NIO' s draft Perspectives

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100160006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

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Part I - Major World Problems
1. General. The balance between the US and USSR in
the tangible elements of national power, while continuing to
be marked by offsetting assymetries, is unlikely to change
fundamentally. Perceptions of the less tangible aspects of
the balance of power--national attitudes, will and momentum
and direction of international events--may change importantly
in either Moscow or Washington or elsewhere. In a situation
of rough equality in intercontinental nuclear forces between
the US and USSR, other national assets will become the contingent
elements of the "strategic" balance of power. In addition,
the strengths and weaknesses of the US and USSR will be
measured in part by the nature of regional power groupings
with which the two nations are associated.. Other nations
will therefore have a major influence on the policies, conduct
and politically useful power of the United States and the
Soviet Union. Additional nations possessing nuclear weapons
or pursuing coersive policies through control over critical
economic resources could upset the international equilibrium.
The conflict between the suppliers and users of natural
resources will strain the world's political, economic and social
institutions. The United States therefore, will be faced
not only with a persistent threat to its interests from the
USSR but also turbulence in its relationships with other
nations.
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2. The USSR. The United States and the Soviet Union
will remain principal adversaries during the next five years,
although relative detente and an absence of armed conflict
will probably continue to mark their relationship. The Soviet
leaders seem convinced that in the overall "correlation of
forces" world events are moving in favor of the USSR. They
will attempt to further this movement through political action
in. Western Europe, the Near East and South Asia and to a
lesser extent in Latin America. In doing so, the Soviets will
try to avoid confrontation with the US and overly assertive
foreign poicies which might risk a reversal of favorable trends
in US-USSR relations and world affairs generally. The USSR
will seek to keep detente as the leading feature of its
foreign policy with the US and Western Europe for at least
the next five years, because it offers more advantages than
any other alternative.
-.For controlling local crises which could lead to general war;
--For managing the confrontation with China;
--In obtaining Western economic and technological assistance;
--And for promoting the disintegration of opposing power blocs.
The Soviets will have to deal, however, with a number of
dilemmas as they attempt to square established military programs
and traditional attitudes with the requirements of a detente
posture. In the field of strategic offensive forces, the
modernization programs now underway will give the Soviets
larger numbers of more accurate missile warheads, improved
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missile survivability and greater operational flexibility.
They are also developing more effective air and missile defenses
and improved weapons and supporting systems for defense
against ballistic missile submarines. In their strategic
nuclear programs research and development is aimed at unique
applications of existing technologies and applications of
advanced technology based on different physical principles.
At the same time, the Soviets will continue to modernize their
ground, naval and air forces for theater warfare along the
periphery of the USSR and for distant limited operations.
The Soviets may have to choose between furthering detente and
some of their military programs.
In its economic policy Moscow will continue to give high
priority to.the kinds of growth which increase national power
and its projection abroad. Domestically, however, pressures
will grow for modernizing reforms of the Soviet economic
system, particularly its administrative structure. How the
leadership responds to these pressures will be important
indications of Soviet future policy. Reforms which seek
managerial benefits of some type of demand system could have,
as in the case of Czechoslovakia, implications for liberalizing
other areas of Russian life, and will accordingly be highly
controversial. Similarly, prolonged detente could result
in some erosion in the pervasive authority of the Communist
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Party over the Soviet populace. In a future which in general
the Soviets probably regard as very favorable, their economic
problems must stand out as major exceptions.
The circumstances which commend detente to the USSR,
however, have complicated this picture. These are: the need
to control local crises lest they lead to general war; the
burden of the Sino-Soviet conflict; and the desire for
economic and technological assistance from the West. The
Soviets will have to deal in the coming years with a number
of dilemmas as they attempt to square traditional attitudes
with the requirements of a detente posture.
