WORLDWIDE OVERVIEW: ITEMS "CHECKED" FOR FURTHER ELABORATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84M00390R000300050038-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2007
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: February 24, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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24 February 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Arnold liorelick, NIO/USSR
SUBJECT : Worldwide Overview: Items "Checked" for
further elaboration
In case we don't get a chance to discuss the three points you checked
on your worldwide briefing talking points, the following comments are
provided for your background:
A. More Assertive Soviet Foreign Policy
1. Point is not that Soviet for. pol. was passive before mid-70s
c~L
and then suddenly became assertive. Rather a broadly assertive pcyli
entered a new more insistent and somewhat more venturesome phase around
1975 when af-ced with mix of challenge and opportunity ~n Angola.?=
Angola drew Soviets into African military intervention with use of
Cuban military manpower, Soviet hardware and logistics.
Ethiia saw Soviets, acting more decisively and massively and more
heavily involved themselves (advisers, generals).
?
Iran).
Finally, Afghanistan--direct large-scale use of their own forces
for first time outside Bloc (except immediate post-war involvement in
which dynamism finds receptive environment.
2. Background, pr-dating d-70s=vras=g ba i-Zation of Soviet
foreign policy interests and involvements. Khruschev began transition,
moving regional to global actor, but lacking efficient military capa-
bilities an networ of clients to follow through. Under Brezhev regime
especially since mid-70s, assertive, global Soviet foreign policy has
come of age. Involves more than 3rd world but that most fluid area in
B. Soviet Afghan Options
1. There may be strong Committee interest in pursuing with
you the issue of Afghan "neutralization" and other forms of possible
political solutions. While responses to direct queries should of'
course be left to Secretary Vance. voir ion of Soviet options
in briefing may invite followup.
2. As background, if that, happens, what follows are some
paragraphs I dictated Friday for use in preparing your briefing book
for the SCC. (I believe you saw only a talking points version of
these thoughts.)
I
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a. At the present time the Soviets are doing so poorly in
Afghanistan that they could not afford to accept a face-saving
$$political solution" that involved Soviet military disengagement and
substantial, much less total, withdrawal at the present time would
almost certainly lead to collapse of whatever Soviet installed
regime was in power and the Soviets are surely aware that no fig leaf
"compromise" solution could obscure the universal perception of a
massive and humiliating Soviet defeat.
b. Nevertheless, the Soviets will continue to indicate,, as they
have from the very beginning, that they are prepared to withdraw their
forces when the "causes" that lead them to intervene have been removed.
This is tantamount to the Soviets saying that they will withdraw when
Soviet forces are no longer needed to preserve a regime in Afghanistan
acceptable to them. However, the Soviets will reject any "compromise"
neutralization proposals that imply condemnation of past Soviet
behavior.
?
c. While the Soviets are not in a position in any case to respond
now to any formula that required their immediate disengagement and
withdrawal, they will undoubtedly welcome signs that the US, the allies,
and those neutrals which currently condemn the Soviet Union, have begun
to engage in a process of negotiating among themselves deals which might
be offered to the Soviets to encourage their military withdrawal from
Afghanistan. The Soviets will expect such a process in the West at this
--stage to be divisive and likely to slow down the momentum of the Western
punitive response-to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets at
the present time are likely to interpret such intra-Western negotiations
as debate over the terms under which the West would be prepared to relent
in exerting punitive measures against the Soviet Union.
d. Serious dialogue.with teh Soviets on a "political sollution" in
Afghanistan is not likely to be feasible until such time as the Soviets
are persuaded that they could politically survive a compromise solution
that would entail their military disengagement from Afghanistan. In
short, they will have to be doing well enough to be able to afford to
consider withdrawal, but not so well as-to be co military
solution at acceptable political cost is at hand
C. Soviet Succession
1. Brezhnev's most likely successors are almost certain to be
transitional leaders.
- Stalin ruled 1/4 century
- Khrushchev was-71 ver a decade
- Brezhnev has been top man for~15' years
Kirilenko, still most ble General Secretary successor, is 73;
even Chernenko is 68.
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2. In time, because the entire senior echelon of leadership is
so old, there will be a generational turnover which could have more far-reaching
consequences than a gradual^ attrition of o d leaders and the co-optation of
other oldsters, to fill in e.g., recent full Politburo elevation of Tikhonov,
age 74)
3. Question for the next few years: Will there be a retail
a w~.ol.es_ale leadership turnover? Cannot predict, because in t
ins amt depends on thr turn of an actuarial roulette wheel.
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