NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 17, 1974
• Content Type: MIN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
WORKING GROUP
Minutes of the Tenth Meeting
1030 Hours, 20 November 1974
White House Situation Room
Chairman: LtGen Samuel V. Wilson, D/DCI/IC
Members present: Mr. Leslie H. Brown, Dept. of State
(representing Mr. George S. Vest,
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs)
Mr. Robert F. Ellsworth, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (International
Security Affairs)
Mr. William N. Morell, Special
Assistant to the Secretary on National
Security, Department of the Treasury
RAdm Robert P. Hilton (representing
LtGen John H. Elder, J-5 [Plans and
Policy], JCS)
Mr. Richard Ober, NSC Staff, Executive
Secretary of the NSCIC
Others present: VAdm Earl F. Rectanus, with Mr.. Ellsworth
Ca t. Gerald W. Dyer, with RAdm Hilton
25X1A9a Executive Secretary
Agenda Item 1: Approval of Minutes of the 30 October Meeting
1. The draft minutes were approved after amendments by Mr.
Morell to the second and fourth paragraphs of Agenda Item 2, and by
Mr. Ober to the third paragraph of the same item (the corrected minutes
will be disseminated).
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New Item: General Wilson's Trip to Moscow and Belgrade
2. General Wilson briefly described highlights of his recent
trip to Europe. Principal focus was on his discussions with foreign
attaches in Moscow and with Yugoslav officials, who spoke with him
concerning the expected post-Tito situation.
Agenda Item 2: Critique of Intelligence Responsiveness to Consumer
Nees'
~---
3. General Wilson referred to Admiral Hilton's letter requesting
the Working Group be briefed on organization, capabilities and present
activities of the Intelligence Community. The chairman said such brief-
ings might well be provided later, but he would like to proceed with the
scheduled critique.
4. Mr. Ellsworth began by noting intelligence consumers often
have difficulty finding out who to ask to respond to their intelligence.
needs, and he thought there would be merit in the Intelligence Community
taking the initiative with briefings or, preferably, a handbook for con-
sumers on the allocation of production responsibilities, status of
capabilities, etc.
5. General Wilson thought this was a good idea. Mr. Brown
said the Community has the capacity to do this. Mr. Morell noted
that his office has two roles--it works with policy levels and it is the
Treasury contact with the Intelligence Community. Any policy shop
which cannot get the answer it wants comes directly to him. General
Wilson noted the explicit nature of Mr. Ellsworth's suggestion, and.
said this was an action which could be moved on right away.
6. Mr. Ellsworth then said that consumers are uneasy about
receiving "unqualified conclusions" from the Community. He thought
it would be helpful if the Community were more fulsome concerning the
qualifications and limitations which applied to particular judgments.
He felt the consumer should know what the parameters of the uncertainties
are.
7. He cited the "15, 000 Warsaw Pact tanks" as an example, stressing
that it is important for MBFR negotiations to know what confidence factor
applies to that figure.
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8. Mr. Ober said the NSC staff members criticized both current
intelligence and estimates on this same point. They want more evaluation.
They also need a means of judging the validity of one item as against
another on the same subject. He felt consumers also needed to know
more about collection capabilities. Consumers tend to feel the Community
can collect anything it wants, and lack of reporting may convey the im-
pression nothing is happening when it may be that no collection capability
exists.
9. Mr. Morell noted that in the National Intelligence Daily, it was
not possible to tell whether the evaulations were being made by CIA or by
the reporting embassy.
10. General Wilson said a more explicit qualification of uncertainties
seemed needed and that this subject would be taken up with the Intelligence
Panel.
11. Mr. Ellsworth said that consumers lack a means of providing
feedback to the Community on its products. He felt this was in part a
problem for the consumers, but he thought the Community could be "more
invitational"' for guiaanc'e on its future effort
ts. He had been told there
were repeated instances of lack of response to consumer feedback.
12. Mr. Brown said he thought the Community needs and would
welcome consumer feedback. General Wilson said this .problem, was one
13. General Wilson said that development of a simple, regular
feedback system may well be a task for his Intelligence Community
Staff.
for periodic feedback.
theIntellig,ence Panel could examine. Mr. Morell said that both the
DDO/ CIA and the SIGINT organizations were asking for evaluation of
their support. He considered there was need for a systematic process
14. Admiral Hilton noted the KIQ system started with something
like this, but he understood it had been dropped from the KIQ-75
program. General Wilson said the KIQ-74 program only evaluated 11
KIQs, but he and Admiral Hilton agreed feedback was important in the
KIQ effort.