While continuing to modernize its ground, naval, and
tactical air forces, the USSR is vigorously pursuing the
opportunities left open by SALT I. Except to the extent
.restrained by arms limitation agreements, the Soviets will
make substantive improvements in their missile forces,
including MIRVing, improved accuracy, increased throw-weight,
and better survivability. At the same time, they will
continue to maintain and to improve their defenses. They
will be working to develop effective weapons and supporting
systems in such areas as ASW, satellites, and lasers.
Expecting strategic equality with the US, the USSR gives
indications of angling further for a measure of strategic
superiority, if that can be obtained at reasonable risk.
Domestically, the pressure for modernizing reforms of
the Soviet system, and particularly its economic administrative
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structure, will continue. Prolonged detente may also eventually
have some effect on the Community Party's ability to wield
its authority effectively in all areas of public life. But
these are long-term possibilities, and over the next five
years the essentials of the Soviet domestic system are not
likely to. be substantially altered. A key intelligence focus
over the next five years will'be the Soviet leadership
succession--as Brezhnev and the other aging seniors leave the
political scene and their replacements consolidate power--
with policy implications for bilateral relations with the US
and the Soviet stance abroad generally, as well as for domestic
Soviet priorities.
.3. China. Almost certainly, China will undergo a
change in leadership. The succession could see an initial
collegial unity followed by an authoritarian, aggressive and
xenophobic leader. The intial period could also be followed
by fragmentation into a variety of contesting military, Party,
and provincial elements. For planning purposes, however,
it would seem most appropriate to assume that the follow-on
leadership in China will maintain the unity and authoritarian
discipline imposed by the Communist Party, that it will be
primarily concerned with internal unity in meeting the social
and economic problems within China, and that it will retain
a somewhat paranoid attitude toward the outside world and
particularly suspicion of countries on its periphery.
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China will continue gradually to develop its strategic
forces and will present a retaliatory threat to the Soviet
Union. By 1980, it will have the capability of threatening
the United States with a demonstration (or desperation)
strike by a.small number of ICBMs and SLBMs. China will
.maintain large general purpose forces capable of operations
on' its periphery but will be unlikely to commit them in the
absence of major provocation or concern.
Internally, China will continue its authoritarian economic.
programs, which are likely to keep agriculture abreast of
.population, to enable industry to expand capacity and output,
and to support an increasingly modern defense establishment.
Internationally, China will endeavor to become the ideological
leader of the Third World. It will participate in aid programs
and similar' political gestures with other Third World powers
but will not establish substantial authority over Third World
countries.
4. Western Europe. In a variety of ways, Western Europe
is in process of transition. Both the more stable and
developed states of North Europe and the more fragile and
volatile nations of the Southern Tier are, often in several
respects, undergoing critical changes; patterns and policies
familiar for 25 years or more are clearly being altered--
sometimes quite rapidly--while the outlines of a new era can
as yet be only dimly perceived. Uncertainties abound and
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results are not foreordained; some of the determining factors
lie within the control of the nations concerned, while others
are international in dimension. US policy will be one
variable in determing the course of events; in some respects
it may be decisive, in others more marginal in impact. In
some respects events are working to diminish US influence
(measured against past benchmarks) while in other, less obvious
ways--(energy and economic interrelationships) it is being
enhanced. But whether US policy is of decisive, important or
very limited impact, Europe's new uncertainties--on the spot
as well as in terms of the US posture--all imply greater need
for discriminating intelligence collection and analysis.
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Each of these affect the others, each is becoming an
increasingly complex misture of politics, foreign policy,
military affairs, economics and psychology. And each combines
familiar dimensions (e.g., the quest for European unity and.
its repercussions on the Atlantic Alliance in an era of
detente) with newer, less understood issues like the social
and political repercussions of hyperinflation and vastly
increased energy costs.
Both the old and newer pressures will bear on such key
European issues as Britain's political health and membership
in the Community, whether the Italian Communists gain a role
in the government, and indeed whether moderate government in
the classic European liberal tradition can cope with current
problems while withstanding assaults from extremists of left
and right.
