RESPONSE TO PFIAB ON IMPLEMENTATION OF EARLIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84M00127R000200080009-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 23, 2007
Sequence Number:
9
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 25, 1982
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
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Body:
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25 May 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Response to PFIAB on Implementation of Earlier
Recommendations
1. I have prepared a short note for you to send to Leo Cherne
informing him that the IC Staff is collecting information on the status
of recommendations by the former PFIAB (Attachment 1). The preparation
of brief, but thorough, substantive responses should take about a week.
In the meantime, let me run down for you those activities of which I am
aware that respond to each recommendation. In its report, "Intelligence
for the Future," dated 2 December 1976, the PFIAB made nine recommenda-
tions (Attachment 2). One month later, then DCI Bush provided a rundown
of Intelligence Community activities on each of the points (Attachment 3).
Both papers are attached for your information.
o The first recommendation suggested that the NSC sponsor
development of three to four models of the world 20 years in the
future and asked the DCI to make a Community-wide estimation of the
intelligence system's performance under each of the projected
futures. As far as I know, the NSC has never undertaken projections
of the future in a formal, structured way. The 1985 Capabilities
Study comes as close to an overall estimate of the intelligence
system's performance in the future as has been done. Plans are
currentl nderwa to update that Study and to project it into the
1990's. Director of the Office of Planning, will 25X1
provide a more detailed response.
o The second recommendation asked the NSC to direct a
review of intelligence support to crisis management. It correctly
predicted that crises stemming from nuclear weapons proliferation
and acts of terrorism would involve the President more frequently
in the decade ahead. Little progress was made during the Carter
Administration, partly because of Dr. Brzezinski's control of the
Situation Room. I have asked Bob Gates to address the portion of
this related to support of the President during crises and 25X1
1 e Community's
l
igenc 25X1
to describe the NIEPS. Reference to the Inte
performance during the Iranian hostage situation might also be
appropriate here.
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o The third recommendation dealt with concealment and
deception by the Soviets. There was a working group dedicated to
this subject for some time and even some publications. I have
asked Evan Hineman, Chairman of the Intelligence Producers Council,
to review the contribution of the working group and provide the
current status of Community efforts in the area.
o Recommendation 4 called for "net assessments." As you
know, the "netness" of the strateic forces NIE was an issue with
DoD until 1981. is in, the best position to discuss 25X1
where we are in this area now.
o The fifth recommendation dealt with Soviet technological
innovations, especially in their military and economic applications.
Inasmuch as the Directorate of Intelligence is the home for the
DCI's Committees on Economic Intelligence, Scientific & Technical
Intelligence, Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence, and Joint
Atomic Energy Intelligence, Bob Gates should be able to address how
the Community is targeting Soviet research and development efforts
in these fields.
o The sixth recommendation suggested that the Community
continue assessments of foreign perceptions of the United States.
The Intelligence Producers Council can discuss Community efforts,
as well as work that has been done by the International Communications
Agency and other non-intelligence organizations.
o The seventh recommendation stressed the need to achieve
major improvements in hum An source collection and analytic processes,
a view I know you share. Chairman of the Human 25X1
Resources Committee, can outline how improvements in the human
resources collection system have affected the management of data
and our understandings of foreign relationships. The Intelligence
Producers Council will be asked to contribute information on the
status of production improvements and the DDO, a general statement
on the recruitment of agents.
o The issuance of National Security Study Directive 2
(NSSD 2) this year is evidence that the need for a U.S. counterintelligence
policy and a coordinated statement of counterintelligence objectives, 25X1
called for in recommendation 8, is still an important issue.
Chief of the Community Counterintelligence Staff, an 25X1
Study Director of the NSSD 2 effort, will outline the
s a u of the study.
o Recommendation 9, relating to the security discipline of
Community personnel, is in some ways the hardest to address.
There, of course, has not been the blue ribbon commission suggested
by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth, but there have been
efforts to improve the security consciousness of those inside and
outside the Community. Chairman of the DCI's Security 25X1
Committee, will discuss these activities.
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2. In addition to their formal recommendations, the PFIAB in its
2 December 1976 report also made a number of observations. Most of
these are not susceptible to analysis in the direct way that the recom-
mendations are. The observations contain, however, a list of six
"important innovations" that the PFIAB thinks worth pursuing. I have
asked members of the IC Staff to update the status of work on these
activities reported in the DCI's letter of 10 January 1977.
3. Should you have any views you would like us to incorporate or
if Leo Cherne has provided any additional information to you directly
that might affect this exercise, I would be grateful if you would let me
know. I expect to have the responses from those whom I have asked for
help by Wednesday, 2 June. I should have a report for you to forward to
Leo Cherne by Friday, 4 June.
Attachments:
1. Ltr for DCI Signature
2. PFIAB Report dtd 2 December 1976
3. DCI Bush's Letter dtd 10 January 1977
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DISTRIBUTION:
Copy No. 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - ER
4 - D/ICS
5 - SA-D/ICS
6 - ICS Registry
DCI/ICi
125 May 1982
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
2 7 1,t932
Mr. Leo Cherne
Vice Chairman
President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Leo:
The President's question to the PFIAB on the status of activities
that respond to the former Board's recommendations has given us a reason
to compare what seemed important some five years ago with what we believe
to be significant now. It is interesting how many of the same issues
are still at the top of the list.
I appreciate your invitation to contribute to the effort, it allows
us to ensure that the Community gets credit for all the initiatives that
address these subjects. A cursory examination shows that a number of
significant efforts have been undertaken either as a result of PFIAB's
suggestions or because the Community recognized independently the importance
of the subjects. My staff is drawing together the status of these
Community activities. I expect to have something for you early in the
week of 7 June.
Sincerely,
7s; p'!
William J. Casey
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25X1
INTELLIGENCE FOR THE FUTURE
A Distillation of Views
by the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
2 December 1976
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
General.
The report does not present a prioritized inventory of intelligence
requirements for the future. It is, rather, an overview of the
problems, potentials and prospects which lie ahead for the intelligence
community and derivatively, for those whom Intelligence` serves.
Conceptions of the future being fallible, judgments in the report
must be subjected to extensive, critical evaluation. We view this
process, wherein certain perceptions will be discarded and others
modified, as a proper utilization of a report of this nature. Further,
we hope that similar endeavors will be repeated at regular intervals
to keep pace with the dynamics of change.
SECT
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