'SMALL-W ' WARNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050056-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: March 4, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050056-9
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Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050056-9
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4 March 1975
"SMALL-w" WARNING
1. Ever since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, there has
been widespread recognition within the U. S. Government of the need
for mechanisms and procedures to warn the policy-maker of the
imminence of military attack against the U. S. or U. S. forces
overseas. This type of warning is called strategic warning, and
the problem of providing such. warning is referred to colloquially
in the intelligence community as the "Big-W" warning problem. =,<
2. Less clear-cut conceptually, and for that reason more
difficult to come to grips with, has been the so-called "small-w"
problem, i. e. , the need to warn the policy-maker of a wide variety
of critical developments--military, technological, political, and
economic--which are less urgent than the threat of military attack
against the U. S. but which, nevertheless, deserve his focused
attention. Examples of such developments in the recent past are
the Greek coup against Makar:ios in July 1974 and the subsequent
Turkish invasion of Cyprus, India's explosion of a nuclear device
in May 1974, OPEC's oil embargo and price increases in late 1973,
"From 1954 until 3 March 1975, this function was carried out by
the Watch Committee of USIB, which issued weekly reports assessing
the likelihood of military attack against the U. S. As of the latter
date, the Watch Committee was disestablished and the strategic
warning function assumed b a Special Assistant to the DCI for
Strategic Warning (Gen. assumed
a small Strategic Warning
Staff under his direction.
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and the Portuguese coup in April 1974. Until recently, forecasts
of such developments would appear (if at all) in one or another of
a wide variety of intelligence products, e. g. , the National Intelligence
Bulletin, a Defense Intelligence Notice, an Interagency Analytic
Memorandum, or a National Intelligence Estimate. Unfortunately,
however, even if the projected development was effectively forecast,
there was no assurance that the policy-maker actually read the
forecast. And even if he did read it, there was the risk that he
would overlook its significance. He was left largely to his own
devices to glean from the mass of finished intelligence products
constantly available to him which particular items deserved his
special attention. The intelligence producer, after the event, was
usually able to demonstrate that in one way or another he had forecast
the event. But ordinarily he assumed no responsibility to provide
specific warning of a particular event.
3. In order to fill this major gap in the community's warning
procedures, the DCI in September 1974 instituted the system of
issuing an Alert Memorandum (AM) when, in his view, the policy-
maker needed to be specially warned of an imminent development.
4. Procedures for AMs were developed by an Ad Hoc Committee
of USIB, chaired by the IC Staff. They were approved by USIB on
9 January 1975 (see attachment). They specify that AMs are to be
addressed to the members of WSAG and disseminated, inter alia, to
all USIB Principals. They assign to the NIOs primary responsibility
for the preparation of AMs and provide for the appropriate coordination
of AMs within the community. They provide also for the identification
in AMs of follow-up actions, such as the establishment of a crisis task
force or the initiation of special collection efforts.
'Over the years, the Watch Committee assumed a responsibility to
report on military-related developments in certain crisis areas such
as Vietnam and the Middle East. While this reporting went beyond
its strategic warning charter, it covered only a small proportion of
developments which fell within the "small-w" warning area.
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5. Seven Alert Memoranda have been issued to date, as follows:
27 Sept. 1974:
4 Oct. 1974:
17 Jan. 1975:
Possibility of Serious Civil Disturbances
or a Coup in Phnom Penh
Possibility of Radical Shift in Portuguese
Policies
Possibility of Inter-Communal Fighting
and of Further Turkish Intervention in
Cyprus
25 Jan. 1975: Possible Coup in Portugal
30 Jan. 1975: Possible Ramifications of Serious Hostilities
in Southern Lebanon
5 Feb. 1975: Possible Coup in Ethiopia
6. Reactions to these memoranda have been generally favorable.
There have been some complaints with respect to coordination and
dissemination, but these have been addressed by the NIOs and are
being remedied. While it is :important that this new system not be
overused and its impact diluted, it is equally important that it be
utilized whenever appropriate to alert senior NSC-level officials to
emerging situations which warrant their particular attention. In our
view, the NIOs have shown excellent discretion in the use of this
vehicle, and we believe it is already filling the procedural gap it
was intended to fill.
Attachment:
USIB-D-28. 5/8
3
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