Comments on NSCIC Working Group Study of Intelligence Crisis Support

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100040092-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 92
• Publication Date: June 18, 1973
• Content Type: MF

{ 3.' f 73- -941
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OCI/IC 73--0551
1s JUN 1973
13E '9ORA DUM FOR: Chairman, !`iSSCIC
SUBJECT: Comments on 1SCIC Working Group
Study of Intelligence Crisis Support
1. The Working Group has done an excellent job in identifying
the principal problems emerging from the three case studies, and in
emphasizing communication as the most important of these. "oreover,
the mechanisms it suggests seem to me to he useful and workable.
2. I anticipate no problems in implementing Actions I and I I
by designating liaison representatives to NSC organizations and the
NSC staff and by making memb?rs of my own staff responsible for
overseeing the process of intelligence support. I am now In the
process of organizing my staff and in doing so will include provision
to handle what is proposed in Actions I and H.
3. The effectiveness of a liaison officer in communicating
the needs of policymakers for intelligence will depend in considerable
measure on his access to the basic concerns and actions of the
policymakers. Thus, I would hope that the policymakars could
permit intelligence liaison officers access even to sensitive matters
so that intelligence support could be tailored to the need.
4. 1 fully endorse Action III, 'iic`i calls for r, riodic
issuance of community-wide summaries of the situation in crisis
periods. This fits in with rmy plans for overall improvement of
current/crisis situation reporting and clear identification of
conflicting viewpoints without degrading the timeliness of the
reporting.
EX r4P XP'?.'; G~Y`f 'i, J ^LtS ig1~,liioY
SCH'ECULF. ' i -GOSY:
AJiG:;3.'_. (;4
(unless ' ossible, Xrt date or event)
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5. The response to Action IV will require that analytic and
estimative production be increased rather than sacrificed in crisis
periods to current reporting. I agree that estimates have been
neglected in past crises. The new criteria I have established
for the production of National Intelligence Estimates will make
that product more useful and available in crisis periods. Improving
communication of policy requirements, through our liaison arrange-
ments, will also contribute to better analytical products.
6. Action V calls for a post-mortem in depth as soon as
possible after each crisis. This requires maintenance of records
during the heat of the action, which is a function of good
management. Those in charge must understand the need for record-
keeping and enforce a record-keeping SOP on their officers. As soon
as the crisis is over, the liaison and/or monitoring officer will be
charged with interviewing the parties involved, reviewing the records
and preparing the post-mortem.
7. By the time of the next NSCIC meeting, I expect to be
prepared to brief the committee in more detail on my responses
to Actions I through V.
cc: each member, NSCIC
/s/ .Vernon A. Wafters
9'James R. Schlesinger
Director of Central Intelligence
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~CI/IC/PRG vdm 14 June 1973
Retyped for15 June 1973
Distribution:
orig - addressee
1 - Attorney General, Deputy Sec/State, Deputy Sec/Defense, Chairman, JCS
1 - ER
PRG subject (file NSCIC WG Project 1-73)
1 - D/DCI/IC
25X1A94i _hrono
1 c rono
15 June 73: first page retyped for changes by Mr. Colby: vdm
I-1Ju~
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