Items for NSCIC Working Groupg

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050022-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 11, 1972
• Content Type: MF

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
11 January 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bronson Tweedy
Chairman, NSCIC Working Group
SUBJECT: Items for NSCIC Working Group
Pursuant to our 13 December meeting, the following is submitted
for consideration by the NSCIC Working Group in preparing a suggested
work program for. the NSCIC. Our items are presented under two broad
headings: (1) basic tasks of the NSCIC and (2) specific problems
for priority attention. Supporting annexes provide additional
discussion.
BASIC TASKS OF NSCIC
We. suggest that one of the first jobs of the Working Group
should be to consider the kinds of basic tasks that might be proposed
to the NSCIC and the kinds of data the committee will need in order
to address itself to the. most important issues and to prepare guidance
for the intelligence community.
It seems to us that the NSCIC can most usefully serve as a kind
of high court of review where the intelligence community can get a
realistic reading of the needs of the policy makers and users of
intelligence. In order to function-in this capacity, NSCIC will need
to have at hand the kinds of data which will enable it to consider
issues in the context of the usefulness of the intelligence effort
as a whole and deal with fundamental choices in priority of emphasis
affecting specific intelligence programs, projects and activities.
We propose, therefore, that the Working Group suggest to the NSCIC
a set of basic types of information and problems which it should
review as groundwork for preparing guidance. It seems to us, for
example, the NSCIC will need in due time to review the following in
support of its basic tasks:
1. Findings resulting from the DCI's reviews of the needs
and'performance of the intelligence community, particularly proposals
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for changes in deployment of resources suggested by the Intelligence
Resources Advisory Committee.
2. The intelligence-objectives, requirements and priorities
established for the entire collection program by the DCI in consultation
with the United States Intelligence Board. (As a contribution to an
understanding of the requirements process currently in use, appended
at Annex A is a,description of State Department procedures.)
3. The. consolidated intelligence program budget prepared by
the DCI.
4. The product evaluations and net assessments prepared by the
Net Assessments Group with the assistance of the agencies represented
on the NSCIC.
5. Special issues of consequence involving differences of 'view
between intelligence agencies about areas in which collection and
analysis appear prima _ facie to be inadequate, redundant or needlessly
overlapping in the IghVci'national policy interests.
Consistent with the discussion in the first meeting of NSCIC,
we also anticipate that the committee will receive a presentation on
the major findings of a recent Department of Defense study of tactical
intelligence.
SPECIFIC PROBLEMS FOR PRIORITY ATTENTION
Beyond this basic work program, NSCIC could profitably, in the
view of the Department of State, sponsor studies of specific current
problems of some magnitude affecting the capability of the intelligence
community to satisfy real needs in the foreign policy and national
security field.
a. In a number of cases we have found that in inter-
national crises in third-world areas (e.g., Near East,
South Asia), State': needs for intelligence to support
critical diplomatic activity run ahead of our resources,
or at least of the capability to focus resources on
specific areas. The Egyptian missile-crisis of 1970
Is a case in point. We feel strongly the need for
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improved flexible intelligence capabilities for quick.
reaction crisis response. This includes particularly
the need for a quick-response photographic satellite
system to support pre-crisis diplomacy and crisis
management, as well as quick-response signals-intercept
facilities for local deployment. We believe that
consideration of this subject should be at the top of
NSCIC's priorities. (See Annex B for additional
discussion and recommendation.)
b. We recognize that one important objective of the
reorganization is to cut down on unnecessary or
duplicative efforts. The USIB community has already
undertaken studies of prioritization of intelligence
objectives by country and we at State are reviewing
our own requirements for information. 'A broad
conceptualization of intelligence objectives and
requirements provides a useful standard against which
.to measure the performance of major intelligence
programs. On the other hand, the experience of the
India-Pakistan war is a fresh reminder of the pitfalls
of simply trying to, forecast needs on the basis of
present expectations. We believe that a systematic
study of ways in which certain intelligence capabilities
could be placed on stand-by and quickly restored or
augmented to respond to a crisis would enable us more
rationally to go about cutting back existing efforts
without destroying recovery capability. In this
context, the State Department is prepared to draft
a list of countries, areas, or topics which -- for
a foreseeable period ahead -- warrant very little
active attention by intelligence collectors and could
be placed on "stand-by" or reduced activity status
until further notice if some risk of surprise can
be accepted. We believe key decisions on such matters
should be reviewed at the national level. (Annex C
provides a draft illustration of a source-oriented
analysis of requirements which can serve as a basis
for selective increases, selective decreases, and
stand-by capabilities.)