The politically more fragile states of Southern Europe,
at both ends of the Mediterranean, share the functional
problems just mentioned--superimposed on peculiar new political
dilemmas of their own. At one end, Portugal and Spain are
passing, or soon will be, through uncertain periods of transition
from long-established authoritarian regimes of the right to
.something not yet defined but manifestly very different. And
in the process, US interests and those of NATO are going to
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be affected in important ways, whether these interests are
as defined for the past 20 years or modified. At. best, neither
.in Spain nor Portugal will the new governments be as. receptive
to US facilities or as amenable to US influence as their
predecessors. And it may be that Portugal and conceivably
Spain will become inhospitable. But certainly in Spain and
perhaps still in Portugal there are grounds for hope that
tolerable accommodations can be worked out.
The situation at the eastern end of the Mediterranean is
if anything more complex--with Greece under Karamanlis
struggling to reestablish viable parliamentary life; Turkey
caught in a structural political stalemate which frustrates
effective government; and both countries antagonistic toward
.each other over rights in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus--where
Makarios retains a potential difficult to control but capable
of embroiling outside powers. With the first trauma of the
1975 Cyprus crisis receding and the clear reluctance of cooler
heads in Athens and Ankara to risk war with each other, there
is good reason to hope for a gradual defusing of this explosive
situation.
Yet formidable obstacles and serious uncertainties remain--
most specifically: whether Karamanlis can achieve a solid
political underpinning in Greece while keeping the radical
left under control and re-integrating the army back into a
Greek political consensus; whether Turkey can overcome its
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political standoff and gain greater government effectiveness
in dealing with rampant inflation and other social problems,
while avoiding another resort to military government. And
both nations badly need improved political cohesion and more
confident leadership if they are to be sure of staying out of
trouble with each other and of repairing the rifts in their
relations with the US (over the Turkish arms embargo) or NATO
(in the case of Greece's partial withdrawal).
S. Eastern Europe. While Eastern Europe will continue
to be under Soviet control, recurrent pressures for some
loosening of ties with Moscow will complicate the picture.
Internal discipline may be alleviated somewhat in these
countries so long as they adhere to Soviet guidance in diplomatic
and security matters. The?five-year period could see an
explosion from within one or more East European countries
.against Soviet dominance, but Moscow would quickly reestablish
its hegemony (by force if necessary), whatever the price in
terms of other policies. The passing of Tito could open a
period of difficulty and contest over the succession and
over the external orientation of Yugoslavia.
6. Japan. Japan will continue to play a major economic
role and as a participant in international economic affairs
generally, expanding its contacts and relations with other
countries, including the USSR and China. It will probably
.still place priority on cooperative relations with the United
States although, on issues it considers vital to its own
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well-being, it will be less amenable to American influence.
The internal Japanese scene is not apt to change so substantially
as to affect Japan's role abroad.
7. New Powers and Blocs. The example of OPEC's disruption
.of' the free world's energy situation is likely to be followed
by further attempts at cooperative efforts by small nations
to exert greater control over other important raw materials,
such as cc pe-r., bauxite, and phosphates. As' this process
develops, these nations may seek to use their economic power
for political purposes. Iran and Saudi Arabia are already
doing so. Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Zaire are also
becoming at least regional great powers and are playing more
substantial roles in world international forums. Aside from
these, several nations having considerable influence within
regions and-whose ties to the US have traditionally been close
will display greater independence in their relations with the
US. This will be particularly prevalent in the economic field
but may also affect certain US strategic interests. Examples
of such powers are Canada, Mexico, Panama, Australia, and
Thailand.
8. The Third World will present other major problems
to US policy-makers. The existing confrontations between the
Arabs and Israel, North and South Vietnam, and North-and South
Korea hold the potential of unravelling detente at a time
when the power of the US to influence their outcome is declining.
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Other regional disputes--between China and Taiwan, India and
Pakistan, Greece and Turkey, and blacks and whites in
southern Africa--could also rekindle and threaten the tenuous
.equilibrium between the great powers. The newly rich powers
will rapidly expand their military capabilities; some will
develop nuclear armaments, however primative. Some Third
.World nations will seek outlets for their frustrations in
assaults on their economic relationships with great powers
and attempts to dominate a variety of international forums..
