REVIEW OF THE RECRUITMENT SYSTEM MANAGEMENT STAFF, DDA MARCH 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00890R000600090019-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: March 1, 1981
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Date
ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SUP 25 March 1981
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,
building, Agency/Post)
1. EO/DDA
..Initials
Date
2
ADDA
3.
DD/A
!L
on
File
Note and Return
p roval
For Clearance
Per Conversation
Requested
For Correction
Prepare Reply
irculate
For Your Information
See Me
mment -
Investigate
signature
Coordination
Justify
REMARKS
Max,
Attached is the study on the Agency's hiring
process that you directed. my
staff did the study and I think ; did' an exemplary job.
I suggest two actions to you at this point.
First, that after you have reviewed this report,
you, Bill and I discuss your reaction to it. Second,
that after your review
to Harry Fitzwater, to
I recommend that you direct implementation of our
recommendations in the Security and Medical Services
area but that we let Harry come to his own conclu-
sions.
(over)
DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
clearances, and similar actions
O
Chief, Management Staff, DDA
5041-102
Room No. Bldg.
7C18 Has
Q
OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
- OFtiV!CD Pages 2 T RU }
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STAT
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CONFIDENTIAL
REVIEW OF THE RECRUITMENT SYSTEM
MANAGEMENT STAFF, DDA
CONFiDENTIAL
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I. Executive Summary
II. Background of Study
III. Recent Activity in Applicant Processing
IV. Modeling of Recruitment Applicant Processing Activity
V. Problems with the Current System and Recommendations
VI. Conclusion
VII. References
Appendix A
Professional Technical Recruiting Summary
Clerical Recruiting Summary
20
21
Appendix B
Project SCIP Funding Requirements 22
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I. Executive Summary
This study does not make conclusive judgments on the entire
recruitment structure, but rather identifies areas that seem to call
for further examination or which present 'a possibility for some
improvement in the recruitment process..
The detailed recommendations are contained in Section.V of this
report. In shortened version, they are:
1. Give the newly implemented OPPPM system six months to:
prove its mettle-.
2. Use computer modeling as a tool for understanding, not
for decisio'nmaking.
3. Evaluate. the overall effectiveness of the Agency's field
recruitment network and.take appropriate action.
4. Reconfigure the OPPPM Review Unit and Processing Assistants
functions to increase the efficiency with which
they process applicant files. Ensure that applicants
are contacted frequently during processing, and
are continually assured of Agency interest.
5. Direct the Office of Security to implement an up-front
polygraph program for all applicants.
6. Fund Project SCIP, Security Communications Improvement
Project now. It will allow OS to more efficiently
process background investigations.
7. Retain the 15-year investigative coverage on applicant
background investigations.
8. Direct OMS to explore with OPPPM the creation of
physical activity job standards, especially for
sedentary jobs. Having done so, the clinical portion of
medical processing for applicants to be assigned to these
jobs could be eliminated. If deemed necessary, the
clinical processing could be postponed until sometime
after EOD.
9. Direct the Office of Medical Services to use the
recently established Communications recruitment task force
as a pilot program for implementation of
a similar pre-medical screening program for all
applicants.
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10. Direct the Office of Medical Services to offer the PATB
on an exception only basis, and to curtail its use for
most college hires.
11. Curtail invitee travel expenses, by better accounting,
reallocation of monies, and less interview activity.
12. Reexamine the Agency's policy on payment of relocation
expenses in light of the limited success of non-Washington
area recruiting activity. Pending the outcome of such
,an,examination, examine the feasibility of implementing
one standard'Agency policy to pay all relocation
expenses. At the very least, identify additional
occupational codes for which we should apply for
an OPM exemption in order to pay relocation expenses.
II... Background of Study.'
