CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC WARNING MECHANISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050055-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: March 6, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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JIEL1 6 March 1975
CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC WARNING MECHANISM (S)
1. (S) Over the many years of its existence the Watch Committee and its
staff, the National Indications Center, had come in for a certain amount
of criticism in studies examining various facets of the strategic warning
mechanism but had never really changed its way of doing business. The
most recent round of critical reports might be said to have started in
late 1972 with a study commissioned by Dr. Hall on the interface between
large W and small w warning. This was eventually reacted to by the CIA
in 1974 with a report also critical of the Watch Committee mechanism.
That report said there had been a need perceived within and without the
intelligence community to revamp the USIB watch mechanism. The basic
conclusions of intelligence officers who participated in recent years in
the activities of the Watch Committee were that there should be:
a. A USIB community watch mechanism to continue to serve as a disci-
pline to prod existing community offices in their handling of the priority
objective on intelligence concerning possible enemy attack.
b. A revitalization of the USIB Community's watch machinery to enable
it to operate efficiently.
c. An updating and narrowing of` the priorities of the watch structure
to concentrate on the more direct threats to the US especially from the
USSR and China.
d. A new, central location for the staff where it could be near the
analytic support and communications that it must share.
e. An oversight group to monitor the work of the staff to ensure that
it performed its functions satisfactorily.
2. (S) This report led the head of the IC Staff, at that time General
Graham, to appoint an ad hoc interagency group to produce some recommen-
dations.on the matter. This group, under chairman, met
several times to come up with some agreed recommen at ions. General
Wilson who replaced General took this matter as a top priority.
The interagency group worked out a revised DCID 1/5 on the new structure
which was then sent to the USIB principals. They made some further changes
and agreement was finally reached on. 18 February of this year.
3. (S) On 3 March 1975 the new structure came into being. A new position,
that of Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for
Strategic Warning was created along with a Strategic Warning Staff. Major
General Deputy Director for Intelligence, DIA, was named
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the Special Assistant. Strategic warning was defined as the earliest
possible warning that the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, the PRC, or
North Korea is considering military action by its armed forces beyond
its borders, or is employing its military capabilities beyond borders
in ways that might threaten military confrontation with the U.S.
4. (S) The functions of the Special Assistant and the Strategic Warning
Staff are:
a. To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence
from all sources which might provide strategic warning.
b. When the situation warrants it, to issue strategic warning notices
to the DCI, who will notify the President and National Security Council or
take such other action as he deems necessary. The DCI will also transmit
the strategic warning notices to the USIB principals for further dissemi-
nation within their departments and agencies. When time is of the essence,
the Special Assistant may issue such notices directly to the President and
NSC with concurrent dissemination to the DCI and USIB principals.
c. To issue such other reports on the status of strategic warning as
the Special Assistant may direct.
d. To conduct studies and analyses with a view to improving the
capabilities of the Intelligence Community to provide strategic warning
and with due consideration for related work being done elsewhere in the
Community.
e. To arrange with appropriate departments and agencies of the
Government for the prompt forwarding to the Strategic Warning Staff of
all the information it needs to carry out its mission.
5. (S) The responsibilities of the USIB departments and agencies are:
a. To provide full-time, senior professional intelligence personnel
to the Strategic Warning Staff and other support as arranged by the
Special Assistant.
b. To provide to the Strategic Warning Staff on a timely basis all
information from every domestic and foreign source pertinent to the
strategic warning mission, as is prescribed in NSAM 226.
6. (S) The DIA is providing the facilities for the Strategic Warning
Staff, including communications, data processing, logistic and adminis-
trative support.
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7. (S) The Strategic Warning Staff is directed by a 25X1A9
CIA officer appointed by the DCI. He is directly responsible to General
end serves as his deputy for Strategic Warning. The staff is
collocated with the National Military Intelligence Center and consists
of intelligence officers assigned from appropriate elements of the
community.
8. (S) The Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, General
Wilson, is responsible for forming a USIB working group to review the
functioning of the strategic warning process.
9. (S) The T/0 for the staff calls for ten analysts, two each from CIA,
DIA and NSA and one each from Army, Navy, Air and State. In addition to
the strategic warning notices, the staff plans to produce a monthly report
for the DCI. on developments in the warning field which will also be
disseminated to previous recipients of the watch report. The staff will
solicit contributions from the community while reserving the right to put
forward its own interpretation or syntheses. There will be an informal
coordinating process to surface any major disagreements and these will
of course be noted. In this way, the least common denominator approach,
which evoked so much criticism in the past, will be avoided.
10. (S) The staff will also prepare information reports for the DCI from
time to time when it thinks it can add a little more depth or perspective
to the current reporting on matters of strategic warning interest. Finally
the staff hopes to do some digging on some of the key indicators and publish
the findings as research reports.
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