A few may resort to blackmail through terrorism--of a
.conventional or nuclear variety.
9. Social change will cause turbulence and possibly create
power vacuums in a number of areas. These will stem from
increased expectations and a perception of the growing economic
gap between 'less developed countries (and classes within
countries) and the developed world. Areas particularly susceptible
to this process will be the Persian'Gulf, certain other. Arab
states such as Morocco, India, possibly Indonesia,. the
Philippines, and, in Latin America, Argentina, Peru, Colombia.,
and possibly even Brazil. Internally this turbulence may
be temporarily stilled by some authoritarian governments,
particularly those benefiting from increased oil revenues,
but these will have difficulties in maintaining themselves
over the longer term and transferring power to successors.
The resulting turbulence can present temptations to neighboring
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states to exploit long-standing differences or to great
.powers desirous of extending their influence. Such turbulence
will also exist within advanced nations, as economic, racial,
ideological, or regional minorities turn to violence and
terrorism to press their claims against more and more
delicately tuned and interdependent societies.
10. The acceleration of events will be characteristic
of the years ahead. This will come from improved communication
and transportation, sharply reducing the time available to
reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international problems.
It will also raise many local events to international prominence
and inflate national or political pride, posing further handicaps
to successful negotiations. There will be a resulting tendency
towards shorter attention spans for individual situations and
a need for simultaneous perception and management of a multi-
plicity or international relationships. Many national or
international institutions are simply not structured to cope
with accelerating change. Such change will occur most conspicuously
in the fields of science and technology, but the pace there
will have substantial effects on the pace of sociological,
industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political
and economic impacts. Identification and accurate assessments
of such changes and their effects will be needed on-an increasingly
rapid or even immediate basis.
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Part II - The Role of Intelligence
.1. General. Intelligence will be charged to give
increased priority to assessments on a range of problems
requiring US decisions. While intelligence on strategic nuclear
developments and strategic warning of military attack will
continue. to receive highest priority, the need will be greater
in,the next few years for intelligence assessments which
anticipate and alert decision makers to policy problems.. In an
era of improved communications and transportation, of a con-
traction of US forward deployments of forces and of accelleration
in events leading to crises, the demands will be greater for
intelligence which is timely and complete. Meeting those demands
will be essential for the use of diplomacy,. negotiation, and
other benign initiatives to head off military confrontations or
international instabilities. To meet the challenges of the
accelleration of events and the explosion of information, greater
intelligence effort will be required (1) to reduce large volumes
of raw information to manageable form; (2) to devise techniques
for rapidly and accurately communicating to consumers the
essential elements of foreign situations and. the reliability
of the assessments; (3) to identify major policy and negotiating
issues; and (4) to assess intentions and likely courses of
action as well as capabilities of other nations. Meeting this
requirement will require more interdisciplinary analysis which melds
economic, technological, sociological and cultural factors with
political and military data into some unified view of the situation
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2. The USSR. The USSR will remain as the major
intelligence target. Its military power, its economic role
in the world, and its foreign policies will continue to pose
major problems for American leadership. Intelligence will be
expected to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities
and economic activity. It must follow Soviet efforts to acquire
advanced scientific and technological assistance and the
potential impact on both military and economic capabilities.
It will be expected also to supply reliable assessments of Soviet
political dynamics and intentions. These must be supplemented
.by clear and accurate forecasts of likely Soviet courses of
action in the political, economic, and military fields. While
a small percentage of this material will become available through
open exchange and access, vast fields of highly important informa-
tion will be. kept by the Soviets within a closed society, requiring
extraordinary efforts to obtain and understand them. A particular
requirement will be accurate and demonstrable monitoring of
arms limitation agreements made with the Soviet Union. In the
military field special attention will be focused on Soviet research
and development, in particular with respect to weapons and
supporting systems which could substantially affect the balance
of power. These will include antisubmarine warfare, ballistic
missiles, satellites and advanced-technology systems. The greater
political utility of non-nuclear forces and perhaps an increasing
.disposition for their use, at least by some of the Soviet client
states, will mean a greater burden on intelligence to maintain
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mean maintaining capabities for tactical intelligence
coverage of potential crises areas and for rapid
augmentation of such coverage in the event of local of
general confrontation or conflict.