This study was commissioned to examine the timeliness and cost
effectiveness.of, the current Agency recruitment system with an
expressed aim of shortening the process. Because there has been a
close scrutiny of Agency personnel practices, including recruitment,
over the past several years, there was a fair amount of data readily
available for analysis. Most of the information reported in this
study, came from available statistics and recently published studies
on personnel activities. However, in addition, the following people
were interviewed to provide their unique perspective:
and other members of
the Directorate
Representatives to
OPPPM/R&P
Deputy for Recruitment & Placement,
OPPPM
Deputy Director of Personnel Security
& Investigations
Office of Medical Services
Plans and Support Staff
DDA Representative
OTE Analyst
Chief, Psychological Services Division,
Office of Medical Services
III. Recent Activity in Recruitment and Processing of Applicants
1. Beginning in 1977, the Agency's personnel system, and
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specifically the recruitment system, have been the subject of
several studies and papers:
IG Report on the Agency's Recruitment System,
January 1980
OPPPM Report on a Proposed Recruitment System,
February 1980
OPPPM Response to the IG Report on'Recruitment,
including several IG recommendations, March 1980
Recommendations Regarding Recruitment and Placement
Policies from the Directorate Task Force to OPPPM/R&P,
January 1981
2. In the past year, OPPPM has instituted multiple changes to
the recruitment and applicant processing system which has existed in
the Agency since the early 1950s. The overriding objective of these
changes have been to reduce cost and to increase the speed of
processing applicants. OPPPM's prime solution for satisfying these
objectives has been to reduce the number of applicants in the system
at any given time, or said another way, to considerably reduce the
ratio of applicants-in-process to EODs. Early indications are that
clerical ratio has been reduced from 2.2 to 1 during the October
1979 through April 1980 time period, to 1.6 to 1 during the May 1980
to October 1980 period. For professionals, the ratios for those
same time periods have been reduced from 2.8 to 1 to 1.9 to 1.
Correspondin 1 the number of applicants in process has been
reduced fro Early indications are that the EOD rate
has not been adversely affected. In fact, the EOD rate has
increased.
3. The methods used for accomplishing this ratio reduction
have involved elimination of questionable applicants (for
qualifications, security or medical reasons) early in the applicant
process. As a result of early security interviews
(Pre-Investigative Interviews) and early verification of information
contained in the Personal History Statement (drug usage, for
example) ,percent of initial applicants were eliminated for
security reasons prior to being formally entered into the applicant
process. Another reduction method has involved targeted
recruiting--best described as recruiting for a specific position by
a specific recruiter. Additionally, some parallel processing,
especially in the security and medical areas, was also implemented,
and the SKILLS BANK, a holding area for applicant files, was
eliminated.
4. Appendix A of this study provides an excellent comparison
of the old applicant processing system and the one proposed by OPPPM
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in March 1980 for both clericals and professionals. OPPPM has not
yet fully implemented all of the changes proposed last year. We
requested an interim report on their progress to date, and they
supplied the following figures.
OPPPM Portion of Applicant Processing
Professional/Technical
Previous
# of Days
Proposed
# of Days
Current
(estimated)
# of Days
Resume Review
24
2
3
Recruiter Interview
25
n/a
n/a
PHS Preparation
39
14
17
PHS Review
4
0
2
Expediter Review
-
-
3
Skills Bank
14
0
n/a
Input, Log, Xerox,
Duplicate, Deliver,
Pick -up
-
-
5
Office Review
22
10
14
Pre-polygraph
Interview
Arrangements
38
14
21
Interviews
7
-
10
Decision to Process
20
-
7
Security Processing
55
30
55
Medical Processing
27
n/a
n/a
Report for Duty
50
30
30
Total Days .
5. As can be seen from the chart, Security and Medical
processing are done concurrently in the new system, and take
approximately 55 days.
6. The total processing time is now 167 days or half of the
325-day processing time which existed when the new system was
implemented circa mid-1980. Further reductions are planned.
7. The following two charts examine the same data from two
other viewpoints: the percent loss of applicants in both the
previous and the proposed systems, and the dropout rate of each
discrete function in both systems.
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Professional/Technical
Loss Figures
Previous Proposed
# Applicants %Lost # Applicants %Lost
Reviewed Resumes
PHS Completions
Skills Bank
Office Review
Interview Arrangements
Interviews
Decision to Process
Security Processing
Medical Processing
Report for Duty
In the previous system we EODed Flpercent of those who
initially expressed interest. In the proposed system, we plan to
EOD ^ percent.
Professional/Technical
Dropout Rates
Reviewed Resumes
PHS Completions
Skills Bank
Office Review
Interview Arrangement
Interviews
Decision to Process
Security Processing
Medical Processing
Report for Duty
Dropout rate is defined as the percent of applicants
entering each discrete process that do not leave it successfully.