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15. Mr. Ober said that feedback-was a...func_ti f the N C
The NIOs maintain consumer contact on a day-to-day basis, but longer
range critiques should be the NSCIC role and the Working Group should
work out how this can be done. He felt serious consideration should be
given to having the next set of KIQs prepared by consumers under aegis
of the Working Group.
16. General Wilson said he was inclined to agree but emphasized
that the statements of consumer needs would have to be translated by
the Community into intelligence requirements.
17. Mr. Ober said his canvass of the NSC staff had indicated a
"uniformly positive" reaction to participating in the drafting of KIQs.
18. General Wilson asked Admiral Hilton if the Joint Staff would
be willing to participate and the Admiral said he thought J-3, J-4, and
-5 could provide good inputs if the JCS agreed to participate. He saw
.UTA as both a producer, and, as J-2, a consumer.
19. Mr. Ellsworth said his deputies would be glad to participate.
20. Mr. Brown agreed generally, but he felt the KIQs were a
catalog and much of the information already was available. He was
concerned about the "disconnect" between what is asked for and what
is received, and thought there was a need to critique what is actually
provided to consumers. He cited the recent estimate on nuclear
proliferation as good but incomplete, and he noted a disconnect between
the estimate and current intelligence. He didn't think it would be appro-
priate for the Working Group to spend all its time "refining menus. "
21. Mr. Ober said the ICIQs might not be the best or only mechanism,, and
suggested a aver be prepared on how consumers are to proyi,de, guidance
fQr a document would be needed to get consideration of the problem.
beyond
22. Mr. Brown raised the question as to whether post mortems
should be done on NIEs, a task he felt consumers could do. Mr.
Ellsworth agreed and asked why it would not be possible before an NIE
written have o gg99 help ~f_t.V. -___ - ..:...... reference.
Mr. Ober agreed with both suestions_... draft the terms of refe?w
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23. Admiral Rectanus said the mechanism to do this now exists
since the DCI puts out proposed terms of reference which the intelli-
gence chief in each department can clear with his consumers to ensure
it meets their needs. Mr. Morell said this was done in Treasury, but
it is often difficult to get users to focus on an NIE or NIAM that won't
be issued until two or more months later. He noted that he gets "static"
from some NIOs when he raises economic matters on what the NIO
considers to be a political estimate, and his problem is to get the NIOs
to see that economic evaluations often govern political actions.
24. General Wilson asked if the members saw schedules of upcoming
sates, and Mr. Ober said these are no longer circulated. He said
he . has received complaints that a particular estimate is being worked
on when it is another that is more urgently needed.
25. General Wilson said this is a problem the Working Group could
examine.
26. Admiral Rectanus thought it should be easy for the NIOs to
inquire of their users what is wanted, and that the DCI "should know
what the President wants. "
27. Admiral Hilton noted there used to be a formal document,
including estimates to he prepared in the future, and he wondered if
it still existed. Mr. Brown said it had been a useful document, but
he hadn't seen it in a year.
28. General Wilson said he would check on this and report back.
29. Mr. Morell asked why the NSC was not represented on the USIB,
and Mr. Ober said this was under consideration.
30. Mr. Ellsworth wondered if it would be out of the question to
allow key consumers to review the penultimate drafts of important
estimates. Admiral Rectanus said this was done in the Navy. Admiral
Hilton and General Wilson both said DIA used to do this with the Joint
Staff. Admiral Rectanus noted that these reviews had not really involved
the OSD hierarchy, and work could be done on this.
31. Continuing his comments, Mr. Ellsworth noted that the Intelli-
gence Community seemed reluctant to release information before it was
..............
in final coordinated form and some reports thereby lost their timeliness.
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He considered a timely rough draft is better than a too-late final
paper. He also noted that there seemed to be a Community attitude
that only Si! TK cleared personnel had a "need to know" and although
others finally get a sanitized version, timeliness is lost in providing
the latter product.
32. Mr. Morell said the SI/TK classification of the current
intelligence dailies poses problems since the reports cannot be left
in a user's office. It was his view that a Top Secret version wouldn't
lose much information and would have greater usefulness.
33. Admiral Hilton said that the results of the TK sanitization
effort are more evident outside than within Washington, and he would
like to see the information disseminated in a classification which
workers can use.