c. We think it would be very useful to make a national
policy level determination on the feasibility and
wisdom of making more use of the intelligence capabilities
and products' of foreign governments in selected cases
and areas. We suggest that In the first instance there
be a careful compilation of significant intelligence data
already being made available by foreign countries, together
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with an assessment of potential further use (taking
account of advantages and disadvantages). In this
process, of course, it will be desirable to consider
cases where divergence of national interests can
cause significant changes in intelligence relationships
and reduce the contributions which foreign countries
make to US intelligence requirements.
d.. The NSCIC should ensure that there is a continuing
study of the extent to which advanced systems of
intelligence collection can substitute for collection
by other means, and whether such systems appear to be
cost-effective in comparison with existing alternatives.
e. We think it might be illuminating to the study of
resource allocation if serious attention could be given
to analyzing data on overt, intelligence-related functions
of the Department of State (e.g., Embassy political and
.economic reporting, communications, and automatic data
processing) which have not traditionally been viewed as
elements of the intelligence process or budget. While
these are operationally dedicated foreign policy assets,
they directly support the intelligence process and are
indispensable to it. Perhaps a cost-performance analysis
of this overt collection and evaluation activity would
provide some basis for measuring the relative contribution
of other classical "intelligence" programs.
f. Examination of the allocation of effort in various
parts of the government to the collection, and particularly
to the analysis, of. economic intelligence on the "free
world" (as distinct from communist areas) might improve,
the production of tirade and investment oriented reports
available to the economic and commercial staffs in our
Embassies and to private American business interests
abroad.
g. We believe also that the business of defining major
critical intelligence needs of the future could be assisted
by informed efforts to make projections of alternative
world environments of the future -- say for the next
five years. The process of preparing such projections'
would involve a close interaction between intelligence
officers and policy makers -- a process which in itself
should help to stimulate and sharpen the expression'of
end-user needs for intelligence. Against the alternative
projections we could measure in broad terms our existing
intelligence capabilities and our potential intelligence
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options for the future, consider possible shifts of
emphasis, and better prepare for contingency intelligence
resources and deployment.
h. Perhaps as a part of improved projections of world,
environments, special consideration should be given to
the impact of policy and political trends on the
deployment of intelligence resources overseas. We'need
to bring into closer relationship all of the factors
which affect the size and distribution of our intelligence
activities in foreign countries -- budgetary constraints,
balance of payments, existing or potential political
considerations, and technological developments. The
NSCIC Working Group might propose that the NSCIC take
the lead in sponsoring a new and far-reaching look at
our total world-wide intelligence base structure,
identifying more clearly what our priorities are, and
trying to come up with orderly and phased adjustments
in the overseas profile that would be more compatible
with our policy imperatives, technical trends, and the
.intelligence needs we see ahead of us. (See Annex D
for a suggested method of proceeding with a NSCIC study
of this subject.)
i. In connection with anticipated NSCIC consideration
of product evaluation and product improvement, it may be
.desirable to seek NSCIC authorization for the Working Group
itself to. launch a series of specific evaluation projects.
We do not'propose that the NSCIC Working Group consider at
this time a comprehensive across-the-board approach to
product evaluation. It seems to us that the evaluation
methods need to be-specially tailored to the kinds of
products being evaluated in particular cases, to the
types of production involved, and to the specific end
uses served. Specific projects might include, for example:
(1) An analysis of the relationship of intelligence
to NSSMs, particularly with respect to critical
intelligence. gaps exposed by the NSSM experience.
and ways in which intelligence can be made more
responsive to the needs of policy makers in the
NSSM process.
`2) An evaluation of intelligence products before,
during and since the- recent Indo-Pakistani War,
giving special attention to (a) lessons for
intelligence contingency planning and the need for
better stand-by capabilities; and (b) the intelligence
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posture which should be planned for the future against
South Asia.
(3) An evaluation of the quality and scope of
intelligence production in response to the greater
significance of financial, commercial and economic
factors in,the international environment.
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