8. The observations which can be made regarding this data
--Cost is not as relevant a factor in the loss of applicants
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as time is. Most of the discrete functions involved
(e.g., interview arrangements) are of negligible cost, but
do involve a significant time investment. With the
exceptions of security and medical processing-, most of the
losses occur during time delays, not during an expensive
processing step.
--With the security and medical processes, there are
significant costs, primarily because of professional time
involved. We currently are unable to predict whether
staffing decreases could result from either our
recommendations or from OPPPM's proposed system.
--Both the proposed OPPPM system and our recommendations are
aimed at reducing the workload of those Agency employees
who process applicants. Polygraph operators are the
exception because their workload most probably will
increase as a result of the recommended changes. The
cost-per-applicant will most probably increase (owing to
the large file reduction) but, at the same time, the total
Agency resources devoted to applicant processing should
decrease. Cost aside, the changes should result in
increased efficiency because the system will no longer be
overburdened.
--Those areas where a decrease in cost should result from a
suggested change are discussed in this study. Examples
are invitee travel, field recruitment activities, clinical
examinations and PATB testing. The recommendations in
these areas also usually contribute to a reduction in
projected processing time.
We applaud OPPPM activity aimed at
reducing the number of days required to
process applicants, and believe that the
new system should be closely monitored
for a longer period of time, at least six
months, before we make any judgements on
its success or failure.
During this time period, it is essential
that OPPPM, OS, and OMS collect extensive
statistics so that a determination of
success or failure can be made on a
quantitative basis.
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IV. Modeling of Recruitment Activity
A. Portions of the recruitment process including the
-- processing activity
-- security approval process
-- Psychological Services Staff functioning
have been the subjects of System Dynamics modelling in the past
year. As a general comment, we believe that these models have
contributed to an understanding of the complexities of the
activities involved. Specifically, in the process of modelling the
applicant processing activity some very valuable suggestions were
made and subsequently implemented. These suggestions include:
-- installing expediters for security and medical
up-front screening of applications,
-- implementing concurrent security and medical
processing,
-- eliminating the Skills Bank, and
-- implementing a two-part Personal History
Statement form.
B. The original goal of the applicant processing model was to
reduce the time required for processing prospective employees. The
model found a .5% per day loss in applicants. Said differently,
each day an applicant was in process, the Agency increased the odds.
that the applicant would not EOD., OPPPM concluded that a reduction
in the number of files in process would accomplish a reduction in
processing time, without decreasing the number of EODs. After
making the above changes, OPPPM has geared its activity toward that
goal. This particular strategy leaves the existing processing
mechanisms intact and reduces their workload. We feel that this
strategy deemphasizes innovative management solutions and
discourages questioning of the rationale for the existence of
certain activities. It preserves those activities rather than
questions them.
C. The particular modeling technique used, Systems Dynamics,
tends to view most relationships as linear, even those that may
exhibit non-linear characteristics when another modeling technique
is used. For instance, the much-quoted .5% per day loss of
applicants which was derived from the System Dynamics model most
probably is a yield rate curve, an "S" shape when viewed closer.
The "S" shape implies that there are points where a difference in
the number of days of processing makes a large difference in EODs
and others where the difference is negligible--that is, if the
process is fast or moderately fast, we can expect the same EOD rate,
or if it is slow or moderately slow, the EOD rate stays nearly
constant.
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D. In the case of the security field office model, the most
appropriate assignment technique needs to be calculated, but it
appears that a linear programming solution to each model could
determine an optimum number for "in-basket" size, and an optimum
caseload. The model suggests a nearly empty in-basket and a
caseload of 5-6 (from experience) present the most efficient
solution.
We ask that the models developed for
various portions of the recruitment and
processing activity be viewed as a
valuable contribution to our
understanding of the process involved,
but not be used as a sole determinant for
action. Particularly, we ask that the
goal of reducing the number of days of
processing not be viewed totally as a
linear function of the number of files in
the system.
E. We applaud efforts at modeling processes in order to more
fully understand them, but we believe that models should be viewed
as one contribution to an overall management strategy for
improvement.