Attitudes and actions within the Soviet leadership
and political and military doctrine strategy and plans will be of
major importance in forecasting undesirable developments and in
assisting in negotiations and in formulation of US policies.
Forecasting and monitoring Soviet conduct abroad-- actions taken,
directly through diplomatic means or indirectly through
surrogate nations, political parties or.through economic
or subversive means -- will be essential with respect to Western
.Europe and to US policies and actions aimed at minimizing
turbulence in the Third World.
3. China. China will continue to be a second but still
important intelligence target. The closed nature of Chinese
society will make it difficult to assess any turmoil within
the country or threats China might pose abroad. The latter will
become particularly important as Chinese strategic power grows
and comes to include capabilities against the United States-
itself. . It will also apply to Chinese political activities
and intentions in view of China's influence in the Far East
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a tes with and aspirations in the Third World.
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3. C;Aina. China will cont?.nue to be,,a second but still
important, intelligence target. .The closed, nature of Chinese
society will make it ifficul; to assess any turmoil within
the country or threats China might pose abroad. The latter will
.become particularly important as Chinese strategic power grows
and comes to include capabilities against the United States
itself: It will also apply to Chinese political activities
and intentions in view of China's influence in the Far East
and ties withand aspirations in the Third World..
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5. Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe will be a constant
collection and assessment target, in order to determine political
developments vis-a-vis the USSR and the military and political
strength the East European nations individually and collectively
bring to the Warsaw Pact.
6.'? Economics. Economic intelligence will increase, in
importance world-wide. This will include economic situations
in nations having a major impact on the world economy and on
relationships with the United States,
Economic intelligence of value to US
policy makers is necessarily international in scope, including
such topics as the activities of multi-national corporations,
international development programs, regional economic arrange-
ments, and the working of international commodity markets.
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Defining
the role of the intelligence community in meeting the needs
of governmetn and the private sector for economic information,
determining requirements and consumers, and developing improved
means of collection and analysis will be the most difficult
and possibly the most important tasks faced by intelligence
during the next five years.
7. Other Priorities. Intelligence will increasingly
be expected to warn of and explain new situations posing
problems to American interests. An example will be to identify
the causes of social change, turbulence, and political terrorism
in Third World countries, so the component elements of these
problems can'be isolated, negotiated about or countered with
appropriate mechanisms. This may require intensified efforts
on our part to understand and communicate the differences between
societies, cultures, and nation personalities. Intelligence will be
called upon more often to assess the threat of terrorists against
US installations and officials as well as private enterprises and
citizens abroad and, beyond that, the risk that some terrorists
may acquire nuclear weapons.
8. A few of the major problems which will be either the subject
of dispute or negotiation, or sometimes both., and consequently
will be priority intelligence requirements, can be lists:
.(a) Developments in critical regional confrontations:
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(1) Arab/Israeli
(2) North Vietnam/South Vietnam
(3) North Korea/South Korea
(b) Indications of a resurgence of other,confrontations:
(1) Pakistan/India
(2) Greece/Turkey
(3) China/Taiwan
(4) Black Africans/White Africans
(5) China/USSR
(c) Rates of production, consumption, and pricing
of raw materials and energy sources and international
commodity arrangements;
(d)
Price and non-price restrictions on international
trade,' including transportation and communication services;
(e) The international payments mechanism and the
coordination of national fiscal-monetary policies;
(f) National policies with respect.to military sales,
receipt of foreign military and economic assistance
and foreign business activity and investment, including
policies toward multi-national corporations;
(g) Arms limitation, nuclear proliferation, and crisis
avoidance;
(h) Jurisdiction, exploitation, and relationships
in the oceans and on sea beds.
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