printing. With reviews such as
Philip Taubman's in the Sunday Times Book Review this,week, it is
likely that The Puzzle Palace will be around for sometime.
Taubman concludes his review with the following observation. He
says:
"By revealing-the scope and opening
up the operations of the NSA without
giving away its most sensitive
secrets, fir. Bamford has performed
an important public service in this
impressive book."
(C) Disagreeing with Mr. Taubman's conclusion, we believe the
book as a whole to be quite damaging indeed and it is difficult
for us to perceive how it serves the public well in any respect.
It certainly does not contribute to the health of the U.S.
intelligence community in general or of the United States Signals
i
Intelligence System in particular.
(C) Responding to the final Committee question which asked for
our assessment of how publication of this volume will effect future
intelligence collection operations of the National Security Agency,
I would state that it is not now possible to respond to this query
in specific, quantifiable terms. As time goes on, it maybe possible
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to make such judgments but for now I would just reiterate my
earlier comment that the cummulative effect of such a book, in
our opinion, must be regarded as damaging to the U.S. intelligence
effort.
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