V. Problems With the Current System and Recommendations
1. All of the OPPPM optimization activity has been
focused on the processing portion of the recruitment activity;
processing being roughly defined as the activity which takes place
after an initial expression of interest by an individual.
2. One area of particular concern is the up-front
recruitment activity, especially the operation of the Field
Recruiter Network. We believe it needs to be completel reexamined
from efficiency and productivity viewpoints. There are field
recruitment offices scattered through the United States. They will
cost the Agenc in 1981. These recruiters last year
accounted for EODs, of which ere professional. The
Washington Area Recruitment Office (WARO) on the other hand, with
77
recruiters, accounted for m EODs, including professionals.
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Many of the people we interviewed during the course of this study
believed that the field recruiters play a passive versus an active
role, that they are "out of touch" with Agency activities and needs.
We believe that their success rate--or lack of same--at certain
universities needs to be analyzed, and recruiting visits tai
accordingly. For instance, the Agency interviewed
recently; none were hired. We have no data on why a recruiter
visits (and revists) certain universities, and does not recruit at
others.
3. We understand that some recruiters work standard
hours. A recruiter available at a county-employment office during
daytime hours will predictably get less activity than one available
during the early evening. A phone call made by a recruiter to the
residence of a student or an employed person during the day also
gets a predictable response.
5. Field recruiters return to Headquarters once a year
for a conference. They spend the rest of their time in the field.
They usually reside in the area in which their office is located.
Field recruitment has not traditionally been a rotational
assignment.
6. Some of those we interviewed stated that Personal .
History Statements received from field recruiters contain errors and
omissions, or obvious security or medically disqualifying
information. We were not able to document instances of this
particular criticism.
a. The entire area of field
recruitment needs to be studied in
detail. We are uncertain that sufficient
justification exists to maintain
recruiters
-- in light of OPPPM's intent to place
significantly fewer applicants in
process;
-- in light of the new system's emphasis
on early interviews by the component,
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not by the recruiter;
-- and in light of the fact that the
field recruiters account for fewer
EODs than the average WARO recruiter.
We need to delineate field recruiter
functions and decide whether those
functions could be done by traveling
recruiters based in Washington rather
than stationery recruiters based in
the field. We need to capture
statistics on colleges and
universities where we do get
employees.
b. At those universities where our
recruitment success rate is low, we
suggest utilization of videotape and
written media in the college or
university recruitment office. The
production of company recruiting tapes is
quite common in industry, and most major
college recruitment offices have a
videotape capability. The expense of
producing the tape can be easily offset
by the reduction in associated travel
funds.
c. The Agency should standardize
its recruiting message. We have an
excellent package which we distribute to
people who write or send resumes. But
when a live recruiter visits a campus or
employment office, he/she should have a
standard message to communicate as
well--slides or a prepared briefing book
or whatever. Our message has to be clear,
concise and consistent.
d. Those who recruit should
explore the use of flexible working hours
for their non-campus activities and for
applicant telephone contacts.
e. We did not undertake in-depth
research of the process by which OPPPM
determines requirements for new
employees. We recommend, however, that
such research could very usefully be
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undertaken, and soon.
B. Applicant Processing
Applicant processing activities involve an enormous amount
of paper, flowing between multiple branches of three different
processing offices (OPPPM, OS, OMS), the hiring office, and Security
field offices. OPPPM has recently implemented a minicomputer based
system, CAPER, to track applicant progress through the OPPPM portion
of this maze. CAPER notwithstanding, the greatest inefficiency in
the whole process remains paper shuffling and tracking, especially
where papers cross office (and directorate) boundaries. The areas
of greatest delay or significant cost which we were able to identify
include:
1. OPPPM appointment arrangements - Two branches in OPPPM
schedule interviews, tests, and EOD dates for applicants,
hiring offices and processing offices. One branch makes
arrangements for clerical applicants, and one branch makes
arrangements for professional applicants. These offices
essentially work regular 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. schedules, and
one of their main problems is getting in touch with the
applicants. These branches also prepare requests for security
and medical processing and reproduce personal history
statements prior to office reviews. An applicant file may
pass through these branches three times during the hiring
process. Each time this happens, delays occur. There are
four processing assistants in the professional branch, three
in the other. As many as 10 days can elapse from the time a
person is cleared for duty until he is notified. On 13 March
1981, for example, there were cleared people who had not
yet been called to EOD] The functions appear to be necessary.
