Suggested Items for Discussion at the 20 November NSCIC Working Group Meeting - Consumer Satisfaction

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050070-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 70
• Content Type: MF

INTELLIGENCE
Approved F~Velease 2001/12/04 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050070-3
OF ICE OF -T H iH- ASSISTANT SHCREQTARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
OSD Declassification/Release Instructions on File
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA)
SUBJECT: Suggested Items for Discussion at the 20 November NSCIC
Working Group Meeting - Consumer Satisfaction
The 20 November meeting of the NSCIC Working Group has only
one substantive item on the agenda, a. continuation of the discussion started
at the last meeting on a critique of intelligence responsiveness to consumer
needs. The following are matters suggested for discussion.
The principal difficulties which the consumer has in satisfying his
intelligence needs generally fall into six areas: management, tasking,
uncertainty, evaluation, methodology, and availability. There is an addi-
tional problem in the handling of information support for crisis manage-
ment which has all of these difficulties compounded by the tithe urgency
.of the information requirements.
a. Management of Consumer Needs. The formal USIB et al
intelligence .requirements system provides such broad tasking that it has
essentially no impact on specific intelligence activities or resource
decisions. There are a vast number of consumer needs and these are
communicated to the intelligence community in a wide variety of formal
and informal ways, at all levels of the intelligence organization, or are
inferred by the community from current issues. The intelligence community
has difficulty in prioritizing these needs on a rational basis in order to use
its resources to best satisfy the most: important needs and to support the
priority, threat sensitive national security decisions.
b. Tasking. When the consumer wants an answer to a specific
question or wants to learn about a specific subject areas, he has great
difficulty in finding out how to go about it. This includes both finding out
what the intelligence community already knows (in both published and un-
published form), and in tasking the community to provide those needed
elements of information which it does not know. This is particularly true
Unclassif'iad Mh.enAttachtuent
Are Detached Approved For Release 200'1 r0 -RDP84B00506R000100050070-3
) Tf I ,I ; - r,
 Approved For Rel ep 2001/12/04: A scc, ~ B00506R000 p0050070-3
of the planner or analyst who is new to the job and has not yet made per-
sonal contacts in the intelligence community. Recognizing this need
DL,k/DC is developing a tutorial briefing on the capabilities and limita-
tions of the community to provide rapid response to intelligence questions.
This effort is directed toward intelligence support of crisis, and should
be expanded to cover longer term requirements. A short handbook from
which the consumer could obtain guidance on how to work with the intelli-
gence community would be useful. (see Tab B)
c. Uncertainty or Alternatives. The consumer of most intelli-
gence products dealing with complex subjects generally has an uneasy
feeling about many of the unqualified conclusions or estimates that are
often presented. He knows that we can't have high confidence in the answers
to some of his questions. He would like a synopsis of the intelligence - .
background and evidence or, if possible, a full scale development of them,
so that he can draw his own conclusions. Where this is not possible, either
because of the classification of the backup information involved, or because
of the effort required to produce the document setting forth the detailed
background information, a well. defined statement of the uncertainty is
needed to permit the consumer to understand the uncertainty. perceived
by the intelligence analyst who made the estimate.
d. Product Evaluation. There is a lack of responsiveness of
the intelligence community due to a failure of the community, in particular
the individual intelligence analyst, to receive sufficient critical feedback
from the consumer to properly guide his future efforts. The analyst often
never learns that some consumers believe his product to be unsatisfactory
and why. This lack of feedback is due to failures on both sides, failure
of the consumer to make any real effort to produce and formally forward
this feedback, and failure of the intelligence community to provide the
channels or procedures to facilitate the flow of and response to feedback.
In many cases, what appear to be established feedback channels turn out,
upon closer examination, to be merely ways in which the intelligence com-
munity judges itself. A handbook would help here, also. In addition, there
are many cases where the community has not responded to repeated con-
sumer suggestions.
e. Intelligence Analysis Methodology. In many cases, the intelli-
gence community is tasked to provide an assessment which requires not
only intelligence data but also sophisticated analysis in its production. An
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-_RDP84B00506R000100050070-3
 Approved For Rel~w 2001/12/04 : 181k:&U0,0506ROO~U0050070-3
example is a request for an estimate of the mobilization and reinforcement
capabilities of the Warsaw Pact ground forces, which requires complex
operations analysis. In many cases like this, some consumers are ass
skilled as,, or more skilled than, the intelligence community in the analysis,
and believe that the intelligence community has used an inferior metho-
dology or has otherwise improperly carried out the analysis. In any event,
disagreement over the analysis leaves. the consumer unsatisfied, and
further tends to influence the willingness of the intelligence community-
to provide the consumer with basic data (basic in the sense that it has.
not had operational analysis applied, yet finished in the sense that it has
had intelligence analysis applied). out of a fear that the consumer will
improperly (in the perception of the intelligence community) use the data
supplied. A similar situation occurs when policy analysis (derivation of
the enemy's intentions from the basic data) is required.
f. Access. For many. consumers, the largest problem area is
simply being able to get that information which already exists. All too
often the consumer is unable to obtain information that could be valuable
to him (either what is known or the fact that little is' known). Some of the
contributing factors are:
(1) The intelligence community's refusal to release infor-
mation which is not yet in final coordinated form. The community fails
to appreciate that the consumer must make decisions, and that rough draft
estimates are useful.
(2) The intelligence community's attitude that only those
with SI/TK clearances have a need to know. The community fails to appre-
ciate that most consumer staff people, who write most of the material that
decision makers use to make decisions, do not have those clearances. A
'.'good intention" to publish a sanitized report is of no help if it is not pub-
lished in timely fashion.
(3) A begrudging attitude on the part of many in the' intelli-
gence community - particularly widespread at the working level - that the
consumer is an irritant (this is the normal reaction of any support organi-
zation that refuses to recognize: that it is a support organization).
g. Warning and Crisis Management: Post facto analysis of
past crises show remarkable consistency in the serious shortcomings of
intelligence support. In retrospect, there always seems to have been
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050070-3
SECRET
 Approved For Rele: 2001 /12/04 4B00506R000p0050070-3
information which, if it had been analyzed, correlated, and presented to
high level decision makers in a timely manner, would have greatly improved
their understanding of the developing crisis, and possibly their ability to
control it. This resulted partially from the fact that past indications and
warning and current intelligence mechanisms and procedures emphasized
consideration and consensus which usually subordinated minority opinions.
Some of the problems have been recognized within the intelligence coin-
munity and several efforts are under way to provide greater technical
capability for information exchange and to develop procedures for high-
lighting dissenting and minority analysis and opinions.
It is uncertain how well the intelligence community will perform
in future crises.
Additional discussion of some of these topics is contained in the
attachments.
Very respectfully,
E. F. Rectanus
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Resources and Management)
Attachments
A. Tasking
B. Uncertainty
C. Product Evaluation
D. Intelligence Analysis Methodology
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: RPFP 506R000100050070-3