NSCIC Working Group Reactions to Your Briefing

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100120001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 30, 1975
• Content Type: MF

SENSITIVE 7-'
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 Cho-RDP8?B00506R90120001-1 /CO
IC 75-1486
30 May 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LT Support Staff
SUBJECT: NSCIC Working Group Reactions to Your Briefing
1. General Wilson wishes me to express his appreciation for the
fine briefing on "Monitoring a SALT Agreement" you presented to the
NSCIC Working Group on 20 May. In addition, you might like to have a
reminder of the principal questions tossed up by the other Working
Group members. Some of these questions probably have been raised
before, and some may be raised again--e.g., in high-level briefings
to PFIAB.
3. He also tried to pin you down on the estimate that if the
Soviets decided to deploy mobile ICBMs the US intelligence community
could confirm this in "about a year." One of Ambassador Ellsworth's
concerns is that the community make such judgments more explicit.
Indeed the Working Group is prodding the IC Staff to develop a paper
on this general subject.
4. Ambassador Ellsworth was joined by other WG members, chiefly
RADM Hilton and Foster Collins, in inquiring about the community's
capability to verify which Soviet deployed systems were MIRVed and
which were not. Your answers touched on 25XIB0a
2. Ambassador Ellsworth was your most persistent challenger.
In setting forth the proposition that "we don't think the Soviets
have the incentive to cheat" on a SAL agreement, you had to beat
.back Ellsworth's point that there was "no intelligence" bearing
on this proposition. You argued that there was at least good logic
bearing on it. However when you reached the part of your briefing
touching on th Ellsworth asserted that this Soviet
development "defies the logic" of the other proposition.
both the ovie systems an our
to your other comparative graphics--which were excellent--might be
useful for the future.
minuteman systems. Mat seemed to satisfy the uestioners; perhaps a
graphic showing (US and Soviet) similar
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5. RADM Hilton showed great concern about whether the Soviets
will MIRV their SLBMs. When you concluded your response to him that
"we believe" the Soviets will, I half expected Ambassador Ellsworth
to add that in this case our belief was based on something more than
just logic.
6. Again, thanks for your cooperation and a fine briefing.
Executive Secretary
NSCIC Working Group
Distribution:
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1 NIO for Strategic Programs
IC Registry
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