The ineffectiveness with which the functions are performed is
unnecessary.
2. The Review Unit has perhaps the most critical job in
applicant process. It determines whether or not to send
applicant files to Agency offices, and if so, which offices.
The Review Unit is often another processing bottleneck. If an
applicant file is sent to an inappropriate office, a two week
delay can and does result. The potential for files of needed
applicants being rejected by the Review Unit and those of
unnecessary applicants being sent to offices for review
appears to be high.
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OPPPM should attempt to reconfigure
the processing assistant jobs to increase
their efficiency. Flextime hours,
including early evening hours, should be
instituted especially for
applicant-conta ctivities. Perhaps
the jobs of the processing
assistants shou be realigned. The
professional processing assistants s!
work on a directorate basis, which may
not be the most optimum division.
Applicants should be contacted at
several points during processing just to
be reassured of continuing Agency
interest. The processing assistants seem
to be the logical group to perform this
function.
The OPPPM Review Unit needs to be
more familiar with requirements of
various offices, and perhaps needs to be
staffed by personnel with more general
Agency experience.
3. Background investigations done by the Office of
Security for all applicants are the longest single function in
the applicant process. It currently takes an average of 54
days to conduct an investigation. The Office of Security
projects that they can eventually complete applicant
background investigations in 45 days, with quite a few taking
no more than 30 days. There are an average of 1.7 field
assignments required to complete each background
investigation. These assignments may involve any of the seven
security field offices. These field assignments exhibit the
"traveling salesman" operations research problem, in that the
field investigator or resident agent (RA) or confidential
correspondent (CC) who handles the assignment picks up
assignments once a week. The rest of his time is spent "on
the road." Assignments necessarily "gather dust" waiting for
the investigator to pick them up. Mailing time to the field
office and then perhaps to an RA or CC adds significantly to
the security processing time, as does clerical typing time.
The availability of travel funds also has a direct impact on
the efficiency of a field investigation.
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The Office of Security background
investigation is a labor intensive
activity. Certain parts of the system
are badly in need of optimization. An ODP
study completed in August 1980 suggested
the implementation of project SCIP,
Security Communications Improvement
Project--the use of word processing and
data processing technology to render
security clearance actions more
efficient, comprehensive and timely.
Project SCIP involves a phased
de el t costing approximately
Iver the first three years.
Funds are budgeted in 1983 at an enhanced
level. Appendix B provides detailed
costing information for Project SCIP. We
recommend its adoption.
We examined background investigation
data to determine if the requirement for
15 year coverage decreased efficiency
appreciably. A study done by the Office
of Security in May 1977 found that
because of the age of applicants, our
average investigative coverage averages
only 6.4 years. The study also found
that noteworthy information was found in
the 10% of the cases where the
investigation covered a full 15 years. We
found that the time required for a
background investigation is related more
to the assignment and travel issue than
it is to the length of investigative
coverage. We recommend that the 15-year
coverage of the background investigation
be retained.
4. The February 1980 Proposed Recruitment System suggest
the implementation of up-front polygraphs (polygraph
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interviews conducted prior to initiation of the background
investigation). Though the Office of Security does these when
requested, they do not do them routinely. The critical point
here is that the polygraph interview may eliminate completely
the need for a background investigation if it produces
unacceptable derogatory information. The polygraph most often
eliminates applicants because of drug usage, thievery, and
homosexuality.
The Office of Security is prepared to
implement and should be directed to
implement an up-front polygraph as the
standard processing activity for all
applicants.
5. The Office of Medical Services conducts two types of
medical testing on applicants--physical and psychiatric. OMS
will not eliminate an applicant as physically unfit for duty
on the basis of information contained in their Medical History
statement (Form 93). Consequently, each applicant receives a
full physical examination. These tests do not contribute to a
significant time delay (2 or 3 days), but they do have to be
scheduled. Scheduling, you will recall, too often creates
unacceptable delays. There is, of course, a significant cost
associated with the clinical screening. Full physical
examinations result in the disqualification of fewer than 2%
of all applicants examined. The cost effectiveness of a full
clinical exam for only a 2% loss is questionable.