34. Mr. Ellsworth said that some users consider the Intelligence
Community has an attitude that the consumer is an irritant, and there
is a need for this to change to an attitude that the consumer is usually
right.
35. General Wilson said a "market arrangement" wasn't possible
under present budget procedures, but if the consumer had to pay for
his intelligence, and would only pay for what he really wanted, there
would be no problem of Community attention.
36. Mr. Ellsworth emphasized that the Secretary of Defense is
pa-rticularly interested in qualitative aspects of the Soviet force
tructure, and on a recent trip to Europe the Secretary had not _wi.th
some surprise that intelligence collectors were not aware of his interest.
37. Mr. Ellsworth said the Secretary is interested. in:
a. more and better comparative defense expenditure
information;
b. an examination as to whether the USSR is more efficient
than the US in manufacturing tanks, guns, ships, etc.;
c. more data on relative defense costs (at this point,
Mr. Morell noted that CIA is putting a tremendous effort on
this at the expense of other economic intelligence and he
wondered whether CIA might use external contractual research
on this problem);
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d. the political impact of the existing strategic balance
on both US allies and adversaries;
e. a better evaluation of how Soviet leadership performs;
f. a better evaluation of the resources devoted to Soviet
strategic programs;
g. a more sophisticated evaluation of the relative
effectiveness of forces (Soviet/US, Warsaw Pact/NATO);
h. a better analysis of the impact of logistics on Soviet
capabilities; and
i. a better analysis of the capabilities of Soviet forces to
execute limited objective operations (as in the Persian Gulf).
38. Admiral Hilton asked if DIA was aware of these points, and
Mr. Ellsworth said yes.
39. General Wilson called on Mr. Brown, who said State's major
interest is to examine the current intelligence output and provide
feedback to t, !Commun ty. He...wQuld like to see the Working Group
put emphasis on this,k%.nd of evaluation rather than on requirements_,or
p r
n resonse, Mr. Ober said that if' the customer is to critique
the product, he must accept responsibility for indicating what he wants
collected and produced.
40. General Wilson noted that Dr. Proctor and others on the
Intelligence Panel had expressed an interest in listening to the critique
from. Working Group members, and that he regretted the Panel members
were not present.
41. The chairman then called on Mr. Ober, who reported most of his
basic proposals already had been covered in the discussion. The next
need was to decide on the mechanics of translating the comments of the
Group members into a programs In his view, the matters on which emphasis
had been put were gui d ngg _ C1 I aJ and evaluation , the current. ntg 1 i r ence
He noted there was a
da11i..e , estimates, at~clu issem.natii on_pro .lems.
criticism of three current dailies rather than one, and he thought the
Group could develop specific recommendations on this. He wondered whether
there was not something better than the present daily pattern of current
intelligence reporting. The need is to define the tasks-of the Working
Group.
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42. General Wilson agreed with the thrust of these comments and
added that the value of what the: Group does will depend on what takes
place in organizations. He wanted to make certain that each task the
Group undertakes is clearly defined and focused to the point that one
of the members could agree to handle it. In some cases, he expected
the Intelligence Panel would be given the task and charged to report
back to the Working Group.
43. Mr. Ober said that a study of the NIB is already underway
and when completed it should be presented to the Working Group. He
said he sometimes felt that the Community changes its reporting system
laterally, and since this affects the consumer, the user should have a
25X1A9a voice in the change,,
44. General Wilson reported that the Intelligence Community
taff is examining current intelligence products. A review was made
,p t of October output, the reviewing system tightened, and review is now
being made of November publications. He__ i h resulting report
cguld~ventu.ally be provided to the Working Group.
45. Mr. Ober said a sub group, s.b p look at the NIEs pd T(~
Mr. Brown said this was what he had in mind., since the NIEs are
fundamental to State.
46. Admiral Hilton considered this kind of an approach might
well bog the Working Group down, particularly since over a short
term it is impossible to determine how accurate some estimates are.
He felt the Group should examine the minutes carefully before deciding
what to undertake as projects.
47. General Wilson said the discussion was bringing the Group
toward consideration of its work program. He was inclined to favor
the use of sub-groups, but he felt care should be taken to define pre-
cisely what was to be done, what the end product should be, and who
could do it best.
ufli-
48. Mr. Ober agreed with the need for firm and specific proposals,
but he hoped the Group would not get involved in detailed analyses.
49. Amz.r _d_- al Hi~ton said a good first step would _ ..,. !e__ .a .....briefing on
the estimative process. Mr. Brawn ad.dedthat this should cover the
NIOs in particular. General Wilson agreed such a briefing would be
provided.
