AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SHAMIM ON THE ALR-69 ISSUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00148R000200440015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: November 5, 1982
• Content Type: CABLE

Approved For Release 2008/08/06: CIA-RDP84BOO148R000200440015-1
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TAGS: FIN OTRA ASEC OREP (WILSON, CHARLES N.) MASS PK
.SUBJ: AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SHAMIM ON THE ALR-69 ISSUE
1. (S) ENTIRE. TEXT.
SUMMARY: ,,.THERE-FOLLOWS A REPORT OF CONGRESSMAN
CHARLES N`'"'WIL'SON'S NOVEMBER 3 MEETING WITH AIR CHIEF
MARSHAL SHAMIM IN WHICH SHAMIM STATED THAT GOP WOULD
NOT ACCEPT DELIVERY OF F-16'S, INCLUDING SIX DUE TO
ARRIVE IN DECEMBER, UNLESS THEY ARE EQUIPPED WITH ALR-69.
WE 00 NOT KNOW WHETHER SHAMIM WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF
GOP. WE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOP HAS SAID NOTHING
TO US ABOUT THIS IN ANY OTHER CHANNEL AND THAT SHAMIM
DID NOT TAKE THIS POSITION IN OCTOBER 26 DISCUSSION WITH
THE AMBASSADOR. SHAMIM, WE WOULD NOTE, DOES NOT BELONG
TO PRESIDENT ZIA'S INNER CIRCLE. WE RECOMMEND THAT USG
NOT SEEK TO CLARIFY THIS ISSUE WITH GOP BUT THAT DELIVERY
OF DECEMBER TRANCHE OF F-16'S PROCEED AS PLANNED UNLESS
AND UNTIL GOP INFORMS US OTHERWISE. END SUMMARY.
3. IN NOVEMBER 3 MEETING, AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SHAMIM TOLD
CONGRESSMAN CHARLES N. WILSON (D.TEX) THAT PAKISTAN WOULD
NOT ACCEPT DELIVERY OF F-16'S IF THEY ARE NOT EQUIPPED
WITH ALR-69'S AND SAID THAT THIS INCLUDES THE SIX AIR-
CRAFT SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN PAKISTN DECEMBER 2. (COM-
MENT: WE TAKE THIS TO MEAN THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE
AGREEMENT ON THE ALR-69, RATHER THAN INSTALLATION OF THE
ALR-69, WHICH WOULD DELAY DELIVERY SEVERAL MONTHS. END
COMMENT.) THE PAKISTAN AIR FORCE. HE EXPLAINED, INTENDS
TO DEFEND PAK AIRSPACE AGAINST SOVIET AND 'AFGHAN INCUR-
SIONS AND IS PREPARED TO.ENGAGE SOVIET/AFGHAN AIRCRAFT.
HE WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, PERMIT THE PAF TO ENGAGE THE
AFGHAN/SOVIETS WITHOUT THE ALR-69. DOWNING OF AN F?-16
WOULD STRIKE AT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GOP AND RAISE
DOUBTS IN THE PEOPLES' MINDS ABOUT THE GOP'S ABILITY TO
DEFEND PAKISTAN. CONGRESSMAN WILSON PROMISED -TO CHECK
INTO STATUS OF THE ALR-69 ISSUE UPON RETURNING TO
WASHINGTON.
4. SHAMIM SAID THAT PAKISTAN HAS BEEN SEEKING TO NORMAL-
IZE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. FOR FOUR YEARS BUT THAT AS
State Dept. review completed
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RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED, THERE HAVE BEEN A SERIES OF PIN-
PRICKS. THE U.S. AIR FORCE HAD RECOMMENDED THE F-16
MODEL STANDARD IN USAF AND UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY HAD
ALSO OFFERED THIS AIRCRAFT. THE NATIONAL DISCLOSURE
POLICY COMMITTEE, HOWEVER, HAD RECENTLY TURNED PAKISTAN
DOWN ON THE.ALR-69.DESPITE THE FACT THAT PAKISTANI AIR
FORCE IS COMMITTED TO THE SECURITY OF F-16 TECHNOLOGY.
THE AIR FORCE WOULD LOSE FACE WERE THE STANDARD EQUIPMENT
DENIED.. HIS INSISTENCE HAD PERSUADED PRESIDENT ZIA TO
AGREE TO SEEK THE F-16 SEVERAL YEARS AGO DESPITE THE
FACT THAT SOUR US-PAK RELATIONS AT THAT TIME SEEMED TO
INDICATE THAT PURCHASE WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. EVEN NOW
THE POWERFUL FRENCH LOBBY IS SAYING THAT THE DEAL WAS A
MISTAKE AND THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD PURCHASE THE MIRAGE 2000,
WHICH IS MORE EXPENSIVE AND LESS CAPABLE. THAN THE F-16.
5. SHAMIM SAID THAT THERE CONTINUE TO BE SOVIET/AFGHAN
INCURSIONS INTO PAKISTAN'S AIRSPACE. ONE HAD OCCURRED
AS RECENTLY AS NOVEMBER 1 WHEN AN AFGHAN AIRCRAFT HAD
PENETRATED NINE MILES INTO PAKISTAN. THERE HAD BEEN 91
SO FAR THIS YEAR. PAKISTAN DOES NOT PRESENTLY HAVE THE'
EQUIPMENT TO REACT. IT WOULD MEAN SENDING F-16'S--I.E.,
WIG-19'S--AGAINST MIG 21'S AND MIG 23'S. IN ADDITION,
THE SOVIETS USUALLY HAD AN "AWACS" TYPE AIRCRAFT SOME 50
MILES WITHIN AFGHANISTAN DIRECTING THE MIG-21'S AND 23'S
AND .GUNSHIP HELD'S (HIND) USED. IN THESE OPERATIONS.
6. SHAMIM OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUS IN
AFGHANISTAN AND THAT THEY ARE PURSUING A LONG RANGE PRO-
GRAM. THEY STARTED MANY YEARS AGO., BEGINNING, FOR EXAMPLE,
TO PENETRATE THE AFGHAN ARMED FORCES AND GOVERNMENT:
THEY ARE NOT WORRIED ABOUT MANPOWER LOSSES. THEY HAD,
HE OBSERVED, LOST SOME 20 MILLION DURING WORLD WAR II..
7. SMAMIM INDICATED THAT PAKISTAN NEEDS AN AIRBORNE.
ELECTRONICS AND RADAR CAPABILITY SINCE THE WESTERN PART
OF AFGHANISTAN IS HILLY AND THEREFORE GROUND BASED RADAR
AND ELECTRONICS IS NOT COMPLETELY EFFECTIVE. HE ALSO INDI-
CATED THAT THE GOP WOULD CONSIDER PURCHASING A SQUADRON
OF A-10'S IF THE BUDGET ALLOWED AND IF THE USAF PURSUES
THE A-10 AWF/LANTRIN CONCEPT. SPIERS
ENO OF MESSAGE SECRET
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