OPPPM and OMS should jointly explore the
utility and cost effectiveness of full
physical examinations for all the
applicants. We suggest they jointly work
to accomplish a goal of developing job
standards, particularly for sedentary
jobs, which would result in a significant
reduction in the number of full clinical
examinations needed.
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essential for those with sedentary jobs,
we recommend that the exam be performed
sometime after the EDO date, thus
removing it from the applicant processing
.system.
6. The Office of Medical Services also performs
psychiatric screening which consists primarily of a form
completion, the Personal Index (PI), which is evaluated by a
psychometrist to determine if a psychiatric interview is
necessary. We recommend no changes to this procedure.
OMS is performing pre-medical field
screening as a part of the upcoming task
force initiative to recruit electronic
technicians for the Office of
Communications. The screening consists of
a review of Medical Form 93 which the
interviewee will complete along with his
Personal History Statement, and a
Personal Index (Psychiatric Screening)
completion by the interviewee. An
interview will take place after the PI is
scored and evaluated. No medical
disqualification will take place, but the
medical technician will make an
off-the-record recommendation to the
interviewer whether to continue
processing the individual.
If this procedure is successful, we
recommend that OMS implement it for the
standard applicant processing activity.
7. OMS estimates that currently 55% to 70% of all
professional applicants take the Professional Aptitude Test
Battery (PATB). There is no standard Agency policy
determining use of the PATB. Choice of testing is left to the
individual line manager sponsoring an applicant for
employment. The PATB is given to all CT applicants. The PATB
does account for some delay in the applicant process. Time
required to score the PATB varies from several days to three
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weeks. Since the background investigation by OS is run
concurrently with medical processing, the delay usually does
not impact overall processing, except in cases where results
from the PATB cause a cancellation of the applicant's
processing.
The Office of Medical Services should
offer its PATB services to components on
an exception only basis. The PATB could
still be used as a suitability measure
for unusual Agency professions, but
certainly not for standard occupations,
for example, accountants, computer
programmers, etc. PATB testing of recent
college graduates should be severely
curtailed. Since college hires average
about 50% of the annual EOD number, this
could greatly reduce PATB use.
We found that each professional applicant travels from his
or her home to Washington and back twice during processing.
Clerical applicants make one round trip each. Cost is about $420
per trip. Total invitee travel, which is budgeted by OPPPM, was
in FY-81. FY-83 projections for Agency-wide invitee travel
tots The number of Invitee travel trips has increased
452 percent in t e past four years. This particular statistic is
fascinating. It means that we are interviewing more applicants
while our number of EOD's has remained relatively constant over that
same period. We are not able to account for invitee travel by
occupation. Statistics on the use of invitee travel funds by
components would be interesting. Unfortunately, this data is not
available. Theoretically, with the new recruitment system, invitee
travel should decrease as up-front screening eliminates undesirable
applicants prior to the interview, yet OPPPM projects a significant
increase for FY-83.
Invitee travel is a free service
provided to components by OPPPM, and
 Approved For Release 2006/11/17: CIA-RDP84B0089OR000600090019-5
components are availing themselves of
this service in ever-increasing numbers.
Use of invitee travel should be much more
carefully monitored by OPPPM. Better
accounting for its use should be
provided. Once accounting information is
available, OPPPM should parcel out
invitee travel funds based on projected
needs, attrition rates, or a similar
figure. Invitee travel funds should not
be divided by current component use. For
example, there is currently a 12-to-1
ratio of applicants to EOD's for the CT
program. We could not confirm that they
used a significant amount of invitee
travel, though we suspect so. If a
disproportionate number of interviews
occurs for the CT program or any other
occupational code, we may need to explore
better methods of up-front screening for
that group. Right now, our problem is
that we don't have the information
available to make a judgment, and our
invitee travel costs are skyrocketing.
D. Relocation Expenses
A statistic which we requested and were unable to obtain
was the number of new employee relocations in any given year which
were paid by the Agency. The overall Agency policy is to conform to
the Federal Personnel Manual, chapter 571, which lists occupational
categories for which relocation expenses may be paid. Relocation
expenses are not budgeted by OPPPM but rather by individual
components. An applicant who is interviewed for several different
jobs by several components will in all likelihood be told that his
or her relocation expenses will be paid by one component, but not by
another. This kind of confusion does nothing to enhance the
Agency's image as an employer. It may also partially account for the
low success rate for field recruitment versus recruitment in the
Washington area. Most major industrial employers pay relocation
expenses for their new hires. A number we are unable to capture is
the loss of potential employees who cannot afford to pay for their
own moving expenses.
