CRITIQUE OF INTELLIGENCE 'SHORTCOMINGS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100090005-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: PAPER

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CRITIQUE OF INTELLIGENCE "SHORTCOMINGS" I C~- '
TALKING PAPER
FOR OPENING THE DISCUSSION
As we discussed at our last meeting, the proncipal focus of our
discussion today is to be on a CRITIQUE OF INTELLIGENCE during which
we would identify shortcomings which could provide the basis for
development of an action program for the Working Group.
We probably will not get into a discussion of the working program
today, but at a minimum I would hope that out of our exchLnge of views
can be formulated a set of statements --perhaps 10 to 15 in number --
which represent our consensus as to intelligence deficiencies calling
for follow-on action, whether by this Group or by various elements of
the Intelligence Community.
What I am hoping for is a frank and candid discussion in which
each of you will participate actively so that we can have the benefit
both of your own views and of your interpretation of the views of the
senior level officials of the organizations which you represent.
The whole point of our exercise is to identify ways of making the
intllligence product of greater use to those for whom it is produced.
What we are after, if you will, is a post mortem list on what; is
wrong the the intelligence now being provided to those who could put
it to use.
Since this Working Group is essent' ll a representative of intelligence
consumers --other than myself -- I that you will feel
free to be completely forthcoming in your comments.
Mr. , would you like to open the discussion.
ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES ARE SEVERAL DIFFERENT IPPROcCHES WHICH MIGHT BE
USED BY THE CHAIRMAN IF THE DICSUSSION FALTERS. THE fRRANGEMENTT OF THE
APPROACHES IS NOT INTENDED TO SUGGEST .ANY RELATIVE PRIORITY.
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APPROACH ONE
. Some intelligence officers believe that the most vocal critics of
intelligence neither read nor are briefed on the available intelligence.
I recognize that what gets ti a senior official is usually determined
by an administrative assistant or an executive officer who screens all
incoming material, including intelligence.
Whether this screener knows anything about intelligence -- or is aware
of what his boss is interested in seeing --undlubtedly varies from office
to office.
Do any of you know,for instance, what t ~-gi intelligence product,
Dr. Kissinger actually reads'
Or Dr. Schlessinger. Or Mr. Clements? Or Mr. Ingerso&? Or Secretary
Simon? or senior members of the JCS staff?
Could we find out --and if we did what value do you think this might
have to our consideration of a Work Program ?
The key problem here is our examining what could be done better to
assure that key intelligence materials actually reach the officials to
whom they are addressed.
Can you identify any aspect of this on which we should be
working?
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APPROPCH TWO
Prhaps it would be useful at this stage to look at the problem of
improving intelligence by approaching it from the standpoint of the
characteristics which are desired in a good intelligence product.
Essentially these characteristics are:
Its pertinence to the policy being formulated or decision being made
The quality of analysis
The manner of presentation
Timeliness or currency
Let's look at each of these in turn.
How or by what actions could we enhance the likelihood
that the intelligence product will be pertinent to the concerns of
its high level users?
What could or should be done to improve the quality of analysis?
How would you like to see the presentation of intelligence improved?
Do you see ways in which timeliness of the intelligence response
could be improved?
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APPROACH THREE
Dr. Kissinger is quote as having been very critical of a particular
National Intelligence Estimate, but when he was asked what kind of an
estimate he really wanted his response allegedly was. "Don't ask me that,
since I don't know. But I will recognize it when I see it."
Similarly, the Chairman of the Joint C fiefs of Staff is reported to
have said that his intelligence support was excellent and would be
outstanding if only he could articulate what he wanted.
These comments are part and parcel of the problem of communicatthnn
between the intelligence producers and the intelligence users.
This piew matter of having intelligence consumers do better at conveying
to intelligence users wh;t it is they want and need may well be the basic
root of the problem we are considering.
What could the Working Group to do that would better enable intelligence
consumers to articulate their needs?
I solicit any ideas you have.
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NSC staff members are quoted as being critical of intelligence on
the b sis that the analysis tends to be "naive" and that "not enough
attention is paid to identification of alternatives or options."
Mr Ober, could you comment on this?
Secretary Clements is quoted as being very critical of the intelligenc he. received, saying that "it answers the wrong questions."
Only very recently he advised intelligence representativ s that his own
sources were much better than the information he obtained from intelligent
Mr Ellsworth, would you care to comment on what might be done to bette
satisfy Mr. Clements' expectations?
Planning weapons systems is a difficult process,and bringing new syste
into being is very time-consuming. Weapons systems planners are less
concerned with current capabilities of potential adversaries than with.
what their capabilities will be 15-20 years in the future. I .dia understand
that DDR&E and the Joint Staff has been critical because intelligence
does not project far enough into the future?
Admiral Hilton, could you comment on this?
The recent expansion in the A US requirement for foreign economic
information has caused the Intelligence Community to devote much more
attention to this kind of intelligence.As ixx result, I understand that
concern has been expressed in departments such as Treasury,Commerce and
A`"r culture as to whether the Intelligence ommunity isn't encroaching
on their domain. This might turn out to be a problem with which the Working
Group should concern itself,along with the Economic Intelligence Subcommittt
of the NSCIC.
Mr. Morell,could you give us the Treasury view on this?
State does not consider as (quote) intelligence (unquote) much of its
reporting which officials in other departments, and particularly
intelligence officers, consider to be intelligence information.
is some of you are aware, Mr. Colby is seeking to make greater use of
Foreign Service reporting in the production of intelligence, but concern
is expressed in some quarters --including Mr. Clements --that State's
"back channel" information which could be extremely useful is not being mad available to those to whom it would be of value.
Mr. Brown could you comment on this particularly as it may relate to
the problem we have under discussion today --the shortcomings in intelligenc
production.
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APPROACH FIVE
Each of you, or representatives of your staffs and offices,
participate in a number of NSC-related special purpose groups.
What specific criticisms are you aware of with respect
to the kind and quality of the intelligence support which these
organizations receive?
Mr. Morell: Could you give us the Treasury view as to
the intelligence support provided to the Council for Inter-
national Economic Policy (CIEP) or to the CIEP Operations Group?
Admiral Hilton: Could you comment with respect to the
intelligence support received by the Verification Panel Work
Group or the Interagency MBFR Coordination Committee?
Mr. Ellsworth: Would you care to comment in regard to
the WSAG Contingency Planning Working Group or the DoD NATO
Task Force, or the Military Advisory Group for Mid-East Peace
Negotiations?
Mr. Brown: Could you comment on intelligence support for
the Technical Working Group of the Under Secretarys' Committee
or the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and
Disarmament?
Mr. Ober: Would you give us an idea as to the kind of
criticisms you have heard recently from NSC staff members,
say from Col. Kennedy, the Assistant to the President for NSC
Planning, or Dennis Clift, who handles European and Soviet
matters, or Dave Elliott in the science and technology fields?
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APPROACH SIX
In general, do any of you see a real difference in the flow of
information during crisis and non-crisis periods?
What I am getting at is that I have been told that during crisis
periods your staffs are flooded with raw intelligence data when what
you really want is more analysis and interpretation.
If this is true, could any of you cite some examples?
More importantly, do any of you have some ideas as to what the
Intelligence Community ought to be focusing attention on in order
to provide better support in crisis periods?
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