LETTER TO HONORABLE ROBERT C. MCFARLANE FROM JAMES M. BEGGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84M00395R000600060005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 8, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2007/04/20: CIA-RDP84M00395R000600060005-5
Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
-Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White Rouse
Washington, DC 20500
For the record, the NASA position taken at the Senior
Interagency Group (Space) meeting of December 3 is as follows:
NASA strongly urges starting production of the fifth Orbiter
in FY84 to provide, at the earliest opportunity, a reserve
Orbiter to assure continued space transportation services for
all users in the event of extended downtime or loss within the
fleet (Option III).
The fifth Orbiter maintains the Space Shuttle production
base over the next several years. This permits support of
Orbiter structural maintenance and repairs, and it allows time
to gain experience and understand the Spare Shuttle inherent
operational capabilities and the market demand for its etrvice.
Starting the fifth Orbiter, I believe, is consistent wibt the
President's National Spp:e Policy committing the U.S. to World
leadership in space transportation with the Space Shuttle as
the Nation's primary space launch system.
Anything less than full production go-ahead of a fifth
Orbiter increases its cost, delays the on-line availability of
reserve capacity, and fails to reassure our commercial and
foreign customers of the Government's intention to provide
them with responsive and dependable aeceec to space. The STS
is now at the threshold of operations. A decision now to
truncate the Nation=s Orbiter production .eapability'-:t 6paee
64 transportation capacity at four :Qrt.iters, before. erotica
in capacity and demand are further' understood, prematurely
forecloses the Nation's future opportunities and initiatives
in space.
Sincerely,
) r:l : ifi for NASA Equities
er NASA Itr. - EF:?&L - E:N -
James M. Beggs
Administrator
M0G/CRGunn/djc/53247:12-8-82
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 Approved For Release 2007/04/20: CIA-RDP84M00395R000600060005-5
STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION ON FIFTH SPACE SHUTTLE ORBITER
The projections of system capability and demand do
not support the need for a -fifth --Shuttle Orbiter at this
time. There needs to be a period of confidence building
in the space program prior to commiting sizeable funding
to additional orbiter production. The argument for con-
tinued production of a fifth orbiter as an "insurance"
for a four orbiter fleet is not adequately substantiated.
Moreover, no persuasive evidence has been provided to
suggest that there is substantial risk of national
security missions displacing civilian and foreign
missions if launch schedule problems arise.
T - William Schneider, Jr.
 Approved For Release 2007/04/20: CIA-RDP84M00395R000600060005-5
DEPARTMENT OF COWRCE
POSITION ON FIFTH ORBITER
he production and delivery of the fifth Orbiter is believed
to be in the best interest of the Nation and production should
start in FY 1984.
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ATTACHMENT I
8 December 1982
0850 Hours
DCI Position on Fifth Orbiter Issue
The DCI position is that our programs alone do not require a fifth
orbiter. From a national perspective, however, we are concerned about our
current lack of understanding of the long-term operability of the STS and the
potential impact of attrition. Because of this, the need exists to ensure
.that the U.S. can adequately maintain an operational four orbiter fleet. This
requires some reserve capacity to cope with unforseen contingencies and a
capability to repair an orbiter after a major incident. Given these needs, we
do not believe it is wise to allow the STS orbiter production base to be shut
down completely. Alternative 2, by maintaining limited orbiter production
capability, will preserve the nation's flexibility to respond to future needs
at a modest additional cost compared to Alternative 1. Alternative 2 is our
recommended choice.
CONFIDENTIAL
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ATTACHMENT 2
CLARIFICATION OF FIFTH ORBITER OPTION II--
MAINTAIN ORBITER PRODUCTION CAPABILITY
This option maintains the capacity of
assemblies selected
addi-
structural
parts and major
tional 1 to 2 years (depending on the element) beyond the normal
close-down of the fourth Orbiter. The selected structural parts
are those most likely to be damaged in handling incidents or
landing accidents (rudder, elevons, speed brake, landing gear,
landing gear doors). These parts will be totally finished and
ready for installation on the Orbiter when needed. The major
structural assemblies are the wings, aft thrust structure engine
compartment, crew module including the nose and cockpit, the mid
and aft fuselage sections, payload doors, vertical tail and the
Orbit Maneuvering System pods. The wings, engine compartment and
mid-fuselage will" be delivered in FY86, the other parts and
assemblies will-be delivered in FY84 and FY85. All the major
structural assemblies will be.completed only up to the point
where they are ready for installation of thermal protection
system, plumbing, wire harneses, and major electrical, propulsion
and hydraulic components. The cost for Option II (in millions
of FY84 dollars) is:
FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 TOTAL
$90-110 $100-120 $90-115 $60-90 $350-435
The lead time to deliver an Orbiter will be reduced about 1 to 2
years from the 5 years in Option III (exclusive of engines, which
would be started under spares).
For comparison, the cost of Option I to close-down the Orbiter
production is:
FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 TOTAL
$65 $85 $40 $40
$230
Close-down includes supplemental spares, documentation, storage
of tooling and attendant sustaining engineering. Long-lead major
structural assemblies are not included in supplemental spares.
For comparison, the cost of Option III to continue full Orbiter
production with delivery of the fifth Orbiter in late 1988 is:
FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 TOTAL
$200 $325 $350 $350 $320 $50 $1,595
 Approved For Release 2007/04/20: CIA-RDP84M00395R000600060005-5
Attachment 3
9 December 1982
DCI Position on Fifth Orbiter Issue
The DCI position is that our programs alone do not require a fifth
orbiter. From a national perspective, however, we are concerned about our
current lack of understanding of the long-term operability of the STS and the
potential impact of attrition. Because of this, the need exists to ensure
that the U.S. can adequately maintain an operational four orbiter fleet. This
requires some reserve capacity to cope with unforseen contingencies and a
capability to repair an orbiter after a major incident. Given these needs, we
do not believe it is wise to allow the STS orbiter production base to be shut
down completely. Alternative II, by maintaining limited orbiter production
capability, will preserve the nation's flexibility to respond to future needs
at a modest additional cost compared to Alternative I. Alternative II is our
recommended choice.
The DCI also notes that CIA has recently estimated that the Soviets are
undertaking a variety of new space programs that will result in a period of
rapid expansion.* Soviet space hardware costs are expected to reach the
equivalent of $12 Billion a year by 1986--double the current outlays. The
increased costs reflect
- Achievement of a permanent Soviet presence in space
- Advances in the technology available for intelligence collection,
photoreconnaissance, and military support satellites
- Expansion of navigation, data relay, communications, and weather
satellite networks
- Development of a reusable spacecraft, a reusable space transportation
system similar to the U.S. shuttle, two new space launch vehicles, and
increasing production of the largerst of the current Soviet space launchers