 Approved For Release 2006/11/17: CIA-RDP84B00890R000600090019-5
The Agency's policy on payment of
relocation expenses is inconsistent and
counterproductive. We recommend that
this entire area be the subject of a
separate study. Our initial
recommendation, pending the outcome of
the study, is that the Agency should pay
all relocation expenses for successful
out-of-town applicants. If not, we
should recruit solely within the
Washington area. Perhaps college hires
could move to this area at their own
expense, but for a person who is changing
jobs, we believe the current policy
presents an unreasonable financial burden
and-negates the effectiveness of
recruiting away from Washington.
If the Agency cannot legally pursue its
own relocation payment policy, then, at
the very least, we recommend that the
Agency requests further exemptions from
OPM based on more of our critical
occupations.
We did not attempt to predict the efficiencies that will
result from implementation of our recommendations. We have
approached the recruiting and applicant processing problem from a
different direction than did OPPPM. We believe that suggestions
resulting from each study approach will improve the efficiency and
cost effectiveness of these processes.
Approved For Release 2006/11/17: CIA-RDP84B00890R000600090019-5
 Approved For Release 2006/11/17: CIA-RDP84B00890R000600090019-5
VII. References (chronological order)
Memo for Chairman, Security Committee from CIA member,
Investigative Standards Working Group, subject:
Investigative Standards Survey Report, 27 May 1977
The Agency's Recruitment System, Inspection Report, Office of the
Inspector General, January 1980
Proposed Recruitment System, OPPPM and
February 1980
publication,
Personnel Security Survey, DCI Investigative Standards Working
Group, May 1980
I
Field Office Automation Study, ODP publication,
13 August 1980
Memo for Director of Security from Deputy Director of Security
(PSI), subject: Security Approval Model, 28 October 1980
Memo for DD/A from Chief, Psychological Services Staff, OMS,
Subject: Survey of Users of the PSS Professional Test Battery
in CIA, 30 October 1980
Memo for DD/A from Chief, Psychological Services Staff, OMS,
Subject: Job Analysis and Test Validation Research Capability
in PSS, 31 October 1980
Security Approval Model, November 1980
Memo for DD/A from C/PSS/OMS, Subject: Supplementary Data on
Users of the PSS Professional Test Battery in CIA,
30 December 1980
Memo for DDCI from D/PPPM, Subject: Recruitment Process,
31 December 1980
Security Communications Improvement Program, Project SCIP,
9 February 1981
Memo for D/PPPM from Directorate Representatives to OPPPM/R&P,
Subject: Recommendations Regarding Recruitment and Placement
Policies, 28 January 1981
Preliminary Draft, Improved Personnel Recruiting for CIA,
Implementation of a Dynamic Simulation Analysis,
10 March 1981 F7
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 Approved FMRe 06/11/17: CIA-RDP84B0089OR000600090019-5
i:LlII!ti' j ` PPE ST
PHS
PREPARATION
PPS REVIEE'1
SKILLS BANK
OFFICE
P.LVIEW
INTERVIEW
INIITATION
INTERVIEWS
DECISION TO
PROCESS
SECURITY
`? ICAL
325 Days
_
PROPOSED
APPLICANT
A~ AAI TABLE
48 Days
IS days)
PROFESSIOW LCELVICAL
116 Days P.ECRJITING .SfJ ' LMRY
Approved For Release 2006/11/17: CIA-RDP84B00890R000600090019-5
 Appr4vWTir Release 200
PHS
PREPARATION
PROPOSED
PHS REVIEW
CSB REVIEW
SECURITY-
NAME CHECK
SECURITY
BACKGROUND-
REPORT FOR
POLY-MEDICAL
ii i i i : C f 4 908000600090019-5
10
45
42 Days
Mnimurrt -- 10 days).
CLERICAL
RECRUITING
REPORT
FOR
DJ-IV
167 Days
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