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50. Mr. Morell said he was concerned with both product and
ingredients, at which Admiral Hilton again said he didn't consider
the Group should get involved in evaluating the accuracy of particular
estimates. Mr. Ober said the Group should stimulate and organize
the critiques. Mr. Morell noted there are many products, and he
wondered why each member of the Group couldn't select the products
which are most important to him, develop a critique, and circulate
it to the other members. He considered it would be valuable to then
combine all these comments into one report.
51.. Admiral Hilton noted there is a tendency to force analysis to
lead to a conclusion and this may not always be justified; consumers
may be pushing for answers on questions for which there is no answer.
52. He considers not enough attention is being paid to Soviet
deception and disinformation activities. The Joint Staff is particularly
inte-Fe-s- 'red 1n crxsxs management and considers there should be a better
intelligence plug-in at the WSAG. He noted that DIA supports the JCS
chairman but there is need for better intelligence support overall.
53. Mr. Ober noted that separate reports by CIA and DIA in crisis
situations cause problems. General Wilson said that work was being
done on this, and he described the arrangements underway for the DCI
to use General Faurer, DDI/DIA, and the NMIC, augmented from other
parts of the Community, on strategic warning.
54.. Mr. Morell said he had several additional points and General
Wilson asked these be provided to him for distribution to the Group.
55. To prevent the Working Group from. "walking over the same
ground" the PFIAB has, Mr. Morell wondered if the Group could be
provided copies of PFIAB critiques of the Community. General Wilson
said these were privileged papers for the President, but he would check
into it.
56. Mr. Morell noted there is debate within the Community as to
the extent to which intelligence officers should look at policy options,
and he felt that comments by the Group could "push" the Community
into this arena.
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57. Mr. Ober said there would be a negative response to this at,
the NSC staff, where the feeling is that intelligence consumers are
responsible for the policy options. What he considered is wanted are
longer-range projections of the consequences of alternative political
-and economic developments abroad.
25X1X . Mr. Morell said that PFIAB had raised the
25X1X4^
and he felt that part of this problem arose because
people outside the Intelligence Community don't understand how clan-
destine operations function, and don't appreciate the incremental risk
factors.
59. He said that the present biographic intelligence is not as useful
as it could be. More attention needs to be given to a foreign official's
policy positions, his basic philosophy, and how long he is likely to be
around, rather than to how many children he has..
60., Mr. Morell said the Intelligence Community could make better
use of the desk-level officials in State and the policy-level Treasury
officials. They are doing intelligence work even though it is not called
intelligence, and there is need for more consultation and interchange.
61. He commented that problems are caused by delays in input of
data from the field because the field wants to submit a completed analysis..
He cited the foreign reaction to Secretary Simon's recent speech dealing
with the proposed $25 billion recycling facility,- as an example, and said
that Treasury still had not heard from the FBIS on this. Treasury Under
Secretary had rreported from Europe by telephone, however.
62. Mr. Brown said that Dr. Kissinger has been pushing hard on
the ambassadors to provide more analytic reporting, and he gets upset
at straight factual reporting.
63.. Mr. Morell said Treasury's problem is two-fold: It needs to
know what is going on as it happens, and it needs an interpretation.
64.: The chairman called on Admiral Rectanus, who said his
perception and views had been reflected in Mr. Ellsworth's comr-aents_
He noted that the support for OSD is the problem of the Director, DIA.
If,.he can't do it, due to circumstances beyond his contro]_ and!
authority, then it becomes a Community problem.
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65. General Wilson said today'_s comments would be reviewed to 1-1 identify follow-on actions:and a memorandum would be prepared. He
hoped to be able to use memoranda to move the program along without
calling meetings too frequently. He said he would welcome inputs from
the members as to future agenda items and comments as to how to
proceed from today's discussion.
66. Admiral Hilton asked if there would be a NSCIC meeting in
December, and General Wilson said none was yet scheduled since much
would depend on what the Working Group proposed.
67, Admiral Hilton's closing comment was that he would like to
see numerical probabilities used in estimates.
68.. The meeting adjourned at 1215 hours.
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Distribution:
1 - each addressee
1 - IC Registry
1 - CS Subject
1 - chrono
1 - D/DCI/IC
25X1A9a
DCI/IC/CS /h# 25 Nov 74
Corrections made as of 17 Dec 74/km
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