Modification of Security Classification

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100090026-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 1998
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: July 11, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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REVISED 18 July 1974
UNITED STATES' INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS
SUBJECT: Modification of Security Classification
REFERENCES: a. USIB-D-46.2/34, 21 June 1974
b. USIB-D-46. 2/35, 24 June 1974
1. In restricted session with the Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance
Office, in attendance, Mr. Colby noted that, because of the policy aspects of
Nihe subject proposal, he had invited representation from the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA). He welcomed Mr. Amrom Katz to the USIB
deliberations on this agenda item.
2. Mr. Colby said that the subject of modifying the security classification
of the photographic satellite reconnaissance program for foreign intelligence
collection had been discussed by the Board at an earlier date. This had resulted
in Presidential approval to classify the "fact of" photographic satellite collec-
tion as SECRET. Mr. Colby observed that there now appeared to be
several factors which suggested that the "fact of" photographic satellite recon-
naissance need not be classified SECRET. He thought it would. be useful to
raise this subject for discussion to see if the community was ready to move in
the direction of declassifying the "fact of'' satellite coverage. He said it was
not his intention, as reflected in the draft letters (reference a), to make this
an official. public announcement. He was aware, however, that several of-the
Principals might not agree with the declassification proposal, noting in particular
the letter from Mr. Plummer (reference b).
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3. Mr. Singel explained the reason for the different views between the
Working Group and Mr. Plummer. The Working Group addressed this problem
from a purely intelligence impact point of view and concluded that declassification
of only the "fact of" would not adversely affect the program. Mr. Plummer, on
the other hand, was concerned with possible political repercussions and advised
against declassification.
4. Mr. Denney said that State had examined the pros and cons of the issue
and, on balance, preferred to retain the program in classified channels because
there were certain advantages to not having to discuss the "fact of" in international
forums.
5. Mr. Colby then invited Mr. Katz of ACDA to comment from his Agency's
point of view. Mr. Katz read from a memorandum sent from Mr. Ikle to the
Secretary of State (a copy is attached).
6. Admiral de Poix acknowledged that there were indeed two sides to
this question and that it was a matter of balance. He said that he had not obtained
a Secretary of Defense position on this matter, but that he and the three Service
Representatives to USIB favored declassifying the "fact of." He said that taking
the initiative on this matter, that is to release what is already a non-secret,
could be to our advantage. The most persuasive argument, from his point of
view, was that declassification might allow for selected publication in the news
media of photographs on major world issues which would tend to prove the U. S.
position. For example, possible Soviet violations of SAL, and/or new weapons
systems developed by the Soviets which could be released to Congress. He said
we should support "freedom of space" in the same way we support "freedom of
the seas."
7. General Allen commented that the existing policy which regards
satellite reconnaissance as a covert activity has helped to create a favorable
security environment for over a decade. He said that it was not his understanding
that officials are required to deny the existence of the program, but rather that
they are enjoined to avoid discussion of it in an unclassified forum. He noted
that this policy has been effective in reducing public discussion of the program
in such areas as Air Force procurement activities, launch. activities, industrial
association, technical societies and contractor activities. General Allen said
that a fundamental change in this policy, while appearing to be only realistic,
will be another "opening wedge" in the security of these programs.
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8. General Allen believed that the issue is not whether the existence.:of
a U. S. satellite reconnaissance is "secret"; the issue is whether we intend to
continue the policy of restraining public discussion of a vital and sensitive
intelligence program. He skid that continuing the present policy is the only
effective way he knew of obtaining such restraint. He felt that the situation is
analogous with the DCI's discussions with the Senate on a total intelligence budget
figure and the arguments there generally apply. General Allen commented that
however discreetly the DCI intends to implement this change, it will prompt
many knowledgeable people (cleared or not) to speculate and experiment in new
discussions. General Allen said that there is the danger that the change in
policy at the Washington level will be misinterpreted the farther one is removed
from the top policy levels. The result of this pyramidal situation is cause for
concern that lower echelons will not feel constrained from discussing other
classified aspects of the program. He said that although the DCI intends now to
apply the change in policy only to photographic satellites, it will further degrade
our ability to maintain security on SIGINT satellites. General Allen said that
these "wedges" go only one way. He felt that the success of our SIGINT satellites
is extremely vulnerable and yet we are taking major action to place great
reliance on their collection. He could not see sufficient merit in the DCI's
proposal to warrant such a profound change in policy. General Allen requested
that his objection be noted to higher authority.
9. Mr. Collins observed that Treasury had no institutional responsibilities
in this matter, but that he personally had been in 'favor of declassification. He
said, however, that the arguments presented at the Board, particularly by
General Allen, carried considerable weight with him.
10. General Giller also was impressed with General Allen's arguments.
He was concerned, however, with the impact on the U. S. public and Congress
of not admitting the "fact of" and that this would be used as a foolish example of
overclassification. He supported the proposal to declassify, citing the current
feeling that classification in government is overdone and vulnerable to criticism.
11. Mr. Colby asked the Services if the declassification would have any
impact on the way they do business. The Service Representatives did not identify
such impact. They indicated they were in favor of declassification although all
noted that persuasive arguments had been made against it.
1Z. Mr. Cregar said that the FBI was not directly involved with the program,
but from a security point of view would support General Allen's position.
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13. General Walters also agreed that General Allen had many good points,
but that he was also impressed with General Giller's comment that we have to
operate with Congress and it is important to keep only secrets which are really
secret. He supported the.DIA and AEC comments and favored declassification.
Colby said he did not intend to come to any final conclusions at
Mr
14
.
. this meeting. He expressed appreciation for the points made and note that
both sides have a solid basis for their positions. Ile said he was impressed
with General Allen's concern about people down the line misinterpreting
Washington-level policy on the matter but that he was also impressed with the
li U S
d
problem ofeng vvit.+ -.. r -
a
secrets which we have to keep. Mr. Colby concluded b statinp,~that?he woUl
ill
h
h
e w
om
present the various views of the USIB Principals to those with w
consult further on this matter.
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Executive Secretary
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